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ABSTRACT

The economic state of black America has never been healthier, yet persistent racial gaps leave African American unemployment at levels more typical of recession for whites in the United States. By challenging the predominant use of race, this compilation refocuses attention on the effects of discrimination and on the lost term "institutional racism." In so doing, it helps maintain the defense of affirmative action. These essays reinforce the position that race is not a biological category but a social category, one that becomes a marker for creating or denying access to wealth. The essays are: (1) "The Cancer Gap: Research Needs of African Americans" (Brian D. Smedley); (2) "Family Environment and Intergenerational Well-Being: Some Preliminary Results" (Patrick L. Mason); (3) "The State of Black Europe" (Clarence Lusane); (4) "Color-Blind Redistricting and the Efficacy of Black Representation" (Ronald Walters); (5) "Unfinished Business: African-American Political Economy during the Age of 'Color-Blind' Politics" (Rhonda M. Williams); (6) "History, Discrimination, and Racial Inequality" (William Darity, Jr.); (7) "A Critical Assessment of Skills Explanations of Black-White Employment and Wage Gaps" (William M. Rodgers, III); (8) "The Reliance of African Americans on the Public Sector" (Lynn C. Burbridge); and (9) "Education Accountability: First the School Systems--Then the Students" (Hugh B. Price). Five appendixes contain a history of the National Urban League, a statistical overview of the progress of African Americans, an index of authors and articles, profiles of the authors, and selected tables from "The Shape of the River: Long-term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions" by William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, 1998. (Contains 67 tables and 1 figure.) (SLD)

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

THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1999

The Impact of Color-consciousness in the United States

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Employment and Wage Gaps   Black Americans and Cancer   Color-blind Politics

Education Accountability   The Persistent Effects of the Past

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THE STATE OF

BLACK AMERICA

1999

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THE STATE OF
BLACK AMERICA
1999

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FOREWORD

Volume Overview

BY HUGH B. PRICE

The economic state of Black America has never been healthier. Unemployment is at a record low, the share of adults with jobs is at a record high, every segment of income distribution—from the bottom fifth to the top—is at a record high. Clearly at such levels, it is difficult to maintain claims about the lack of skills among African Americans in a modern economy. After all, the unemployment rate for African-American men in this highly competitive, well-functioning economy—the envy of the world—is lower than the unemployment rate for males in most European countries. So it follows that national economic policies may have much more to say to us than we have focused on.

Yet, despite a 1990s growth pattern that has benefited African Americans far more than the growth path of a decade ago, persistent racial gaps leave African-American unemployment at levels more typical of recessions for white America. The African-American unemployment rate has slid just below a level that is double the national average, where it persistently hovers.

Continued growth may push it lower. But why did the effect of economic policy on African Americans drift into the background of discussion? Why did the national debate move away from the effects of racism to a discussion on race? *The State of Black America 1999* looks at a philosophy of approaching racial differences. It lifts a veil on social science research that clouds our view of race and policies addressing racial disparities in income, wealth and life chances. By challenging the predominant use of race, this compilation refocuses us on the effects of discrimination, as well as on a lost term: "institutional racism." And by so doing, it helps to maintain the defense of affirmative action.

Surprisingly, most social science research on racial disparities begins with no definition of race. To many, that may be surprising; to others it may be self-evident. But how race is defined determines how we understand racial disparities.

Imagine reading an article that examines "success." Immediately, you would want to know how the author defines success, since it probably would affect the author's conclusion. We think we know what we mean by race, but do we really? When a researcher concludes, like the authors of *The Bell Curve*, that racial differences are genetic differences, that is one definition of race—a naturally occurring, gene-based grouping.

Yet, writing on the same subject, using the same data sets, a different set of authors concluded that racial differences were really differences in unobserved child-rearing practices—a social construct of race based on ethnic affinities, a cultural definition of race. Where did those definitions come from? How did those authors assert those meanings of race?

Understanding racial differences plunges us deep into the methodologies of social science. Unlike physical scientists who can do controlled experiments—for instance, giving water to one field of corn, water and fertilizer to another field of corn and nothing to another field of corn—social scientists must rely on existing differences, and how those differences, or variations, relate. People with higher-than-average education, for instance, tend to earn higher-than-average incomes.

But because social science deals with real-world issues, there are many different variations. Not all education is the same. People get educated in very different settings, and some study harder than others. Some variations are observed, like the number of years of schooling, and the data is collected for the social scientist to see. Other variations, such as the effort expended in getting an education, are not collected. So the meaning of race becomes very important in understanding how to interpret differences in those things that are observed and most things that are not observed.

The State of Black America 1999 highlights how, among those things we observe like family background, income and school resources, there are more similarities across races than differences within races. It's the approach anthropologists have taken in looking at race and genetics, and they have found that genetic differences *across* races are far fewer than genetic differences *within* race groupings. The conclusion: Race is not a biological category, but a social category.

Brian Smedley highlights how race influences policy in an arena not usually subjected to such scrutiny: cancer research. Cancer is a leading cause of death. Except for a few cancers, they are not related to genetics. African Americans die at a higher rate than whites from cancer. Because there is no genetic basis for racial categories, and very little genetic basis for cancer, it's a startling statistic. Smedley's piece emphasizes how the almost glib way race-based differences in cancer rates are reported has led to a national lack of emphasis in researching race-based differences in cancer death rates. The way racial differences in cancer rates are reported suggests a biological base to the differences, which to some does not warrant extra study. That is disturbing, because other studies have pointed to race-based differences in the aggressiveness with which some diseases are treated. It's just one dramatic confirmation that defining what we mean by race can be extremely important.

Most social science research assumes race is "exogenous," that is, determined by nature—an immutable variable. That allows racial disparities to be associated with other differences that might be racial in origin, like culture or family structure. The policy implications of such an approach are clear. Why do racial disparities persist when obvious barriers to racial inclusion, like legal segregation, have faded, and observable racial differences, like years of schooling, have gotten smaller? In its less benign form, the answer is because the genetic or social structure of African Americans is inferior.

The assumption is that African Americans are more like other African Americans, despite differences in income, education, family structure and residence, than they are like whites of similar incomes, education, family structure and residence. That is, an African-American married couple with a college education and family, living in the suburbs, is more similar to an African-American, single-parent family without a high school education, living in the central city, than they are like their white counterparts. A racial income gap that remains for African Americans and whites with equal observed differences is explained assuming that some common, but unobserved, African-American trait is the culprit. Stripped of observed differences, such an approach must rely on unobserved negative traits—which a non-social scientist might easily be forgiven for interpreting as "stereotype." It also explains why some social scientists can make explaining racial disparity appear so simple.

Works in *The State of Black America 1999* challenge us to look at race as "endogenous," that is, something that is defined within a political-economic system and not at all natural or immutable. From that perspective, it understands the use of "race" as a marker to create, or deny, access to wealth.

As Clarence Lusane helps to highlight in "The State of Black Europe," race means different things in different countries. Lusane's piece also challenges the notion of a cultural origin for racial disparity. Though the discrimination faced by Africans in Europe is different than that confronting African Americans in the United States, so are some of the historical and cultural aspects of African-European interactions different. And as suggested by

William Darity Jr. in "History, Discrimination and Racial Inequality," race has meant different things in the United States at different times.

Rhonda Williams' essay, "Unfinished Business: African-American Political Economy During the Age of 'Color-Blind' Politics," gives us an understanding that race, as defined in the United States, was a vehicle for granting privilege. Whiteness and blackness determined who had rights and privileges that were protected and who did not. As we change our laws, and courts change their interpretation of laws, those privileges change. At first, the most obvious privilege was who was free and who was a slave; who had rights the Constitution must honor and who did not. That slowly shifted from an absolute lack of African-American rights and privileges, to recognizing that African Americans could make claims on public access ... but not private intercourse. African Americans could be segregated, but given public access—separate but equal. The "strict scrutiny" doctrine that guides the Supreme Court today allows African Americans to make some claim for private intercourse—being seated at lunch counters—but not against the effects of privilege. The result, Williams explains, is that "color-blind" does not mean the same thing as non-discriminatory.

Racial privilege has real economic meaning. After all, economics is the study of who gets what and how much. Privilege is access to goods. William Darity's essay clearly demonstrates that the wealth effect of racial privilege is enduring. The definition of race, embodied in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, is an accurate predictor of racial income differences today. He shows that racial gaps in income at the time of *Plessy* are an accurate predictor of racial gaps in income today. Race is not something defined outside the economic system; it is defined *by* the economic system, to grant or deny access to wealth accumulation.

Today, as a result of struggle, the rights and privileges of African Americans have changed. And as William Rodgers emphasizes in "A Critical Assessment of Skills Explanations of Black-White Employment and Wage Gaps," the result has been a huge shrinking of the racial gap in education and skill attainment—African Americans exercising their rights to claims for public access. But as Williams' essay shows, "color-blind" law leaves market-based and other forms of de facto discrimination intact.

In its benign form, a different answer for racial disparities could be that persistent effects of discrimination leave African Americans less skilled than whites—that despite the end of legal segregation 40 years ago by *Brown v. Board of Education*, schooling differences still leave African Americans unable to compete. The market is "color-blind," and attempts to change earlier white access to education have failed.

On that basis, people reject affirmative action as patently unfair. The conclusion is that—even though it's not their fault—African Americans are not as skilled as whites, and more-skilled whites are being unfairly asked to move aside for them. The policy proscription is that African-American skills are what need tending, not supposedly race-neutral markets.

That assessment assumes a society where white resistance to change has withstood 40 years of onslaught when it comes to privileged access to education, but has withered against less-assailed areas of racial privilege like market behavior. It also is a very pessimistic view of our ability to change racial privilege within a democratic tradition. For if the Civil Rights movement did not succeed in a meaningful transformation of racial privilege, at least along the lines of public access, then what hope would there be for further attempts against the same privilege?

Rodgers shows that comparing racial wage gaps at different times lets us categorize the gaps into those caused by observed skills, like educational attainment, and unobserved skills, like customer relations and school quality. The shifts in educational attainment clearly favor a shrinking of black-white income differences given the tremendous increase in African-American educational attainment. Rodgers points to researchers who have claimed the shift must be from unmeasured skills. Looking at wage differences that are not explained by education differences, he examines the shifting skill position of African Americans compared to whites.

Using his analogy, it is possible to observe whether the rungs of the job ladder moved down for African Americans, or whether the rungs were moved farther apart. It turns out that the shifting skill position of African Americans compared to whites has more to do with discrimination in pay for African American skills than with a downward shift in relative skill levels. It's not the skill gap that tells the stories of the 1980s and 1990s. It is the discrimination gap.

Such an approach answers the policy quandary of persistent racial disparities by highlighting racism, a system that can replicate a social ordering of rewards and access. In a "racialized" system, we come to accept a certain ordering, and in implementing policies to fight racial disparity we must always be on guard that new markers are not created to *increase* racial disparities—even though the markers may appear to be race-neutral.

Ronald Walters helps to highlight how a race-neutral mechanism, like geographic proximity in drawing Congressional District lines, can create rewards for white voting patterns. In a system where racial privilege is determined politically, clearly those defined as white and those defined as black have different political interests. Most discussions on the controversy of majority African-American districts have highlighted the election of African Americans to Congress. But Walters reminds us that African Americans have separate political interests—no less relevant than the grouping of polling precincts to give farmers a voice. Using "color-blind" districts diminishes the political voice of African Americans, so "race-neutral" or "color-blind" methods can repeat racial privilege.

The use of test scores as a basis for a meritocracy is another apparently race-neutral device. Among other issues tackled by

Rodgers is a summary of work done concerning the relationship between standardized test scores and income differences. The data is the same that has generated two different views of the relationship between race and income differences. When Herrnstein and Murray looked at it, they concluded that genetic differences between African Americans and whites explained test score differences, which ultimately generated income differences. In his examination, Christopher Jencks speculates that unobserved inferior child rearing practices by African-American families explain test score differences.

But Rodgers carefully shows that test scores do not equally predict wages for African Americans and whites. Two very important differences are shown. First, the relationship between increasing test scores and wages is distinctly different for African Americans and whites. And second, African Americans are rewarded for higher scores on verbal parts of the test, and not for higher quantitative skills; whites are rewarded for higher quantitative skills, but not for verbal skills.

The best analogy would be to imagine a recording tape of two singers. One singer is recorded in a New York City subway station, the other in a cathedral. If the tapes are made on the same recorder, they will not be biased with respect to what they record. But trying to interpret the ability of the two singers based on the tapes would lead to a bias. Some skills would be highlighted in the tape made in the subway station, while other skills would be heard in the cathedral.

Rodgers' piece shows that when the "noise" is removed from the test scores, they do not really explain racial differences in wages. He reminds us that all researchers looking at this data have found the scores do not explain differences in unemployment rates. Further, the scores presumably help us measure quality differences in schooling, yet have no significant effect on our measure of how important the number of years of schooling is in predicting wages.

Reaching the Christopher Jencks supposition about inadequate child rearing by African Americans requires us to believe that apart from income, parental education, family structure and a host of other family characteristics, African Americans of different income, education and family structure have more in common than African Americans and whites of the same income, education and family structure when it comes to child rearing.

Patrick Mason looks directly at the issue of family structure, finding that differences in family structure between African Americans and whites explains very little of the difference in individual economic outcomes. The reason? For given family structures, African-American families are more likely than whites to have their children get more education and participate in the labor force. Using Jencks' definition of race, that would just serve as statistical confirmation that African-American families take to heart the notion that, in a world that discriminates, you have to run harder to keep up. His supposition about inadequate child rearing by African-Americans remains, at best, a puzzle.

The editorial and statistical discussion by Lynn Burbridge helps to show that a very disproportionate share of African-American management skills go to the public and non-profit sector—exactly the sectors where, Rhonda Williams reminds us, racial privilege has been minimized the longest.

Celebrating the successes of the Civil Rights movement in narrowing the education gap, however, does not let us rest on that accomplishment. As the economy changes and new skill demands appear, it is important that new skill gaps are not created.

The State of Black America 1999 also includes a discussion of the issues surrounding the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The last ESEA authorization helped cement the school accountability movement at the state and local level. In response to the act, state and local schools have listened more carefully for calls to hold schools accountable for ensuring that they meet certain standards.

The Urban League's Campaign for African-American Achievement has helped empower African-American communities to participate in that dialog. The focus has been to ensure that those standards equip African-American children with the skills they need, and to build on and highlight what Patrick Mason boldly demonstrates is the community's belief in education and skill attainment.

We do not want to retreat from any advances made because of ESEA reforms. Instead, we encourage the next wave: equal access to quality education. If we are going to set high standards for students, we must set higher standards for adults to accept the challenge of providing equal access to quality education for all students. A belief that all students can learn must be met by a commitment to give them what it takes to learn.

"Education Accountability: First the School Systems—Then the Students," summarizes what we know are the essential elements of a quality education. Now we need to insist on schools moving toward those practices. "Tough love" for students is not the answer, at least not until we show adults in charge of schools how tough we are going to be on them by insisting that they do the right thing.

The State of Black America 1999 also speaks to the deeper issues of race and the immediacy of education policy. By demonstrating that a discrimination gap drove the racial wage gap of the 1980s and 1990s, it reminds us to focus on the doable. We must solve the problem of getting skilled African Americans paid on the same level as skilled whites before we can address the more difficult task of unskilled African Americans. And we must do the doable in education. We must have schools that are committed to giving every child an equal chance to learn.

In showing that discrimination is not just a factor, but *the* major factor in holding back African-American income, we must not lose sight that in a racialized society, racial privilege can change. Though African Americans have achieved some success in acquiring skills, we must keep that access open. Skills are necessary, and made current levels of income and employment attainable, but they clearly are not sufficient to close the racial gaps that persist.

Though *The State of Black America 1999* documents the African-American community's commitment to education and skill attainment, we can never stop encouraging and nourishing that commitment. There is much left to be done, but we must celebrate the level of success we enjoy as a result of increased skill attainment by African Americans, and as a result of policy shifts that have made this economic recovery our best so far.

ARTICLE | 1

The Cancer Gap: Research Needs of African Americans

BY BRIAN D. SMEDLEY, PH.D.

One of the overarching objectives of *Healthy People 2010*, the federal health blueprint for the first decade of the 21st century, is to eliminate health disparities between racial and ethnic groups in the United States. It's an ambitious goal, backed by new money from the Clinton administration to close the gap between whites and other racial and ethnic groups in six health areas: infant mortality, cancer screening and management, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, HIV infection, and child and adult immunizations.

Of those, cancer represents one of the most significant threats to the nation's health. Cancer is second only to cardiovascular disease as the leading cause of death among Americans. One in four deaths in the United States is attributable to cancer and one in three Americans will eventually develop some form of it, fueling expectations that it will become the leading cause of death in the United States in the next century.

Yet, breakthroughs in cancer prevention, diagnosis and treatment combined with reductions in smoking and other risk behaviors in the general population have resulted in an overall decline in the cancer death rate between 1990 and 1995, the first such sustained decline in decades. Minority groups shared in the decline, with deaths among African Americans falling 0.8 percent, a slightly greater decrease than the 0.5 percent decline in the general population.

Disease-related disparities between African Americans and whites, however, remain large. African Americans, especially males, experience far greater incidence of the disease than any other racial or ethnic group in the United States. Rates of cancer mortality for the group are among the highest in the industrialized world. And while African-American women are less likely than white women to develop cancer, they are more likely to die from the disease.

What are the underlying reasons for higher rates of cancer and poor survival among African Americans? Given that African Americans are disproportionately represented among lower socioeconomic groups, are disparities between African Americans and whites in income and education the culprit? Are there underlying biological or genetic differences between African Americans and whites that may increase susceptibility or the likelihood of contracting the disease? Or are racial and ethnic health disparities the result of some combination of factors?

Increasingly, some in the U.S. Congress are interested in the answers to those questions, and in the ability of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to answer them. In 1997, Congress asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to review the status of cancer research at NIH and to determine whether current NIH efforts are adequately addressing prevention and research needs of minority and medically underserved groups. In response, IOM recently released a report, *The Unequal Burden of Cancer: An Assessment of NIH Research and Programs for Ethnic Minorities and the Medically Underserved*, which offers a number of recommendations for improving minority health research. Here are some of its findings. (A summary of the committee's recommendations appears at the end of this chapter)

Cancer Incidence, Mortality and Survival Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in the United States

African-American males contract cancer about 15 percent more frequently than white men, and have the highest overall incidence of cancer among all racial and ethnic groups (see Table 1). Rates of lung cancer among African-American men are two to three times higher than rates among many other U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups, and the rate of prostate cancer among African Americans is an astounding eight times greater than the lowest rate among any U.S. racial or ethnic group. And while cancer rates among African-American women are slightly lower overall than among white women, their rates of colon, rectal, lung and bronchial cancers are among the highest of any U.S. racial and ethnic group (see Table 2).

Similarly, the overall cancer mortality rate among African-American males is 50 percent greater than for white males (see Table 3). For African-American men, mortality rates from prostate cancer are two to five times higher than other groups, and mortality from lung cancer is 30 percent higher than whites. And despite a lower incidence of cancer, overall mortality among African-American women is 17 percent higher than among white women (see Table 4). In particular, African-American women experience the highest cancer mortality rates of any U.S. group in breast and cervical cancers.

Perhaps the most significant index of the health gap between black and white America, however, is the cancer survival rate. As a result of advances in treatment and management, more Americans are survivors of cancer than at any other time. Racial and ethnic minorities, however, have poorer rates of survival from cancer than whites (see Table 5). Today, half of whites with cancer will be alive five years from diagnosis. In contrast, five-year survival rates among African Americans and Native Americans are considerably lower (38 percent and 34 percent, respectively).

TABLE NO. 1

CANCER INCIDENCE AT SELECTED SITES AMONG U.S. MEN BY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP

Age Adjusted to 1970 U.S. Standards.[a] Incidence per 100,000 Population

RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP	STOMACH	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	PROSTATE	ALL SITES
Alaska Native	27.2	79.7	81.1	46.1	372
American Indian (New Mexico)	b	18.6	14.4	52.5	196
Black	17.9	60.7	117.0	180.6	560
Chinese	15.7	44.8	52.1	46.0	282
Filipino	8.5	35.4	52.6	69.8	274
Hawaiian	20.5	42.4	89.0	57.2	340
Japanese	30.5	64.1	43.0	88.0	322
Korean	48.9	31.7	53.2	24.2	266
Vietnamese	25.8	30.5	70.9	40.0	326
Hispanic (Total)	15.3	38.3	41.8	89.0	319
White, non-Hispanic[c]	9.6	57.6	79.0	137.9	481

a. SEER program estimates are from 1988 to 1992.

b. SEER program does not calculate incidence when fewer than 25 cases are reported.

c. Includes medically underserved white, non-Hispanic males among whom the cancer incidence differs from that among the majority white, non-Hispanic population.

SOURCE: Miller et al. (1996).

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CANCER INCIDENCE AT SELECTED SITES AMONG U.S. WOMEN BY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP

TABLE NO. 2

Age Adjusted to 1970 U.S. Standards.[a] Incidence per 100,000 Population

RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP	STOMACH	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	BREAST	CERVIX UTERI	ALL SITES
Alaska Native	b	67.4	50.6	78.9	15.8	348
American Indian (New Mexico)	b	15.3	b	31.6	9.9	180
Black	7.6	45.5	44.2	95.4	13.2	326
Chinese	8.3	33.6	25.3	55.0	7.3	213
Filipino	5.3	20.9	17.5	73.1	9.6	224
Hawaiian	13.0	30.5	43.0	105.6	9.3	321
Japanese	15.3	39.5	15.2	82.3	5.8	241
Korean	19.1	21.9	16.0	28.5	15.2	180
Vietnamese	25.8	27.1	31.2	37.5	43.0	273
Hispanic (Total)	15.3	24.7	19.5	69.8	16.2	243
White, non-Hispanic[c]	9.6	39.2	43.7	115.7	7.5	354

a. SEER program estimates are from 1988 to 1992.

b. SEER program does not calculate incidence when fewer than 25 cases are reported.

c. Includes medically underserved white, non-Hispanic males among whom the cancer incidence differs from that among the majority white, non-Hispanic population.

SOURCE: Miller et al. (1996).

TABLE NO. 3

CANCER MORTALITY AT SELECTED SITES AMONG U.S. MEN BY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP

Age Adjusted to 1970 U.S. Standards.[a] Mortality per 100,000 Population

RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP	STOMACH	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	PROSTATE	ALL SITES
Alaska Native	b	27.2	69.4	b	225
American Indian (New Mexico)	b	b	b	16.2	123
Black	13.6	28.2	44.2	53.7	319
Chinese	10.5	15.7	25.3	6.6	139
Filipino	3.6	11.4	17.5	13.5	105
Hawaiian	14.4	23.7	43.0	19.9	239
Japanese	17.4	20.5	15.2	11.7	133
Korean	NA	NA	16.0	NA	NA
Vietnamese	NA	NA	31.2	NA	NA
Hispanic (Total)	8.4	12.8	19.5	15.3	129
White, non-Hispanic[c]	6.0	23.4	43.7	24.4	217

a. SEER program estimates are from 1988 to 1992.

b. SEER program does not calculate incidence when fewer than 25 cases are reported.

c. Includes medically underserved white, non-Hispanic males among whom the cancer incidence differs from that among the majority white, non-Hispanic population.

SOURCE: Miller et al. (1996).

TABLE NO. 4

CANCER MORTALITY AT SELECTED SITES AMONG U.S. WOMEN BY RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP

Age Adjusted to 1970 U.S. Standards.[a] Mortality per 100,000 Population

RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP	STOMACH	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	BREAST	CERVIX UTERI	ALL SITES
Alaska Native	b	24.0	45.3	b	b	179
American Indian (New Mexico)	b	b	b	b	b	99
Black	5.6	20.4	31.5	31.4	6.7	168
Chinese	4.8	10.5	18.5	11.2	2.6	86
Filipino	2.5	5.8	10.0	11.9	2.4	63
Hawaiian	12.8	11.4	44.1	25.0	b	168
Japanese	9.3	12.3	12.9	12.5	1.5	88
Korean	NA[c]	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Vietnamese	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Hispanic (total)	4.2	7.3	10.8	15.0	3.4	85
White, non-Hispanic	2.7	15.6	32.9	27.7	2.5	143

a. SEER program estimates are from 1988 to 1992.

b. SEER program does not calculate incidence when fewer than 25 cases are reported.

SOURCE: Miller et al. (1996).

FIVE-YEAR RELATIVE SURVIVAL RATES BY SELECTED SITES AMONG RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES[a]

TABLE NO. 5

RACIAL OR ETHNIC GROUP	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	FEMALE BREAST	CERVIX UTERI	ALL SITES
Native American	37	5	53	67	34
Black	44	11	63	63	38
Chinese	50	15	78	72	44
Filipino	41	12	72	72	46
Hawaiian	51	16	76	73	44
Japanese	58	14	85	72	51
Korean	NA[b]	NA	NA	NA	NA
Vietnamese	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Hispanic (total)	46	11	72	69	47
White, non-Hispanic	51	12	75	68	50

[a] Percentage (both sexes) surviving 5 years following cancer diagnosis; SEER program estimates are from 1978 to 1981.

[b] SEER program does not calculate incidence when fewer than 25 cases are reported.

SOURCE: Miller et al. (1996).

Risk Behaviors and Stage of Diagnosis

A first step toward understanding disparities in cancer incidence, mortality, and survival rates between minority and non-minority Americans involve an examination of data on risk behaviors and other health-related attributes. Smoking, poor nutrition (including certain high-fat, low-fiber diets), heavy alcohol consumption, and excessive weight are established risk factors that increase the likelihood of developing cancer. Some estimate that 60 percent of cancer diagnoses in the United States can be avoided by modification of such risk behaviors. In addition to specific behaviors and attributes, the availability of timely, quality health care can significantly increase one's chances of avoiding or surviving cancer. A lack of adequate health insurance or access to care, and insufficient availability of cancer screening procedures to detect cancer in its early development, are among the major causes of poor cancer and other health outcomes.

Table 6 displays the percentage of U.S. adults by race/ethnicity and gender who self-report cancer risk factors. Native-American and African-American males who report the highest levels of smoking of any gender and ethnic group, are more likely to be overweight and are more likely than their white male peers to lack a health care plan. More than one-third of Hispanic men lack a health care plan, the highest rate of uninsurance among any group. Similarly, Native-American and African-American women report the highest rates of smoking and excessive weight, while Hispanic women are least likely to have a health care plan. Significantly, however, nearly two-thirds of African-American women report having had a Pap test within the last two years, a rate greater than that for white women. Asian-American women report the lowest rates of accessing both Pap tests and mammography.

Another important risk factor for poor cancer survival is the stage at which the disease is diagnosed. In general, localized tumors or other cancerous growths are most amenable to surgery and chemotherapy treatments that enhance the likelihood of survival. Cancers that have spread beyond localized tissue or organ systems to other areas of the body pose greater challenges for treatment, and diminish the patient's prognosis for recovery. Despite evidence that African-American women utilize Pap tests and mammograms at rates slightly higher than white women, many cancers, such as breast and cervical cancers, are diagnosed at later stages of development among African-American women (see Table 7), a trend that also holds true for many cancers among African-American men. While some educational and outreach programs have been success-

TABLE NO. 6

PERCENTAGE OF U.S. ADULTS WITH SELECTED SELF-REPORTED CANCER RISK FACTORS BY SEX, RACE AND ETHNICITY

RISK FACTOR	AFRICAN AMERICAN %(SE)	ASIAN & PACIFIC ISLANDER %(SE)	NATIVE AMERICAN %(SE)	WHITE %(SE)	HISPANIC[a] %(SE)	NON-HISPANIC[b] %(SE)
MALES						
Current tobacco use[c]	33.9 (2.0)	20.4 (3.1)	53.7 (8.6)	28.0 (0.6)	24.3 (2.1)	N/A
Chronic alcohol consumption[d]	4.3 (0.4)	2.3 (0.4)	6.9 (1.4)	6.7 (0.2)	5.9 (0.6)	6.4 (0.1)
Overweight[e]	28.4 (0.8)	10.8 (1.1)	33.8 (3.0)	24.8 (0.3)	23.8 (1.2)	25.0 (0.2)
Lack of health care plan[f]	22.2 (0.8)	17.5 (1.6)	33.2 (3.0)	15.1 (0.2)	35.5 (1.4)	14.6 (0.2)
FEMALES						
Current tobacco use[c]	21.8 (1.1)	7.5 (1.8)	33.1 (5.5)	24.7 (0.6)	15.2 (1.4)	N/A
Chronic alcohol consumption[d]	0.7 (0.1)	UE	UE	1.1 (0.6)	0.8 (0.2)	1.0 (0.1)
Overweight[e]	37.7 (0.7)	10.1 (1.0)	30.3 (2.5)	21.7 (0.2)	26.5 (1.1)	23.1 (0.2)
Pap test within past 2 years	66.1 (0.7)	58.4 (1.9)	61.2 (2.9)	62.3 (0.3)	63.4 (1.0)	62.6 (0.2)
Mammogram and CBE[g]	54.9 (1.3)	48.5 (4.2)	60.7 (5.1)	57.7 (0.4)	55.0 (2.3)	57.5 (0.4)
Lack of health care plan[f]	20.8 (0.6)	15.7 (1.5)	24.8 (2.4)	12.5 (0.2)	32.6 (1.2)	12.2 (0.2)

a. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

b. Persons of any race who are not of Hispanic origin.

c. Persons who had ever smoked 100 cigarettes and who were current smokers in 1994.

d. Persons who consumed 60 or more drinks during the past month, 1991-1992.

e. Body mass index 27.8 or greater in men or 27.3 or greater in women, 1991-1992.

f. No coverage by insurance, prepaid plan such as an HMO, or government plan such as Medicare or Medicaid, 1991-1992.

g. Screening mammography and clinical breast examination within the preceding 2 years among women 50 years and older.

N/A = data not available; SE = standard error; UE = unstable estimate based on fewer than 50 observations.

SOURCE: Parker, Davis, Wingo, Ries, and Heath, Jr., 1998.

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. CANCER CASES BY RACE AND STAGE AT DIAGNOSIS, 1986-1993

TABLE NO. 7

SITE	BREAST	CERVIX (UTERUS)	COLON & RECTUM	LUNG & BRONCHUS	PROSTATE	STOMACH
AFRICAN AMERICAN						
Localized	49	40	32	13	54	19
Regional	37	40	35	26	14	29
Distant	9	12	25	49	18	39
WHITE						
Localized	60	54	38	15	59	18
Regional	31	31	37	25	18	31
Distant	6	8	19	45	10	36

NOTE: Staging according to SEER historical categories rather than the Americans Joint Committee on Cancer (AJCC) staging system. For each site and race, stage categories do not total 100% because sufficient information is not available to assign a stage to all cancer cases.
SOURCE: Parker, Davis, Wingo, Ries, and Heath, Jr., 1998

ful in encouraging cancer screening in African-American communities, more must be done to ensure that African Americans receive regular, appropriate cancer screening and follow-up care.

These data suggest that relative to whites, increased cancer risk among African Americans is more closely related to factors such as poor health behaviors and late diagnosis, rather than genetics or biology. To conclusively determine the nature of that relationship, however, it is important to understand what is known about the nature of human biological variation and race. In addition, it's important to collect appropriate data to disentangle the relationship among race, ethnicity, environmental living conditions and socioeconomic status.

Determining the Burden of Disease: Cancer Surveillance and Risk Factor Research

The development of sound cancer prevention and control strategies begins with an all-encompassing cancer surveillance effort. Differences in cancer rates among various groups can point to factors such as environmental exposures, genetic susceptibility and dietary patterns, and suggest intervention and prevention strategies. In addition, disparities in cancer survival rates can serve as a tip-off to inequities in health care service accessibility and delivery, or to cultural factors affecting individuals' attitudes about the health care system. Studies of differences in the cancer experiences of various groups also have the potential to benefit the entire U.S. population, as policies and practices associated with groups that are at lower risk are applied to those at greater risk.

Defining U.S. Population Groups

The National Cancer Institute (NCI), the leading agency within NIH responsible for cancer research, conducts national cancer surveillance to help guide its overall research efforts. NCI's data collection is shaped by Directive No. 15 of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which stipulates that the U.S. population be classified according to one of four racial categories (American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, black or African American, or white) and one of two ethnic groups (Hispanic or non-Hispanic). With the inclusion of some Asian subgroups for whom NCI collects data, those are the principle groups for which cancer incidence and mortality data are reported to the public.

Although racial classifications carry important historical, social, and political significance in the United States, the IOM Committee believes they are of limited usefulness for purposes of health research because they imply that race, per se, is the reason for differing rates in the incidence of cancer. The concept of race, however, rests upon unfounded assumptions that there are fundamental—often genetically-based—biological and behavioral differences among racial groups (American Anthropological Association, 1998; Cooper, 1984; President's Cancer Panel, 1997; Williams et al., 1994). In reality, human biodiversity cannot be adequately summarized according to the broad, presumably discrete categories assumed by race. Racial categories are based only on observable differences, such as skin color, hair texture and facial features, but those differences reflect only a tiny fraction of human genetic variability. In fact, "racial" groups as defined by OMB are not discernible on the basis of genetic information (American Anthropological Association, 1998; President's Cancer Panel, 1997). The use of racial terms in medical research, therefore, inaccurately implies that racial distinctions have a scientific basis, a viewpoint shared by a growing consensus of geneticists, anthropologists, biologists and other scientists.

The IOM Committee considers the term "ethnic group" a better descriptor for human population groups, as it places emphasis on cultural and behavioral factors, beliefs, lifestyle patterns, diet, environmental living conditions and other factors that serve as major sources of cancer risk. It's not merely a semantic shift, but rather a conceptual shift intended to enhance understanding of the causes of health differences. Ethnic groups include individuals who share a history different from that of other groups, in addition to attributes such as language, customs, ancestry and religion. Usually, a combination of those features identifies an ethnic group. In the United States, racial groups may be more accurately referred to as macro-ethnic groups. They include white Americans of European descent, African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. It is important to recognize, however, that there is considerable cultural and biologic heterogeneity within the groups. Researchers must use caution in interpreting the sources of observed differences among them.

Research does, however, document the prevalence of *racism* as a factor in determining access to and delivery of health services, and in exposure to health risks. So it remains useful to collect data on ethnic groups that are commonly referred to as "races," understanding that as long as social stratification and access to political, social and economic resources in the United States is based on racial lines, different health outcomes will be among the consequences.

Expanding Geographic Coverage of Population Groups

NCI's Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) program was established to provide selected geographical data on the incidence of cancer that may be generalized to the total U.S. population. At this time, the SEER program gives us the best approximation of a national cancer database. Because of its limited geographic scope it does not, however, fully describe the burden of cancer for many U.S. ethnic minority and medically underserved populations, according to the IOM committee. It therefore lacks the necessary database concerning disproportionate cancer incidence, mortality and survival rates among ethnic minorities and medically underserved groups that would permit NCI to disentangle the effects of culture, poverty and environmental living conditions on cancer risk. Those groups include lower-income or poverty-level whites, particularly those living in rural areas such as Appalachia; African Americans living in rural communities, particularly in the South; culturally diverse American-Indian populations; and Hispanics of national origins not currently included. The IOM committee recommended expanding the SEER program to include them.

Expanded geographic coverage also helps in understanding possible links between environmental degradation and cancer. While the IOM Committee on Cancer Research Among Minorities and the Medically Underserved did not comment extensively on environmental risks and cancer, a subsequent IOM report, *Toward*

Environmental Justice: Research, Education and Health Policy Needs, notes that greater coordination is needed among federal, state and local public health agencies to improve the quality and availability of data on environmental health. That is especially critical for ethnic minority communities, which are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation. As yet, conclusive data regarding cancers that may be linked to environmental toxins in minority and non-minority communities are lacking.

Medically Underserved Groups

In addition, the SEER program fails to consistently collect and report on data for medically underserved populations, which suffer from disproportionately high cancer incidence and mortality rates. Medically underserved populations may be defined as low-income individuals, those without medical insurance, and those who lack access to quality cancer care. The IOM committee, however, found no consistent definition of this population in the SEER program or in other NCI programs. A clear, consistent definition of the medically underserved is needed, and cancer surveillance reports should regularly include data on cancer incidence and survival rates among that population. Further, because U.S. ethnic minority groups are disproportionately represented among the medically underserved, data is needed on medically underserved and non-underserved individuals within each ethnic group, so that the relationships among ethnicity, socioeconomic status and health outcomes can be better understood.

Reporting of Cancer Survival Data

Information on survival rates among cancer patients can help in the identification of potential problems in either access to, or quality of cancer screening and treatment services. That data is particularly important for U.S. minorities, given that cancer survival rates are lower among them. Research into the causes of survival rate disparities among ethnic groups consistently demonstrates that minorities tend to be diagnosed at later stages of the disease. Late diagnoses may be linked to a lack of awareness of early warning signs; poor availability of screening, outreach or other educational efforts; cultural factors, such as fatalism and pessimism; a lack of, or inadequate health insurance; and many other factors that pose barriers to early diagnostic care.

In addition, a growing body of evidence demonstrates that ethnic minorities are less likely than whites to receive aggressive therapies and treatments for cancer. Geiger (1996) and others, for instance, document studies showing that minority patients, particularly African Americans, are less likely than whites to receive appropriate clinical treatment, even when controlling for income, education, insurance status and other factors. Shulman et al. (1998), in an experimental manipulation using vignettes of African-American and white "patients," found that physicians were less likely to prescribe an appropriate treatment for African Americans than for whites, despite the fact that the patients displayed the same symptoms of heart disease and were controlled for age, gender and other factors that may affect clinical judgement. Data on cancer survival rates among ethnic minority groups, particularly when combined with data on insurance status, can help to uncover trends and raise awareness of clinical bias.

Clinical Trials and the Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities in Research

NCI funds the vast majority of clinical cancer research in the United States, thereby bridging scientific breakthroughs in the laboratory with clinical application. In many instances, patients in clinical trials receive state-of-the-art care. Many in ethnic minority and lower-income communities, however, are reluctant to participate in clinical trials, in part due to longstanding apprehension and mistrust of the scientific establishment. That mistrust has been reinforced by historical mistreatment of minorities by the research community (for example, the failure of researchers in Tuskegee, Alabama, to provide adequate treatment for African-American research subjects infected with syphilis).

From a scientific perspective, however, it is important that minorities are included as research subjects to enhance the applicability of study samples to the broader population. Such samples should be large enough to detect differences (whether due to diet, socioeconomic differences or other factors) in response to clinical intervention.

The IOM committee found that NIH-funded cancer clinical treatment trials by and large have included ethnic minority research participants at levels equivalent to or greater than the incidence of disease among their groups in the population. That success is due to many significant outreach efforts at NCI, including funding of community-based clinical trial programs to enhance minority participation. NIH-funded cancer prevention trials, however, have not enjoyed similar success in recruiting ethnic minority research subjects. The committee recommended that the NIH work closely with other federal health funding agencies to ensure that costs associated with later follow-up care can be assumed, especially for medically indigent patients. In addition, the committee urged simplifying and improving the informed-consent process, especially to address the needs of individuals with low literacy. Collaborations between NIH and research and medical institutions serving minority and medically underserved populations should also be expanded to improve outreach efforts and increase research opportunities.

Getting the Word Out

The committee recommended a regular reporting mechanism to increase the NIH's accountability to Congress and to the public regarding cancer studies of ethnic minorities and medically underserved groups. Reports should include the number and type of research programs specifically targeting those groups, and the contributions of ethnic minority scientists and community groups to setting research priorities. At the same time, NCI should improve efforts to disseminate information about cancer to patients, clinicians and others in ethnic minority and underserved communities, and create a system to assess its effectiveness. In addition, community health centers and cancer survivors should be tapped as important resources for reaching others in the community with cancer education information.

Summary

Disparities in cancer incidence, mortality and survival rates between African Americans and whites are linked to a number of complex, yet interrelated factors. Socioeconomic differences, long suspected as the primary source of the health gap between black and white America, are implicated in a number of ways:

- Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to be aware of health risks and steps to reduce susceptibility to cancer, such as avoiding tobacco products, and are more likely to have the personal resources and skills to gather health information;
- Higher-income individuals are more likely to have health insurance and access to high-quality medical care;
- Lower-income individuals face greater obstacles in obtaining appropriate treatment;
- The poor are more likely to engage in health risk behaviors such as smoking, poor diet, heavy alcohol consumption and substance abuse; and
- Lower-income individuals are less likely to have accurate information regarding cancer screening and the need for early detection, as underscored by the estimates of some experts that at least half of the difference in cancer survival rates between the poor and well-to-do is due to late stage of diagnosis (Freeman, 1990).

But socioeconomic differences alone don't fully explain the burden of cancer among African Americans. Racism, both in its institutional form and as it unfolds in the daily interactions of health providers and patients, plays a significant role in determining risk for cancer and the quality of treatment. For example:

- Evidence is increasing that African Americans and other minorities receive less aggressive treatments and a lower quality of care than whites, even when differences in income, education and related variables are held constant;
- African Americans living in conditions of concentrated poverty are more likely to be exposed to advertisements promoting unhealthful products such as tobacco and alcohol, and are less likely to have access to high quality, inexpensive fresh foods that are important in maintaining a well-balanced diet;
- While data is incomplete, African Americans and other ethnic minorities are more likely than whites to live in communities where environmental degradation and toxic wastes are present, potentially increasing risk of exposure to carcinogens.

Research must place a greater emphasis on understanding how those variables increase the risk of developing cancer and decrease the likelihood of survival among ethnic minority populations. NCI is increasingly expanding behavioral and social science research, and coordinating its national surveillance effort with those of state-based registries. Ultimately, however, a greater integration of science and service delivery—bringing state-of-the-art technology to all populations, including those who traditionally have not benefited from scientific advancements—is needed to close the cancer gap.

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Summary of IOM Findings and Recommendations

1. The National Cancer Institute (NCI), through its Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) program, provides high-

quality data that is the best approximation of a national cancer database. The SEER program, however, does not fully describe the burden of cancer for many U.S. ethnic minority and medically underserved populations. It lacks the necessary database concerning disproportionate cancer incidence and survival rates among ethnic minorities and the medically underserved that would permit it to develop and evaluate effective cancer control strategies dealing with those populations. They include lower-income or poverty-level whites, particularly those living in rural areas such as Appalachia; African Americans living in rural communities, particularly in the South; culturally diverse American Indian populations; and Hispanics of all national origins.

2. Despite NIH and NCI funding of an impressive array of research projects and training initiatives to address the burden of cancer among ethnic minorities and the medically underserved, no blueprint or strategic plan to coordinate that activity exists, and overall funding to address the needs of ethnic minority and medically underserved populations is inadequate.

3. The Institute of Medicine committee believes that NCI and NIH should more accurately assess the amount of resources allocated to addressing the needs of ethnic minority and medically underserved groups. While NCI reports that $124 million was allocated to research and training programs relevant to ethnic minority and medically underserved groups in fiscal year 1997, the committee believes the actual figure is only slightly more than $24 million, or approximately 1 percent of the total NCI budget. Funds allocated to cancer-related minority health research and training programs by other NIH institutes and centers also are small relative to their respective overall budgets. The committee finds those resources insufficient relative to the burden of disease among ethnic minority and medically underserved communities, changing U.S. demo-

graphics, and scientific opportunities inherent in the study of diverse populations. Moreover, the committee found no evidence that NIH calculates total expenditures for research on medically underserved groups, apart from calculations derived from data for ethnic minority populations.

4. The committee finds that, as currently structured and with limited capabilities, the NCI Office of Special Populations Research is not able to address the needs of ethnic minority and medically underserved populations. It also finds that, rather than leveraging more funds for minority cancer research by adding resources to those of NCI, funds from the NIH Office of Research on Minority Health have supplanted NCI resources.

5. Research has so far failed to take advantage of the diverse populations of the United States in understanding the causes of cancer and reducing mortality. The new NCI divisions of Cancer Prevention and Cancer Control and Population Sciences offer new promise, and are expected to address population diversity and behavioral and other studies in a more vigorous manner.

6. NCI and NIH must undertake a thorough assessment of training programs to determine whether they are producing adequate numbers of ethnic minority researchers in all appropriate cancer research fields; they also must determine whether training programs have resulted in the increased representation of ethnic minorities in cancer research fields.

7. There has been inconsistent progress in increasing the number of scientists, consumers and community members from and representing ethnic minority and medically underserved communities on NCI advisory panels and committees.

8. The committee finds that the research priority-setting process at NCI and NIH fails to serve the needs of ethnic minority and medically underserved groups.

9. Ethnic minority participation in NCI-supported clinical treatment trials appears to be proportional to the incidence of cancer among minorities, but is lower than expected in cancer prevention trials. The committee urges NCI and NIH to continue to coordinate with other federal agencies to address the lack of funding for follow-up costs associated with trial participation, and to simplify the informed consent process.

10. Although NCI has developed several sophisticated mechanisms for the dissemination of information to cancer patients, clinicians and others, relatively little attention has been devoted to the specific needs of ethnic minority and medically underserved populations, and there is no strategic plan regarding information dissemination to those groups and their health providers.

11. The committee could find no evidence of a strategic plan that addresses the needs of cancer survivors in ethnic minority and medically underserved communities. There has been limited research on health issues affecting cancer survivors, and even less regarding survivors in ethnic minority and medically underserved communities.

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The author is a senior program officer at the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and served as study director for the IOM report, "The Unequal Burden of Cancer: An Assessment of NIH Research and Programs for Ethnic Minorities and the Medically Underserved." The viewpoints expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IOM Committee on Cancer Research Among Minorities and the Medically Underserved, or the IOM. Sections of this paper are adapted from the summary to "The Unequal Burden of Cancer," published by the National Academy Press. The full report is available online at www.nap.edu/readingroom.

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

Family Environment and Intergenerational Well-being: Some Preliminary Results

BY PATRICK L. MASON

Families are crucial for intergenerational mobility. Family values influence the acquisition of marketable skills by offspring, and family socioeconomic status affects both skill acquisition and the next generation's access to individuals in positions of authority and power. Given those accepted generalizations, three specific questions come to mind.

First, how much do childhood family values and family status matter for young adult socioeconomic outcomes? Second, does accounting for individual differences in childhood family environment eliminate racial and sexual differences in the well-being of young adult workers? In other words, is there discrimination in the labor market, or can we explain racial and sexual differences in labor market outcomes as the result of differences in family environment and other attributes, such as education and experience? Third, does the impact of childhood family environment on young adult well-being vary across racial and sexual groups? To answer those questions, we'll examine the impact of family values and family status on educational attainment, hourly wages and hours of employment.

Literature Review

Kosters (1994:12–14) argues that more than half the rise in male inequality between 1963 and 1989 is attributable to growth in inequality for workers of identical education and experience. Only one-third can be accounted for by rising wage premiums for more-skilled workers (more-educated and more-experienced workers). Rising inequality within education-experience groups may reflect a variety of factors. The more popular explanations include increased racial and gender discrimination (Darity and Mason, 1998), institutional changes that disproportionately affect low-income and blue-collar workers (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997), the impact of international trade (Wood, 1995), and a rising premium for labor quality (Johnson, 1997; Neal and Johnson, 1997).

Labor quality refers to such worker attributes as cognitive ability and the quality of schooling, and perhaps attributes that are difficult to measure such as promptness, worker effort, capacity for teamwork, ability to interact with customers and so forth. However, Neal and Johnson specifically suggested that cognitive ability is a proxy for family and community background. They and others (Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996; Mason, 1997) provide strong evidence of the influence of socioeconomic status on cognitive skill.

Our efforts will concentrate on the relative importance of family values and family status as sources of individual differences in intergenerational mobility. Bowles (1972) argues that class background and years of education determine individual wage rates. Additionally, educational attainment increases with an individual's social class background. In his model, class background ultimately determines wages. Similarly, Loury (1981,1977) shows that social capital is a major determinant in the distribution of income. Mason (1999) argues that, narrowly considered, social capital in Loury's model consists of family and neighborhood values (behaviors) that help an individual to gain market attributes such as education, promptness, work effort and the ability to work with others.

However, Mason argues that social capital also may consist of access to individuals who exercise control over resources—that is, access to people in positions of power and authority. Increased access to persons with control over resources and vital information increases the opportunity for upward mobility. Accordingly, family behavior and family status are collectively synonymous with Loury's social capital concept and Bowles' social class variable.

So family environment (family values or behaviors, and family socioeconomic status or class) determines observable differences in workers, such as education, experience and the extent of labor force participation. Family environment also determines attributes observed by employers, but not usually observed by statistical analysts—attributes such as work effort, promptness and extent of access to persons with control over resources.

Family environment includes aspects of a child's home life such as risk-taking, future orientation, achievement expectations, parental work effort, family socioeconomic status and parental cognitive ability. For a given set of values, young workers from elite family backgrounds are able to obtain higher earnings for at least two reasons. First, they have greater access to persons in positions of power and authority in the job market (Granovetter, 1988). Second, their wealth provides greater bargaining power in the labor market (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). Given family status, young workers from families with higher levels of market values and behaviors will attain higher levels of socioeconomic achievement—education, for example, as well as hours of work and hourly wages.

Studies on rising inequality in the intra- and interracial distribution of wages have implicitly or explicitly argued that family environment is an important factor in labor market outcomes. For example, Neal and Johnson (1997) argue that racial differences in cognitive ability—as captured by the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT)—can explain nearly all the interracial wage gaps for young men and all the interracial wage gaps for young women. They claim that AFQT is an index of marketable skills. Further, interracial differences in test scores are a direct reflection of group differences in family background and school environment.[1] However, given the tremendous economic and racial segregation of American residential life and the fact that students living in particular neighborhoods are often required to attend particular schools (or school districts), many of the interracial differences in school environment really reflect interracial differences in family environment.

Kirscheman and Neckerman (1990) show that for sales and customer service jobs, clerical jobs, and semiskilled, unskilled and other service jobs, employers' hiring criteria often include factors beyond years of education, work history, experience and scores on skill tests. Those criteria include communication skills, appearance, ability to deal with the public, dependability, desire to work, capacity for teamwork, attitude and work ethic. Clearly, family environment exercises influence over the formation of each of those attributes. Kirscheman and Neckerman also show that the substantial inaccuracy with which those factors are measured creates considerable room for employers to exercise subjective biases regarding the relationship between race and marketable attributes.

Moss and Tilly (1995) also provide some evidence that race influences employers' perception of the skills of African-American male workers, especially so-called "soft skills." Hard skills include objectively measurable attributes such as literacy and computational ability, while soft skills include more subjective attributes such as communication and people skills, teamwork skills, demeanor, motivation, flexibility, initiative, work attitudes and effort.[2] They find that employers have expressed an increasing demand for soft skills, and rate African-American males poorly in terms of those skills.

Contrary to conventional wisdom among economists and the equally prejudicial views of many employers, in a 1997 work I suggest that African-American family culture may actually operate to lower interracial wage inequality. Otherwise identical African-American students are 6-7 percent more likely than white students to graduate from high school and 5-6 percent more likely to obtain post-secondary education. Relatively greater educational effort permits African-American students to translate a given set of family characteristics into more years of educational attainment than otherwise identical white students. Further, individual education effort is a product of family and group environment. In particular, individuals from below-average standard-of-living groups are subjected to cultural pressures to work harder than normal to raise the groups' relative standards of living. Parents from discriminated groups socialize their children to form expectations that they must put forth supra-normal effort to achieve the same socioeconomic outcomes as otherwise identical individuals from dominant groups.

Goldsmith, Veum and Darity (1997) provide the most explicit empirical analysis of interactions between family environment and economic well-being. They argue that psychological capital governs individual motivation and general attitude toward work. Self-esteem is a measure of psychological health. An individual with a higher level of self-esteem, that is, psychological capital, will be more productive. High-self-esteem workers are more efficient because they need less managerial supervision, have lower "down time," exhibit a greater willingness to consider a wider range of solutions to problems, and thereby are more confident decision-makers. Self-esteem, a multidimensional feature of personality "comprising notions of worth, goodness, health, appearance and social competence," is shaped by home environment. Goldsmith, Veum and Darity write:

> Families and significant others are the agents that socialize youths, affecting the evolution of their senses of self-esteem. These interactions also may contribute to the formation of values and attitudes, not fully captured by self-esteem, that influ-

> ence subsequent productivity. [The estimation procedure] contains variables to account for the possible role of a person's adolescent youth environment in generating such individual-specific heterogeneity. Socialization leading to greater subsequent productivity and wages is presumed to occur in families where *both parents* are present, *parent education* is greater, a professional parent resides, and there is an affiliation with a *religion* (page 8, emphasis in original).

Table 1 presents a synopsis of their qualitative results. They were able to confirm that high wages produce high self-esteem, and that high self-esteem produces high wages. Consider the impact of locus of control, a variable that refers to an individual's general outlook on life. Persons with an internal locus of control believe they are "masters of their own fate." Persons with an external locus of control believe their lives are controlled by outside forces. An increase in internal locus of control raises self-esteem and, indirectly, wages. The authors argued that an individual's locus of control is a relatively fixed trait determined by early childhood experiences, especially home environment. Family environment also has a direct impact on wages and self-esteem. Children from wealthier families, two-parent families, families with more highly educated parents, and more religious families tend to earn higher wages because of the *direct* effect of those variables on the wage rate, and because of their positive effect on self-esteem, which also *indirectly* affects wages.

Collectively, those studies indicate the organization of the labor process—the quality, level and type of effort extracted from workers—is not simply a technical matter of the number and quality of workers, machinery and raw materials employed by the firm. Rather, the labor process also involves an exercise of power (Mason, 1999). Employers and managers make subjective decisions regarding whether workers possess preferred attributes and

QUALITATIVE RESULTS FROM GOLDSMITH, VEUM AND DARITY (1997)

TABLE NO. 1

	WAGE RATE	SELF-ESTEEM
Wage Rate	NA	+
Self-esteem	+	NA
Education	+	+
Tenure	+	+
Experience	+	+
AFQT	+	+
Locus of Control	NA	+
Male	+	+
Black	-	+
Age	+/0	-
Married	-/0	+
Kids	0	+
Wealth	0/+	+
Professional Parent	-/+	-
Both Parents	+/-	+
Parent Education	0/+	+
Religion	+/0	+/0
SMSA	+	NA
Unemployment	0/+	NA

behaviors. There are overlapping family and community values that influence both workers and employers. Racial and sexual biases are an element of non-workplace organizations and decisions, but they also influence the demand for labor because managers do not have immunity from the values, norms, habits and traditions of their family and neighborhood, political and social leaders, or traditional market practices. Similar arguments can be advanced regarding education, professional training and skilled trade union apprenticeships.[3]

Accordingly, the predicted socioeconomic status of a young worker is directly correlated to the average socioeconomic status of the worker's racial (or ethnic) group. Family values and family class status, jointly referred to as family environment, exercise a major influence over such things as neighborhood location, marriage and other social networks, intra-ethnic exchange, language group or dialect, work and school behavior, and access to persons in position of control over resources and decision-making. Hence, family environment provides an institutional framework for transferring status from the group to the individual.

Data

The data represent a cohort of school-age individuals (ages 6 to 17) drawn from the 1972 wave of the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), representing 5,384 families (Institute for Social Research, 1972, 1983-1993). We can observe the group as it matures from ages 17 to 28 in 1983, to ages 27 to 38 in 1993. Economic outcomes are examined each year from the 1983-1993 waves of the PSID. All dollar values are in 1990 terms, using the consumer price index.[4] The sample is limited to persons who remained in the survey through 1991. The hourly wage rate is equal to annual wages divided by annual hours of employment. Labor market outcomes refer to earnings or employment in the year previous to the actual year of the survey.

Table 2 presents race-sex differences in socioeconomic outcomes for young workers, as well as some basic demographic and economic data. The sample has identical years of potential work experience (as captured by age) and very similar years of education. There is no substantive sexual difference in years of education, and the white-black difference in years of education is quite small, 0.71 and 0.65 years among men and women, respectively. Four percent of African-American women were enrolled as students during the survey years, but 6 percent of all other race-sex groups were currently enrolled as students.

But there are stunning differences in socioeconomic outcomes for these young workers. White men earn $2.47 per hour more than white women. However, white women earn $1.07 per hour more than African-American males. African-American women are at the bottom of the wage ladder, earning $4.99 per hour less than white men. Neither group of young African Americans averages full-time/full-year employment. Young white males were employed 304 hours more per year than young African-American males, 2,074 hours versus 1,770 hours. White women obtained 1,634 hours of annual employment, while African-American women were limited to 1,518 hours of annual employment.

Seventy-three percent of African-American men were working or enrolled as students, while 94 percent were working, enrolled as students, or unemployed. That suggests African-American males had an unemployment rate of 21 percent, even as 6 percent were not labor force participants and not enrolled in school. African-American women had an unemployment rate of 18 percent, with 22 percent out of the labor force and not enrolled in school. A similar number of white women were not labor force participants and not enrolled in school (21 percent), but only 6 percent were unemployed. Just 7 percent of white males were unemployed and only 2 percent were not labor force participants.

The average unemployment rate in the county of residence for African Americans is 6.4 percent, while whites live in counties with

TABLE NO. 2

SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES, COUNTY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA[5]

	AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEN	AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN
Hourly Wage Rate	$7.15	$6.56	$10.55	$8.08
Annual Hours of Employment	1770	1518	2074	1634
Years of Education	12.62	12.75	13.33	13.40
Working or Currently Enrolled in School	0.73	0.60	0.91	0.73
Labor Force (employed, laid off, unemployed, or student)	0.94	0.78	0.98	0.79
Self-Employed	0.035	0.015	0.086	0.046
Currently Enrolled as Student	0.0590	0.0396	0.0624	0.0579
Age	28	28	28	28
Resides in Home with Unmarried Male Head	0.4091	0.0102	0.2636	0.0009
Resides in Home with Unmarried Female Head	0.1290	0.6222	0.0468	0.2984
Northeast	0.1498	0.1819	0.2523	0.2963
Northcentral	0.2119	0.1676	0.2857	0.2635
West	0.0922	0.0989	0.1776	0.1580
County Unemployment Rate	6.4132	6.3598	6.1026	5.9086

an average unemployment of 6 percent. Young African Americans were considerably less likely to reside in married households than young whites. Seventy percent of white men and women resided in married homes, but only 46 and 37 percent of African-American men and women, respectively, were residents of married households. Finally, 55 percent of African Americans lived in the South versus 28 percent of whites.

Family values and family socioeconomic status are captured by three tables: family values (Table 3), family status (Table 4), and status of grandparents (Table 5). Each variable, except FMHELP72, is an index constructed from additional variables. Details on the construction of these indices are contained in the appendix.

Table 3 shows that both African Americans and whites have extensive religious affiliations (about 94 percent for both groups). However, it is readily apparent that the religious affiliations of whites and African Americans are substantially different. In 1972, 75-80 percent of all African Americans lived in Baptist- or Methodist-affiliated homes, but only 26-31 percent of whites lived in similar households. Similarly, more than one-third of whites reside in Catholic homes, but only 5 percent of African Americans were Catholic in 1972.

Table 3 shows there are no racial differences in families' connectedness to potential sources of help (CONECT72). That is to say, African-American and white families are equally likely to be connected to non-family individuals, relatives, neighbors, community and workplace institutions, social establishments and media information. African Americans and whites also maintain families with similar aspiration-ambition environments (ASPIRE72). However, African-American families are more likely to express a desire to financially assist parents and other relatives (FMHELP72). Additionally, African-American families exhibited a moderately higher degree of financial prudence (ECNOMZ72), even as they maintained a higher risk-taking environment than white families.

TABLE NO. 3

FAMILY VALUES
OF HEAD'S CHILDHOOD (1972) FAMILY

VARIABLE	AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEN	AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN
Fmhelp72—Would you feel you had to help your parents or other relatives (more) if you had more money?	0.5915	0.6029	0.3656	0.4029
Efplan72—Reported efficacy and planning.	2.8847	2.7230	3.4748	3.3867
Trust72—Index of trust or hostility.	1.8855	1.7887	2.7857	2.7565
Wrklng72—Whether head worked long hours in 1971 and/or wanted more work at time of interview?	0.2985	0.2821	0.3819	0.4687
Aspire72—Aspiration-ambition	2.8114	2.6872	2.4976	2.7696
Savact72—Real-earnings acts	1.8016	2.1309	2.6211	2.5376
Ecnomz72—Economizing	3.9029	3.8346	3.4192	3.3492
Risk72—Risk avoidance	4.1419	4.2044	5.0714	5.1146
Horizn72—Horizon proxies	4.6186	4.6318	4.9825	4.9745
Conect72—Connectedness to potential sources of help.	6.4222	6.3967	6.6100	6.7134
Mnyact72—Money-earning acts (Current money-earning behavior)	3.1242	3.1747	3.4888	3.4418
Achiev72—Index of achievement motivation	8.3214	9.0905	9.1438	9.1358
Readalot—A lot of reading material was visible during interview	0.0512	0.0564	0.1155	0.1111
Readnone—No reading material was visible during interview	0.4122	0.4272	0.3001	0.3189
Langdiff—Were there language or problems that made it difficult to interview respondent?	0.0661	0.1058	0.0441	0.0376

Continued next page

FAMILY VALUES OF HEAD'S CHILDHOOD (1972) FAMILY

TABLE NO. 3

VARIABLE	AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEN	AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN
Baptist, 1972	0.7586	0.6726	0.1562	0.1812
Methodist, 1972	0.0504	0.0839	0.0983	0.1317
Episcopalian, 1972	0.0016	0.0011	0.0195	0.0180
Presbyterian, 1972	0.0005	0.0222	0.0367	0.0380
Lutheran, 1972	0.0007	0.0063	0.0789	0.0448
Other Religion, 1972	0.0615	0.1227	0.1765	0.1430
Catholic, 1972	0.0618	0.0425	0.3397	0.3553
Jewish, 1972	0.0033	0.0017	0.0287	0.0425

White families are more likely to exhibit a higher degree of efficacy and planning (Efplan72). They also are more likely to maintain an environment that favors the status quo (Trust72), and are more likely to engage in self-help activities (Savact72). Finally, white families are marginally more likely to maintain a long-term planning horizon (Horizn72), experience a higher level of achievement motivation (Achiev72), and carry out more money-earning acts (Mnyact72).

Table 3 also shows that 5-6 percent of African-American homes had a large amount of visible reading material during the interview, but 40 percent had no visible reading material. By comparison, 11-12 percent of white homes had a large amount of visible reading material and 30-32 percent had no visible reading material.

The class background of whites exhibits greater family income, greater family wealth, higher status neighborhoods, greater parental occupational prestige, and higher quality and quantity of parental education relative to the class background of African Americans. For example, the typical African American was raised in a family with annual income of about $18,000, while the typical white was raised in a family with annual income of about $36,000.

Four percent of African Americans received a lump sum payment (such as an inheritance or an insurance claim), but at least 9 percent of whites received such payments. One-third of African Americans were raised in female-headed households compared to just 9 percent of whites.

Table 5 presents interracial differences in class resources among the grandparents of young workers. Regardless of race, a substantial fraction of individuals in the sample had poor grandparents. Among African Americans, 70 of every 100 individuals had poor grandparents. Among whites, nearly 47 of every 100 individuals had poor grandparents. Eighty-seven to 91 percent of African-American grandparents were raised in the South, while 17-21 percent of white grandparents had immigrant origins. Just 1 percent of African-American grandparents were self-employed, while 5-8 percent of white grandparents were self-employed. Forty-three to 48 percent of African-American grandparents were farmers, while 38-44 percent of white grandparents were craftsmen, foremen or operatives.

Tables 2–5 present a startling portrait of racial differences in family environment and socioeconomic outcomes for young workers. Although racial differences in education and potential experience (age) are small or nonexistent, racial differences in market outcomes—for example, hours of employment, hourly wage rates, self-employment and the probability of employment—are quite large. There are differences in family values and behaviors, but the differences appear to be of a rather small magnitude and do not uniformly favor a particular race-sex group. Finally, the tables document more than two generations of racial inequality in the class backgrounds of young workers. Specifically, young African-

FAMILY STATUS VARIABLES OF 1972 YOUTH COHORT

TABLE NO. 4

HEAD'S FAMILY BACKGROUND: PARENTS' EDUCATION & REGIONAL ORIGIN

	AFRICAN-AMERICAN		WHITE	
	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
LUMPSUM, Individual received inheritance or lump sum payment	0.0432	0.0441	0.0869	0.1014
AVGINC5Y, Logarithm of average family income, 1968-1972	9.7759	9.8896	10.4648	10.5031
AGEHD72, Age of head of household	44	45	42	42
HNQUAL72, Housing and neighborhood quality	3.5235	3.7249	5.0752	5.2066
HDMOTH72, Mother is head of household	0.3255	0.3385	0.0926	0.0919
SENTST72, Score on sentence completion test	7.39	8.14	10.18	10.01
EFA_LTHS, Education of father less than high school	0.5804	0.4651	0.3563	0.3097
EFA_GTHS, Education of father greater than high school	0.0392	0.0464	0.1107	0.1183
EFA_DEG, Education of father college degree	0.0131	0.0473	0.2036	0.2001
EMO_LTHS, Education of mother less than high school	0.5491	0.4939	0.2525	0.2339
EMO_GTHS, Education of mother greater than high school	0.0862	0.0611	0.1347	0.1376
EMO_DEG, Education of mother college degree	0.0218	0.0398	0.1261	0.1288
HFA_NE, Head's father raised in Northeast	0.0456	0.1115	0.2512	0.3111
HFA_WEST, Head's father raised in West	0.0022	0.0031	0.0901	0.0636
HFA_NC, Head's father raised in Northcentral	0.0909	0.0864	0.3412	0.3119
HFA_SOUT, Head's father raised in South	0.7978	0.6827	0.2254	0.2242
HMO_NE, Head's mother raised in Northeast	0.0543	0.0692	0.2540	0.3108
HMO_WEST, Head's mother raised in West	0.0211	0.0050	0.0897	0.0667
HMO_NC, Head's mother raised in Northcentral	0.0812	0.0971	0.3605	0.3062

Continued on next page

FAMILY STATUS VARIABLES OF 1972 YOUTH COHORT

TABLE NO. 4

	AFRICAN-AMERICAN		WHITE	
	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
MO_SOUT, Head's mother raised in South	0.8246	0.7462	0.2107	0.2285
GRWRUR72, Head raised in rural area	0.5628	0.4278	0.2865	0.2405
GRWTWN72, Head raised in large town	0.1908	0.2951	0.3589	0.4139
GRWCTY72, Head raised in large city	0.1953	0.2519	0.2985	0.3135
HEAD'S FAMILY BACKGROUND: OCCUPATION OF 1972 HEAD AND WIFE				
W72PROTE Professional or technical	0.0070	0.0004	0.0721	0.0525
W72MANAG Manager or official	0.0030	0.0016	0.0082	0.0103
W72BUSOW Self-employed businesswomen	0.0009	0.0015	0.0098	0.0083
W72CLRSL Clerical or sales worker	0.1028	0.1640	0.1804	0.1489
W72CRAFT Craftswomen or forewomen	0.0000	0.0000	0.0038	0.0033
W72OPERT Operatives	0.0754	0.0619	0.0734	0.0707
W72FARMR Farmers, farm managers, or ranchers	0.0000	0.0000	0.0021	0.0007
W72LABOR Unskilled laborers and service workers	0.2417	0.1296	0.1253	0.1297
W72MISC Miscellaneous, NA, DK	0.0058	0.0047	0.0068	0.0058
H72PROTE Professional, technical and kindred work	0.0306	0.0222	0.1915	0.1704
H72MANAG Managers, officials and proprietors	0.0281	0.0201	0.1197	0.1564
H72BUSOW Self-employed businessmen	0.0039	0.0088	0.0754	0.0731
H72CLRSL Clerical and sales workers	0.0719	0.0941	0.1077	0.1096
H72CRAFT, Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	0.0804	0.0782	0.2126	0.2375
H72OPERT Operatives and kindred workers	0.2452	0.2515	0.1344	0.1285
H72FARMR Farmers and farm managers	0.0143	0.0077	0.0359	0.0292
H72LABOR, Laborers and service workers, farm labor	0.3173	0.3193	0.0494	0.0467
H72MISC, Miscellaneous (armed services, protective workers, unemployed last year but looking for work now; NA)	0.0056	0.0042	0.0154	0.0107

American workers were much more likely to have been reared in homes of modest socioeconomic status and were even more likely to have had grandparents with lower socioeconomic status.

There are several hypotheses. One: Family values and behavior in an individual's childhood home have an impact on young adult well-being, as measured by years of educational attainment and a variety of labor market outcomes. Two: Racial differences in childhood family values explain little or none of the racial differences in young adult well-being. Three: Childhood family socioeconomic status has a positive impact on young adult well-being. For example, higher childhood family income, higher parental education and affluent grandparents will increase the well-being of young adults. Four: interracial differences in childhood family socioeconomic status are an important factor in explaining interracial differences in young adult well-being. Five: Racial discrimination continues to be an important phenomenon in determining the life-chances of African Americans. In other words, race is not simply a convenient proxy variable that summarizes group differences in childhood family values and childhood socioeconomic status—what we are calling family environment. Family values are important for intraracial differences in young adult well-being. Family socioeconomic status is important for both intra- and interracial differences in young adult well-being. Yet, regardless of sex and family environment, it is our hypothesis that there are race-specific differences in labor market outcome. We call that difference racial discrimination.

Model

Consider the following explanation of young adult well-being:[6]

Young Adult Well-being = f(Race, Sex, Education, Age, Marital Status, Region, County Unemployment Rate, Student, Family Values of Head's 1972 Family Household, Parent's Education and Regional Origin, Occupation of 1972 Household Head and Wife, Grandparents' Socioeconomic Status and Regional Origin).

FAMILY STATUS OF GRANDPARENTS OF 1972 YOUTH COHORT

TABLE NO. 5

HEAD'S FAMILY BACKGROUND: GRANDPARENTS' SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REGIONAL ORIGIN

VARIABLE	AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEN	AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN
GP_POOR Grandparents were poor	0.6814	0.7412	0.4793	0.4572
GP_RICH Grandparents were rich	0.1212	0.0846	0.1180	0.1081
GFA_NE Raised in Northeast	0.0054	0.0135	0.2046	0.2425
GFA_WEST Raised in West	0.0000	0.0000	0.0374	0.0356
GFA_NC Raised in Northcentral	0.0475	0.0274	0.3073	0.2968
GFA_SOUT Raised in South	0.8919	0.8843	0.2398	0.2266
GMO_NE Raised in Northeast	0.0094	0.0341	0.2012	0.2638
GMO_WEST Raised in West	0.0000	0.0015	0.0600	0.0378
GMO_NC Raised in Northcentral	0.0266	0.0269	0.3076	0.2935
GMO_SOUT Raised in South	0.9096	0.8683	0.2415	0.2393
GFPRGTEC Professional, technical, or kindred worker	0.0089	0.0731	0.0627	0.0564
GFMANAGE Manager, official, or proprietor	0.0227	0.0032	0.0499	0.0458
GFBUSOWN Self-employed businessman	0.0067	0.0125	0.0546	0.0784
GFCLRSAL Clerical or sales worker	0.0015	0.0024	0.0365	0.0411
GFCRAFT Craftsman, foreman, or kindred worker	0.0415	0.1223	0.2244	0.2769
GFOPERAT Operative or kindred worker	0.0965	0.0725	0.1549	0.1610
GFFARMER Farmer or farm manager	0.4838	0.4288	0.2446	0.1856
GFLABRER Laborer, service worker, or farm worker	0.1617	0.1390	0.1048	0.0832
GFMISC Armed services, protective services, or misc. worker	0.1766	0.1463	0.0676	0.0693

We will restrict our measures of well-being to hourly wages, annual hours of work and education. Young adult well-being is inversely related to the county unemployment rate, but is directly related to parents' education and occupational status as well as grandparents' socioeconomic status. Hence, demographic characteristics, local labor market conditions and the family environment (values and socioeconomic status) of individuals ultimately determines the distribution of income.

Family values will have an impact on intergenerational well-being, even as their precise effect may be difficult to predict. As Goldsmith, Veum and Darity have demonstrated, religious affiliation will have a positive impact on self-esteem and wages. Accordingly, we hypothesize that religious affiliation also will have a positive impact on annual work hours and years of education.[7] We make no predictions regarding the effect of interracial differences in religious affiliation.[8]

Connectedness to potential sources of help (Conect72), a desire to assist family members (Fmhelp72), the strength of aspirations-ambitions (Aspire72), and the extent of financial prudence (Ecnomz72) refer to an individual's ability to make maximum use of his or her resources. As such, we hypothesize that each will have a positive correlation with well-being.

The extent of self-help activity (Savact72) and money-earning acts (Mnyact72) may be indicators of industriousness and hence have a positive impact on well-being. But self-help behavior and money-earning acts also may indicate individuals who are detached from the market, or individuals who do not expect to be very successful in the market. Hence, we cannot establish hypotheses on the relationship between well-being and self-help or money-earning.

Trust72 captures (in part) the capacity for cooperative behavior. We expect it will have a positive correlation with well-being. Similarly, since achievement motivation (Achiev72), planning horizon (Horizn72), and efficacy and planning (Efplan72) capture expectations of success, we expect each to have a positive correlation with well-being.

Reading material in the home is an important input into educational quality. As such, individuals raised in families with a relatively greater volume of reading material also should obtain a relatively higher level of socioeconomic well-being.

Finally, whether an individual's parent worked long hours or desired to work more hours (Wrklng72) and whether a household respondent had language or other problems that made it difficult to conduct the interview (Langdiff) are less valid indicators of family values and behaviors than the other variables in Table 3. Language difficulty requires a subjective evaluation by the interviewer, while working hours ignore the extent of employment discrimination or other difficulties an individual may encounter in obtaining employment. To the extent that results actually measure a language deficiency, they will have a negative correlation with well-being. However, since working long hours may capture a willingness to work, we expect it to have a positive correlation with well-being.

Family Values and Intergenerational Well-being

Table 6 presents the effect of family values and behaviors on hourly wages, annual work hours and years of education. Along with the level of education, race, sex, student status, age, region, and county unemployment rate (Unemrate), we also have included a limited number of family background variables such as housing and neighborhood quality (Hnqual72); sentence completion test score for household respondent (Sentst72); age of head of household (Agehd72); average family income for 1968-1972 (Log5yinc); economic status of grandparents (Gp_poor, Gp_rich), and whether an individual has ever received an inheritance, insurance claim or other lump sum payment (Lumpsum). Finally, the annual rate of growth of years of education, hourly wage and hours of work is captured by Trend. We have limited the number of family status variables included in the first stage of the analysis to highlight the importance of family values.

Values Effects

The desire to provide financial assistance to relatives (Fmhelp72) has a positive impact on annual work hours, but it has no statistically significant effect on either years of education or the hourly wage rate. Specifically, a unit increase in a childhood family's desire to assist other family members is associated with an additional 40 hours of work for young adults. A unit increase in connectedness to potential sources of help (Conect72) raised years of education by 0.12 years, but had no impact on hourly wages or annual work hours. Our measure of trust or hostility (Trutst72) reflects the extent of a household's social alienation from societal norms. As trust increases or hostility decreases, social alienation decreases. Higher trust and less hostility has a negative impact on young adult work hours, even though a unit increase in Trust72 raises education by 0.07 years.

Wages, hours and education all rise with increases in reported efficacy and planning (Efplan72). Greater childhood household efficacy and planning raises the young adult wage rate by 1 percent, increases work time by 15 hours, and increases education by 0.09 years. Our statistical results do not confirm the expectation that children from high-aspiration/high-ambition (Aspire72) homes will obtain higher earnings and hours, although they will obtain greater years of education than children from low-aspiration/low-ambition homes. Specifically, a point increase in aspiration-ambition lowers wages by 2 percent and work time by 14 hours. Similarly, a point rise in aspiration-ambition raises education by 0.03 years. As we hypothesized, individuals raised in homes with a strong future orientation (Horizn72) accumulate more years of education (0.14 years) and greater earnings. A point increase in the childhood family planning horizon will raise wages by 1.3 percent.

We expected that self-help activity (Savact72), thriftiness (Ecnomz72), and extra employment effort (Mnyact72) would show a positive correlation with wages, hours and education. The data are somewhat ambiguous. Extra parental employment effort increases a child's work time by 16 hours, while greater self-help activity raises employment by 10 hours. Greater thriftiness is associated with 1.4 percent lower wages. Extra employment effort is associated with educational decreases of 0.07 years, but a unit increase in thriftiness will raise education by 0.16 years.

We predicted that children reared in homes where the head of the household either worked more than 2,000 hours per year, or expressed a desire for greater work time (Wrklng72), will achieve higher levels of well-being. Children reared in such homes will receive a 6 percent increase in hourly wages and expand their work year by 52 hours. However, a high work-to-home environment also produces 0.06 lower years of educational attainment—a reduction of two weeks of schooling.

We hypothesized that achievement motivation (Achiev72) would have a positive impact on well-being, that is, higher levels of achievement motivation are expected to raise wages, hours and years of education. Our empirical results show that achievement motivation has no statistically significant impact on wages, but it increases the work year by seven hours for each point increase in achievement motivation. A point increase in childhood family achievement motivation raises young adult years of education by 0.02 years. On the other hand, increasing levels of risk avoidance (Risk72) has no impact on hours of work, but a one-point increase in less risky behavior will raise the hourly wage rate by two-thirds of 1 percent and increase education by 0.12 years.

People raised in homes were there exist language or other problems that made it difficult to interview the household respondent were expected to obtain lower wages, lower hours and lower years of education. Instead, we found that people raised in such homes have 4 percent higher wages, 87 more hours of annual work, and 0.17 more years of education. The results for individuals raised in female-headed households (Hdmoth72) are equally surprising; wages are 7 percent higher and education increases by 0.49 years. In homes where a lot of reading material was visible during the interview (readalot), the young adult hourly wage rate decreased by 6 percent, hours of employment increased and years of education increased by 0.58 years. In homes where no reading material was present during the interview (readnone), the hourly wage of children is 4 percent lower and years of education decreased by 0.24 years. However, children raised in low-reading-material homes worked 24 hours more per year.

The religious affiliation of one's childhood home also affects the socioeconomic status of young workers. Compared to people raised in non-religious homes, workers raised in Jewish homes accumulate nearly 1.50 more years of schooling and 12 percent greater wages, improvements that allow individuals raised in Jewish homes to work 127 fewer hours per year. Young workers raised in Catholic homes work 58 hours more per year and obtain one-third more years of schooling than individuals raised in non-religious homes. On the other hand, individuals raised in Baptist homes (the largest Protestant group in America) tend to earn 7 percent lower wages and receive 0.25 fewer years of schooling.

Class Effects

Table 6 also contains select information on the impact of socioeconomic status. Although we have considered the availability of reading material a reflection of family values and behavior, a parent's cognitive ability is in large measure a reflection of his or her social and economic opportunities during their own childhood, and during their time in the market prior to taking the sentence completion test for the PSID. In any case, it pays to have parents with high cognitive ability. Specifically, a one-point rise in the parental sen-

FAMILY VALUES AND INTERGENERATIONAL WELL-BEING

TABLE NO. 6

HOURLY WAGE		ANNUAL HOURS OF EDUCATION		YEARS OF WORK	
Constant	-1.9305†	Constant	-1648†	Constant	-6.3525†
Educate	0.0705†	Educate	40†	Educate	n.a.
African	-0.0816†	African	-185†	African	0.2884†
Female	-0.2470†	Female	-417†	Female	0.0222
Student	-0.1065†	Student	-404†	Student	0.7838†
Age	0.1132†	Age	179†	Age	0.5968†
Age2	-0.0014†	Age2	-3†	Age2	-0.0101†
Nrtheast	0.1085†	Nrtheast	-99†	Nrtheast	-0.0469
Nrthcent	-0.0504†	Nrthcent	-108†	Nrthcent	-0.2506†
West	0.0775†	West	-79†	West	-0.0200
Fmhelp72	0.0108	Fmhelp72	40†	Fmhelp72	0.0017
Hnqual72	0.0094†	Hnqual72	-16†	Hnqual72	0.1262†
Efplan72	0.0097†	Efplan72	15†	Efplan72	0.0902†
Trust72	-0.0048	Trust72	-35†	Trust72	0.0732†
Wrklng72	0.0602†	Wrklng72	52†	Wrklng72	-0.0609†
Aspire72	-0.0166†	Aspire72	-14†	Aspire72	0.0267†
Savact72	-0.0022	Savact72	10†	Savact72	-0.0702†
Ecnomz72	-0.0141†	Ecnomz72	-9	Ecnomz72	0.1616†
Risk72	0.0067†	Risk72	-7	Risk72	0.1213†
Horizn72	0.0132†	Horizn72	-1	Horizn72	0.1355†
Conect72	0.0001	Conect72	-1	Conect72	0.1194†
Mnyact72	-0.0039	Mnyact72	16†	Mnyact72	-0.0030

Continued on next page

FAMILY VALUES AND INTERGENERATIONAL WELL-BEING

TABLE NO. 6

HOURLY WAGE		ANNUAL HOURS OF EDUCATION		YEARS OF WORK	
Sentst72	0.0071†	Sentst72	3	Sentst72	0.0354†
Achiev72	0.0022	Achiev72	7†	Achiev72	0.0168†
Hdmoth72	0.0691†	Hdmoth72	27	Hdmoth72	0.4925†
Agehd72	-0.0032†	Agehd72	0	Agehd72	0.0179†
Log5yinc	0.1224†	Log5yinc	59†	Log5yinc	0.5684†
Readalot	-0.0579†	Readalot	9	Readalot	0.5774†
Readnone	-0.0395†	Readnone	24†	Readnone	-0.2386†
Langdiff	0.0400†	Langdiff	87†	Langdiff	0.1672†
Baptis72	-0.0708†	Baptis72	8	Baptis72	-0.2545†
Method72	-0.0686†	Method72	80†	Method72	-0.0127
Episco72	0.0047	Episco72	45	Episco72	-0.2156†
Presby72	-0.0517†	Presby72	33	Presby72	0.1230
Luther72	-0.0304	Luther72	21	Luther72	-0.0064
Othrpr72	-0.0834†	Othrpr72	64†	Othrpr72	-0.3043†
Cathol72	0.0167	Cathol72	58‡	Cathol72	0.3255†
Jewish72	0.1195†	Jewish72	-127†	Jewish72	1.4831†
Unemrate	-0.0057†	Unemrate	-10†	Unemrate	-0.0150†
Trend	-0.0016	Trend	11†	Trend	0.0282†
Gp_poor	0.0063	Gp_poor	-36†	Gp_poor	-0.0342
Gp_rich	-0.0152	Gp_rich	-62†	Gp_rich	0.4145†
Lumpsum	-0.0159	Lumpsum	-20	Lumpsum	0.1468†

† Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
‡ Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

tence completion test score is associated with nearly 1 percent higher wages for offspring and 0.04 years of additional schooling.

Consider also the impact of family income on a child's well-being. Children from high-income families receive higher hourly wages, work for longer periods and obtain more years of education. A 10 percent increase in childhood annual family income will increase the young adult expected hourly wage rate by 1.22 percent, increase annual employment by 590 hours, and raise education by 5.68 years.[9] By contrast, unemployment has a uniformly negative impact on well-being. A one-percentage-point increase in the county unemployment rate lowers the wage rate by 0.6 percent, reduces employment by 10 hours, and decreases educational attainment by 0.2 years. Our statistical results also offer dramatic confirmation of stagnation in hourly wages, despite growth in work time and education. Specifically, from 1982-1992 employment among young workers expanded by 11 hours per year and education grew by 0.03 years per year, while there was no statistically significant trend for the hourly wage rate.

Grandparents' economic status has no effect on the hourly wage rates of young men and women, but it does affect hours of employment and years of schooling. Individuals with impoverished grandparents obtain 36 fewer hours of employment than individuals with middle-income grandparents. Individuals with rich grandparents work 62 fewer hours per year than those with middle-income grandparents, but they obtain 0.45 more years of schooling. Receiving a lump sum payment also increases educational attainment by 0.15 years. Collectively, a young person with rich grandparents who has received a lump sum payment, and who was reared in a family where income was 10 percent above average, will obtain 6.24 years more education than an individual raised in an average-income household, with middle-income grandparents and no lump sum payment.

An additional wealth effect on the transmission of intergenerational well-being is strongly demonstrated by the impact of housing and neighborhood quality on educational attainment and labor market outcomes. A one-unit increase in a child's housing and neighborhood quality increases schooling by 0.13 years, raises wages by 1 percent, and leads to a reduction of unemployment by 16 years. The suggestion is that being reared in a more advantageous neighborhood increases one's skill level and the pay associated with any given skill level; workers take advantage of those gains in pay to reduce market work hours and increase leisure and other non-market activities.

Race and Sex Effects

Table 2 demonstrates racial inequality in wages, hours and education. It has become fashionable to argue that such differences are due to racial differences in family environment (family status and family values), as well as racial differences in other factors such as education, age (work experience), student status and regional location. From that perspective, labor market discrimination no longer exists in the contemporary economy (Heckman, 1998). Results in Table 6 indicate it would be erroneous to argue that racial (and sexual) discrimination are relatively minor problems in contemporary labor markets.

Although we have controlled for differences in values, class and a number of demographic factors, we find that race is statistically significant. Indeed, we find that *all other things being equal, African Americans will accumulate 0.29 more years of education than whites.* If we were to observe two individuals—one African-American and one white—with identical class backgrounds, reared in homes with identical family values and behavior, living in the same region of the country and having the same age and gender, the young African American will accumulate 0.29 years more education than an otherwise identical young white worker.

That is a difference of 52 school days.[10] The significant point here is not the size of the differential, but that a racial difference exists

MEASURING RACIAL AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AMONG YOUNG WORKERS

TABLE NO. 7

LOGWAGE	**BASIC**	**BASIC W/VALUES**	**BASIC W/STATUS**	**ALL**
African-American	-0.2075	-0.1399	-0.0702	-0.0829
Female	-0.2419	-0.2429	-0.2542	-0.2528
ANNUAL HOURS				
African-American	-205	-199	-156	-163
Female	-413	-416	-421	-421
YEARS OF EDUCATION				
African-American	-0.5928	0.0256	0.4086	0.1944
Female	0.0897	0.0738	0.0038	0.0176
CURRENTLY WORKING OR IN SCHOOL				
African-American	-0.1028	-0.0643	-0.0387	-0.0439
Female	-0.1707	-0.1665	-0.1683	-0.1641
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION				
African-American	0.0014	0.0144	0.0245	0.0164
Female	-0.1831	-0.1773	-0.1705	-0.1668
SELF-EMPLOYMENT				
African-American	-0.0708	-0.0531	-0.0434	-0.0403
Female	-0.0292	-0.0279	-0.0217	-0.0222

and that it favors African Americans. As I suggested in an earlier work (1997), it may well reflect greater educational effort among African Americans. In any case, it unequivocally indicates something positively correlated to education, but not included in our model, that has to do with being an African American. Assuming the school system does not systematically favor African Americans over whites and that genetic favors are not responsible for such a racial difference, there is something about African-American families or cultural values that encourages above-average educational attainment.

Yet, African Americans receive an 8.2 percent wage penalty along with 185 fewer hours of employment—a clear reduction in the demand for African-American workers. Those penalties suggest that among young adults, racial discrimination explains 48 percent of the male racial wage differential and 90 percent of the female racial wage differential.[11] Wage and employment penalties most likely underestimate the extent of racial discrimination. Our wage and hours statistics do not control for greater educational attainment among African Americans, which surely has a positive impact on wages, if not employment. Also, Table 7 shows that after accounting for family environment, African Americans are 1.5-2.5 percent more likely to be labor force participants or to be enrolled in school than young white workers.

Female status results in 25 percent lower wages and 417 fewer hours of work, but has no impact on years of education. Lower wages in combination with fewer hours are an unmistakable indication of lower demand for female workers. However, women are 17 percent less likely to be labor force participants or enrolled in school than men (Table 7). Hence, we cannot conclude that the entire male-female hour and wage gap is due to discrimination. The lower participatory rate of women suggests the actual labor market experience of women at a given age is lower than the actual labor market experience of men at a given age. Hence, only part of the sexual differences in wages and hours of employment is the result of discrimination against female workers.

Comparing Family Class and Family Values

Are family values more or less important than family socioeconomic status for determining intergenerational well-being? More specifically, are the values of an individual's childhood household relatively more important than the socioeconomic status (class) of that same household? Does the relative importance of values and class differ for African Americans and whites? Women and men?

Table 8 presents the percentage of variation explained by family values and class status for hourly wages, years of education and annual hours of work. For example, among African-American males, class explains 25-29 percent of the individual differences in years of education attainment.[12] On the other hand, individual differences in family values account for only 5-9 percent of the difference in years of education among African-American males.

It's quite evident from Table 8 that family values are substantially less important than family class position. Regardless of race, sex, or indicators of well-being, class explains a higher percentage of variation in economic well-being than family values. Indeed, class is seldom less than 50 percent more important than family values and is often greater than 100 percent more important. For example, class explains 10-13, 25-29, and 8-9 percent, respectively, of the African-American male variation in hourly wages, years of education and annual work hours. However, family values explain only 2-5, 5-9, and 2-4 percent, respectively.

Class is far more important for African-American male intergenerational mobility than it is for white male mobility. However, among women, the absolute and relative effects of class and family values show somewhat less racial differentiation. Among African-American women, family socioeconomic status accounts for 7-12 percent of the variation in hourly wages, 20-26 percent of the variation in education, and 7-12 percent of the variation in hours of

TABLE NO. 8

PERCENTAGE OF VARIATION EXPLAINED BY VALUES AND CLASS, BY RACE AND SEX

		HOURLY WAGE	YEARS OF EDUCATION	ANNUAL HOURS OF WORK
African-American Males	VALUES	2 – 5	5 – 9	2 – 4
	CLASS	10 – 13	25 – 29	8 – 9
African-American Females	VALUES	3 – 8	4 – 9	4 – 9
	CLASS	7 – 12	20 – 26	7 – 12
White Males	VALUES	1 – 3	6 – 22	3 – 3
	CLASS	4 – 6	17 – 33	5 – 5
White Females	VALUES	2 – 4	8 – 26	2 – 2
	CLASS	4 – 6	15 – 33	5 – 5

work. Among white women, family socioeconomic status accounts for 4-6 percent of the variation in hourly wages, 15-33 percent of the variation in education, and 5 percent of the variation in hours of work. For African-American women, class is about 1.7 times as important as values in determining hourly wages, 3.5 times as important as values in determining years of education, and 1.5 times as important as values in determining hours of work. The respective numbers for white women are 1.7, 1.4, and 2.5.

Although family values are equally important for determining intergenerational mobility among African-American men and women, class explains a slightly larger portion of the variation in mobility among African-American men. Family values and family socioeconomic status are equally important for white men and women.

Summary and Discussion

Our study has examined the effect of childhood family environment on young adult years of educational attainment, wage rates and annual hours of employment. We find that childhood family values explain 1-8 percent of young adult variation in hourly wage rates, 8-26 percent of the variation in years of education, and 2-9 percent of the variation in annual hours of employment.[13] However, interracial differences in childhood family values explain few or none of the racial differences in young adult well-being. Our best estimate is that racial differences in childhood family values can account for 14 percent of the young adult racial wage differential, virtually none of the racial employment differential, and negative 29 percent of the racial differential in years of education.[14] In other words, African-American/white differences in childhood home family values tend to expand wage inequality and have no impact on hours, but reduce differences in years of education.

Higher childhood family income, higher parental education and affluent grandparents will increase the well-being of young adults. Childhood family socioeconomic status explains 4-13 percent of young adult variation in hourly wage rates, 15-33 percent of the variation in years of education, and 5-12 percent of the variation in annual hours of employment.[15]

Interracial differences in childhood family socioeconomic status are an important factor in explaining interracial differences in young adult well-being. Racial differences in childhood family status can account for 48 percent of the young adult racial wage differential, 21 percent of the racial employment differential, and negative 98 percent of the racial differential in years of education.[16] In other words, African-American/white differences in childhood home family values tend to expand wage inequality and have no impact on hours, but reduce differences in years of education.

Racial discrimination within the labor market continues to be a major determinant of well-being, explaining at least 40 percent of the hourly wage differential and 80 percent of the difference in hours of employment. However, greater effort among African Americans reduces the educational gap by 33 percent.

Throughout our discussion we have assumed that our indicators of family values and behaviors capture attitudes and preferences that are independent of the family's socioeconomic status. In reality, that is unlikely. Consider household efficacy and planning (Efplan72), household index of trust or hostility (Trust72), and family risk avoidance (Risk72)—the family values that exhibit the largest white/African-American differential (Table 3). Collectively, those variables tend to increase wages, hours and years of education (Table 6). Therefore, it would seem reasonable to draw the conclusion that such presumed family behaviors play some part in expanding interracial inequality. That is, if African-American families were to become more risk averse, more trusting and less hostile, and more efficacious in their planning, we would observe less interracial inequality in well-being.

But that conclusion is limited by the fact that each of the variables may be correlated to the family's class position. Many of the components of each of the variables is undoubtedly related to the family's contemporary economic position (see appendix). Other indicators of family values, such as the presence of reading material, whether a woman is head of the household, and whether an individual's parents worked long hours or desire more work hours, also are correlated with socioeconomic status. For example, a poor family may have a strong preference for education, but possess no discretionary funds to purchase books, journals and newspapers. Accordingly, we may wish to retain our statistical conclusion that family values matter, but we do so with the understanding that we may very well have overestimated how much those values matter in determining the socioeconomic well-being of young adults. Also, we have greater confidence in the qualitative and quantitative predictive accuracy of our indicators of family values *as a collective unit* than we have in the predictive accuracy of a particular indicator of family behavior.

Implications for Public Policy

Our policy conclusions are straightforward. First, both race and sex anti-discrimination policies are not sufficient and greatly needed. Policies that prohibit discrimination are sufficient in an environment where discriminatory treatment is not a major factor in explaining racial and sexual differences in well-being. Our results suggest that racial discrimination substantially reduces the well-being of young adult African Americans. It may also be true that sexual discrimination has a large and negative influence on the well-being of young women, but we have not provided precise estimates of the impact of sexual discrimination. Hence, the most appropriate policy is one of aggressive affirmative action by employers combined with serious penalties for those organizations that engage in discriminatory behavior.

Our results also suggest it is appropriate for government to adopt strong measures to counterbalance class effects on individual well-being. We have uncovered class effects so large that even if we were to observe individuals of the same race and sex, raised in homes with the same family values, large class differences among them would produce sizable differences in young adult well-being. Indeed, our statistical results show that current well-being among young adults is affected by the inequality of class status for both their parents and grandparents. In the absence of serious redistributive policies, inequality of class status will persist across generations without end.

Future Research

The information presented here has left many unanswered questions that will be addressed by future research. For example, we are currently using this data to derive more precise statistics on the extent of discrimination against women. Women's well-being in the marketplace is very much related to marital status and the presence of young children at home, and future research must incorporate those variables into the estimation process. A second research question is whether the impact of childhood family environment increases or decreases with age. If the impact of childhood family status diminishes with age, it would imply that market processes tend to become increasingly meritocratic with individual experience. Future research also will explore race-group differences in the impact of family values.

Finally, our analysis has focused on wages, hours of employment and years of education. Future research will examine the relationship between family environment and such variables as self-employment, labor force participation, the number of spells and duration of public assistance, and transitions in family status among young adults.

Notes

[1] Neal and Johnson used the student-teacher ratio, disadvantaged student ratio, drop-out rate and teacher turnover rate to represent school environment.

[2] Moss and Tilly (1995:4) write:

> We have identified two clusters of soft skills that are important to employers in our interviews. The first, interaction, has to do with ability to interact with customers and co-workers. This cluster includes friendliness, teamwork, ability to fit in, spoken communication skills, and appearance and attire. A second cluster we call motivation takes in characteristics such as enthusiasm, positive work attitude, commitment, dependability and willingness to learn. We distinguish both from hard skills, including skills in math, reading and writing; past experience; "brightness;" ability to learn; educational attainment; and physical strength.

[3] Braddock and McPartland (1987) confirm these arguments in their nationally representative (U.S.) survey of 4,078 employers. They find equal opportunity barriers (preferential treatment for whites) in the three most critical stages of the labor demand process: targeting a potential pool of employees, hiring and entry, and promotion within the firm once hired. For Braddock and McPartland, segregated job networks, information bias, statistical discrimination and closed internal labor markets are the crucial processes which perpetuate discrimination and link the supply of and demand for laborers.

[4] I used the CPI-U-X1, consumer price index for urban families that uses the rental equivalence approach to measure the value of housing. See http://www.bls.gov/cpihome.htm for details on the CPI-U-X1.

[5] The hourly wage rates are geometric means.

[6] We estimated the following model:

$W_c = \beta_0 + X_f\beta_1 + V_f\beta_2 + E$, where $\beta_1 > 0$, $\beta_2 > 0$, and E is a random error term. This model states that the well-being of children (W_c) is a function of family status (X_f) and family values (V_f) of the households.

[7] See Freeman (1986) and Datcher-Loury and Loury (1986) for analyses of religion and labor market outcomes for young African-American males. They show that attending church does produce values and behaviors that are conducive to increasing labor supply and increasing earnings. However, the current study captures religious affiliation, not actual church attendance.

[8] Although some of my work (1999, 1997) has shown there are racial differences in the impact of religious affiliation on wages and educational attainment, I was unable to establish a causal explanation for the difference.

[9] The dependent variable is ln(wage), while the independent variable is ln(average income for 1968-1972). Therefore, the coefficient on Log5yinc represents an elasticity.

[10] The typical American school year is 180 days. So, 52 days = 0.29 x 180 days.

[11] For men, the white/African-American wage gap is 0.17 log points. For women, the gap is 0.09 log points. The race effect from Tables 6 and 7 is 0.081 log points.

[12] I ran four regressions for each race-sex group. The explanatory variables for the "basic" model were Educate, Student, Age, Age2, Nrtheast, Nrthcent, West, Unemrate, and Trend. The explanatory variables for the "values" model included all of the variables from the basic model plus Fmhelp72, Efplan72, Trust72 , Wrklng72, Aspire72,

Savact72, Ecnomz72, Risk72, Horizn72, Conect72, Mnyact72, Achiev72, Hdmoth72, Readalot, readnone, Langdiff, Baptis72, Method72, Episco72, Presby72, Luther72, OthrPr72, Cathol72, and Jewish72. Whether an individual was raised in a female-headed household (Hdmoth72) does not necessarily indicate anything definitive regarding the values of the household. However, we opted to include it in the values regression to give our results a conservative statistical bias.

The explanatory variables for the "class" model include each of the variables in the basic model plus Hnqual72, SentsT72, Agehd72 , Grwrur72, Grwtwn72, Grwcty72, Log5yinc, Hefalths, Hefagths, Hefadegr, Hemolths, Hemogths, Hemodegr, Hfa_ne , Hfa _west, Hfa _nc , Hfa _sout, Hmo_ne, Hmo _ west, Hmo _nc , Hmo_sout, w72prote, w72manag, w72busow, W72clrsl, W72craft, W72opert, W72farmr, W72labor, W72misc, H72prote, H72manag, H72busow, H72clrsl, H72craft, H72opert, H72farmr, H72labor, H72misc, Gp_poor, Gp_rich, Gfa_ne, Gfa_west, Gfa_nc , Gfa_sout, Gmo_ne, Gmo_west, Gmo_nc , Gmo_sout, Gfprotec, Gfmanage, Gfbusown, Gfclrsal, Gfcraft, Gfoperat, Gffarmer, Gflabrer, and Lumpsum.

The "All" model included the complete set of basic values and class explanatory variables. The upper bound for the values model was calculated by subtracting the R^2 of the basic model from the R^2 of the values model. The lower bound for the values model was calculated by subtracting the R^2 of the class model from the R^2 of the all-variables regression. The upper bound for the class model was calculated by subtracting the R^2 of the basic model from the R^2 of the class model. The lower bound for the class model was calculated by subtracting the R^2 of the values model from the R^2 of the all-variables regression. The table on the next page contains the R^2 from each regression.

[13] See Table 6.

[14] These figures are derived from Table 7. For example, when family values are added to the basic model, the log wage differential declines from -0.2075 to -0.1399. When all variables are included in the model, the log wage differential is -0.0829, implying family values account for -0.01 to 0.07 log points, with a midpoint of 0.03. Dividing 0.03 by -0.2075 suggests that values can account for 14 percent of the racial wage differential.

[15] See Table 6.

[16] See Note 13 for explanation of how these figures are derived.

AFRICAN-AMERICAN

	LOGWAGE	HOURS	EDUCATE
All	0.27	0.28	0.44
Basic	0.11	0.16	0.09
Values	0.17	0.20	0.19
Class	0.24	0.26	0.38

	LOGWAGE	HOURS	EDUCATE
All	0.34	0.22	0.35
Basic	0.20	0.06	0.05
Values	0.28	0.15	0.14
Class	0.32	0.18	0.31

WHITE

	LOGWAGE	HOURS	EDUCATE
All	0.29	0.18	0.44
Basic	0.22	0.11	0.05
Values	0.24	0.14	0.27
Class	0.27	0.16	0.38

	LOGWAGE	HOURS	EDUCATE
All	0.28	0.11	0.46
Basic	0.20	0.04	0.05
Values	0.24	0.06	0.31
Class	0.26	0.09	0.38

Appendix

This appendix provides information on the components of each of the family environment variables. All information is taken from Survey Reach Center (1972), which also provides greater detail on the precise wording of each question that is used as a component of each variable. The head of household is the reference for each question.

FMHELP72. Would you feel you had to help your parents or other relatives (more) if you had more money?

1. Yes
3. Yes, qualified; depends
5. No
9. Not applicable; don't know.

HNQUAL72. 1972 housing and neighborhood quality. Family receives one point for each affirmative response to the following seven questions:

Owns home?

Lives 5-30 miles from center of city of 50,000 or more?

Single-family home?

Neighborhood of single-family houses?

Value per room Value = (10 x rent for non-owners) $2,000 or more?

2 or more extra rooms?

Dwelling contains running water, inside toilet and does not need extensive or major repairs?

EFPLAN72. 1972 reported efficacy and planning. Family receives one point for each affirmative response to the following six questions:

Sure life would work out?

Plans life ahead?

Gets to carry out things?

Finishes things?

Rather save for future?

Thinks about things that might happen in future?

TRUST72. 1972 trust or hostility. Family receives one point for each affirmative response to the following five questions:

Does not get angry easily?

Matters what others think?

Trusts most other people?

Believes life of average man getting better?

Believes there are not a lot of people who have good things they don't deserve?

WRKLNG72. Whether head worked long hours in 1971 and/or wanted more work at time of 1972 interview?

0. Head worked 2,500 or fewer hours in 1971 (V39 = 1-2500) and did not want more work (V209 = 5, 9, O)

1. Inappropriate, head not employed at time of 1972 interview (V208 = 0)

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2. Head worked more than 2,500 hours in 1971 (V39 >2500), and/or head in labor force in 1972 and wanted more work (V209 = 1)

ASPIRE72. Aspiration-ambition (1972). Family receives weighted points for each affirmative response to the following questions:
Might make purposive move?
Wanted more work and/or worked > 2,500 hours (2 points added—1 point added to neutralize the inappropriate responses.)
Might quit a job because it was not challenging?
Prefers a job with chances for making more money even if dislikes job?
Dissatisfied with self?
Spends time figuring out how to get more money?
Plans to get a new job, knows what type of job *and* knows what it might pay (2 points added)?
Neutralize inappropriate responses and one point for plans for job regardless of details.

SAVACT72. Real earnings acts (1972). Family receives weighted points for each affirmative response to the following questions:
Saved more than $75 on additions and repairs (2 points —1 point for non-homeowners who did not save more than $75)?
Saved more than $75 growing own food (2 points)?
Saved more than $75 on car repairs (2 points)?
1 point for non-car owners to neutralize.
Head of family taking courses or lessons with economic potential?
Head of family spends spare time productively?

ECNOMZ72. Economizing (1972). Family receives one point for each affirmative response to the following six questions:
Spend less than $150 a year on alcohol?
Spend less than $150 a year on cigarettes?
Received more than $100 worth of free help?
Do not own a '70 or later year model car?

Eat together most of time?
Spend less than $260 a year on eating out?

RISK72. Risk Avoidance (1972). Family receives weighted points for each affirmative response to the following questions:
Newest (assumed to be best) car in good condition?
Neutralize non-car owners (2 points)
All cars are insured?
Uses seat belts some of the time (1 point)?
Uses seat belts all the time (2 points)?
Has medical insurance or a way to get free care?
Head smokes less than one pack a day?
Have some liquid savings but < than two months?
Have two months' income saved (2 points)?

HORIZN72. Horizon proxies (1972). Family receives weighted points for each affirmative response to the following questions:
Is sure whether will or will not move?
Has explicit plans for children's education (2 points)?
Neutralize those with no children in school (1 point).
Has plans for an explicit kind of new job?
Knows and mentions what kind of training new job requires?
Has substantial savings relative to income?
Expects to have a child more than one year hence, or expects no more children and is doing something to limit the number of children (2 points)?
Neutralize those who expect child within one year and inappropriate cases.

CONECT72. Connectedness to potential sources of help. Family receives 1-2 points for each affirmative response to the following eleven questions:
Attended a PTA meeting within a year?
Neutralize those with no children in school.
Attends church once a month or more?
Watches television more than 1 hour/day?

Reads a newspaper once a week or more?

Knows 2-5 neighbors by name?

Knows 6 or more neighbors by name (2 points)?

Has relatives within walking distance of dwelling unit?

Goes to organizations once a month or more?

Goes to a bar or tavern once a month or more?

Belongs to a labor union and pays dues?

MNYACT72. Money-earning acts (current money-earning behavior). Family receives 1-2 points for each affirmative response to the following questions:

Head worked more than 2,000 hours in 1971?

Wife worked more than 1,000 hours in 1971 (2 points)?

Neutralize no wife.

Head self-employed and/or owns a business?

Has changed jobs in past year and present job pays more than previous one?

Has done something about a better job?

If employed:

Head seldom or never late for work?

Head rarely or never fails to go to work when not sick?

Head has extra jobs (or ways of making money)?

If unemployed:

Head seldom or never late for work?

Head rarely or never failed to go to work when not sick?

Head has been to more than one place in past few weeks to find a job?

Low reservation price: No jobs not worth taking, or they pay less than $1.50/hour?

If retired, housewife, disabled:

Has been to more than one place in past few weeks to find a job?

Low reservation price: No jobs not worth taking, or they pay less than $1.50/hour?

SENTST72. Score on sentence completion test.

A point is given for each correct reply on a multiple-choice (fill in the blank) examination. Scores range from zero to thirteen.

ACHIEV72. Index of Achievement Motivation. Family receives 1 point for each affirmative response to the following sixteen questions:
Would quit job if no longer challenging?
Rather have child be leader than popular?
Rather have child be leader than do work teacher expects?
Rather do better at what you try than have more friends?
Rather do better at what you try than have others listen to your point of view?
Rather have job where you think for yourself than work with nice group?
Rather have job where you think for yourself than have a say in what goes on?
Rather hear that your opinion carried weight than that people would like living next door to you?
Rather hear others say he can do what he sets his mind on doing than that other people like him?
Rather hear others say that people go to him for important advice than that he's fun at a party?
Does not get upset at all when taking tests?
Heartbeat normal when taking tests?
Did not worry about failure when taking tests?
Did not perspire when taking important tests?
Would want to know more about tests if he did well on them?
Would think more about future tests if told he was doing well on test?

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ARTICLE | 3

The State of Black Europe

BY CLARENCE LUSANE

Europe has never been all white. The historic and contemporary presence of people of color throughout the region challenges any notion of Europe as simply the evolution of white experiences, white contributions and white legitimacy.

White European dominance has always been contested space. That is not to minimize the impact of racism or the hegemonic authority of European whites, but mainly to underscore that resistance to racism, white supremacy and a white Euro-centrism has been constant. Such resistance continues in the form of struggles against racist immigration policies, police violence and murders, assaults by right-wing extremists, and other social, cultural and economic problems faced by people of color.

In most European nations, people of color are categorized under the generic label "black," a term that includes people from Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. While the term is being contested and undergoing change, it is still used to capture a broad array of peoples of color who have either historically resided in the region or recently immigrated, and who share the historic experience of colonialism. At the same time, the notion of specific black identities is different in each country. To be a black in Germany, for instance, does not necessarily mean the same thing as being a black in England, France, Hungary or Italy.

The differences come from both official state definitions, popular notions about who is in what group and self-definitions.

As historian Ivan Van Sertima and others note, the African presence in Europe dates back to antiquity.[1] The oldest skull ever found in Europe, in Dusseldorf, Germany, is that of an African. The black Moorish invasion and occupation in parts of Europe, particularly in Spain and southern Europe, from 715 through the 16th century is generally well known.[2] While the Moors were eventually driven out, Africans remained in the region and settled in many places.

That presence continues today. In every nation in Europe, people of African descent can be found. Though for the most part the number of blacks is relatively small, the prominence of Afro-Europeans in a wide range of areas is growing. Due largely to the popularity of sports and music personalities, there is an awareness of people of African descent in England and France, But generally speaking, the experiences and situations of Afro-Caribbeans, Africans and even African Americans in the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Southern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe are unknown. There are significant numbers of people of African descent in the region, and they suffer from specific forms of racism aimed at dark-skinned people.

Some authors have noted the phenomena of "multiple racisms," that is, in a given society, different ethno-racial groups may experience racism in dissimilar and distinct ways, although all may suffer from a general form of racial prejudice and discrimination.[3] In Europe, it can be argued that those of African descent experience expressions of racism distinct from Asians, the Roma (Gypsies) or people from the Middle East. For example, the invective "nigger" is still hurled almost exclusively at people of African descent across the region.[4] The identification of specific forms of anti-dark-skinned, anti-African racism is by no means meant to diminish racism and other forms of intolerance visited upon other groups. The difference lies not in one form being better or worse than another, but in the specific historical-social contexts out of which particular groups emerged.

Other groups suffering from racial and ethnic discrimination include the Roma, Turks, Kurds, southern Asians and Middle Easterners. The Roma, whom King Henry VIII called "Europe's most unwanted race," continue to endure unbridled discrimination and oppression throughout Europe.[5] In Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, the Roma experience physical attacks, nearly universal unemployment, and widespread attitudes that view them as less than human.

The variety of peoples of color in Europe complicates our understanding of different racial views embraced by Europeans. There is no one European view of race or racial differences. While blacks from Africa and the Caribbean in France are seen (and see themselves) as French in every sense of the term, Afro-Germans rarely obtain German citizenship despite several generations of residency. In most instances, nationalism and ethnic differences among white Europeans, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, lead to more conflicts than differences between whites and blacks. Although people of color play increasingly visible roles, from entertainment and sports stars to elected officials and human rights leaders, their small numbers are no threat to the lifestyles, employment or general opportunities available to whites. In other words, resistance to blacks is based more on ideological and politically-derived notions and motives rather than any concrete data that whites are losing ground.

Who's Black?

The term black as a category for all people of color is losing favor somewhat, due to the increasingly different positions that various groups find themselves in regarding their socioeconomic status. In England, for instance, third-generation Afro-Caribbeans tend to be, on average, much more integrated and economically and socially secure than first-generation Pakistanis. Some argue, in fact, that the category "black" really doesn't represent different social locations, and that it is more important to see each group in its own particular light. Also, a rising black nationalist ideology among some people of African descent in England, France and Germany advocates a "blacks only" or "blacks first" perspective that undermines collective action among people of color. It is seen in the growth of nationalist groups such as the U.S.-based Nation of Islam. Similar calls of nationalism or ethnocentrism come from other groups as well.

One difficulty in assessing the impact of racism on people of color is that few countries collect data that is racially useful. Census counts don't include racial categories, for instance, and researchers are left to calculate in most instances from immigration data and respondents' information on nation of origin. Needless to say, calculating racial counts by nation of origin is highly problemmatic, particularly given that racial categories themselves are social constructs that are fluid and elastic. It is no more correct to conclude that an immigrant from Jamaica is "black" than to believe that one from the United States or Canada is "white."

Given such caveats, immigrant and census data, and some independent studies, provide a clue to the general numbers of racial minorities, particularly those of African descent, in Europe. According to research by the European Union, out of a total population of about 320 million, there are about 17.6 million immigrants in the 15 member states of the European Community. It is roughly estimated that about six million are from the developing world, the bulk of whom are distributed in Germany, France and the United Kingdom.[6] Other research shows there are about 300,000 Afro-Germans, with some estimates as high as 500,000.[7] In France, out of a population of 56.5 million, people of African descent constitute about one million.[8] And, in the UK, the African-Caribbean population is about 1.6 percent (880,000) out of 52 million.[9]

Perhaps the most significant factor is the relatively small number of non-whites in the region. In the United Kingdom, for example, blacks constitute only about 5 percent of the population—with people of African descent totaling less than half of that number—and are disproportionately concentrated in London, Bristol, Liverpool and a few other major cities. In Central and Eastern Europe, there are small numbers of people of African descent, many of whom are former students who never left or could not leave after the Cold War. Finally, there are a number of African-American expatriates living in many states across Europe.[10]

Europe United (and Divided)

A pan-European consciousness has emerged in recent years in a number of ways: the development of the Euro, the NAFTA-like Maastricht Treaty, the increasing importance of the European Union, the elimination of borders, and NATO expansion. More than ever, a European identity is being promoted and developed among citizens of the region, with a concerted and calculated effort to minimize economic and political differences among states being coordinated by political leaders and policy-makers. Those occurrences, however, coincide with a significant growth in racism, xenophobia and anti-immigrant passions. Both in rhetoric and in political and policy actions, a backlash against "blacks" is evident in Western, Central, Southern and Eastern Europe, with minorities of all colors under attack and on the defensive.

In the political arena, there has been a disturbing success on the part of racist and extremist political parties to win elected office. While small in number, extremists have discovered the politics (and the rhetoric) of anti-government, pro-working-class populism. They have gained mass audiences, media exposure and quasi-legitimacy by winning elections and engaging conservative, liberal and radical politicians on relatively equal electoral grounds. Outside mainstream political systems, racist and fascist organizations have experienced a growth spurt in recent years, becoming bolder (and often deadly) in their physical attacks on racial minorities and immigrants, making many areas of Europe unsafe for travel. Assaults also emerge in a context of virulent anti-immigration legislation put in place to discourage and reverse long-standing liberal immigration laws.

Finally, it should be noted that racism and discrimination against blacks are present in the criminal justice systems of the region. While disproportionate numbers of blacks are being incarcerated or deported, police brutality against racial minorities—including murder—has skyrocketed.

At the regional, state and community levels, albeit for different reasons and with a different sense of urgency, resistance to racism has been steady and resolute. Governments and even the European Parliament have been forced to address the issues of racism, xenophobia and fascism. National and regional anti-racism organizations exist in virtually every country, particularly in Western Europe, but also in Central and Eastern Europe, and have been effective in important ways. There also has been a tremendous fight back against racism on the part of ethnic and racial minorities. Critically, links are being made among communities of color and ethnic and national minorities, across Europe and in the United States.

Rise of Racist and Neo-Fascist Parties

One of the most disturbing trends in recent years has been a growing support for racist and right-wing extremist political parties. In some instances, the groups are split-offs from more violent fascist and even neo-Nazi organizations. In others, political leaders have advocated rigidly conservative and racist views to explain dislocations associated with such factors as economic globalization. Broad, post-Communist political transformations in the area have created destabilized societies that have found it easy to blame immigrants and "others" for their internal problems.[11]

According to the Minister to the European Parliament (MEP) Glyn Ford, Special Rappatour for the European Parliament, since the 1983 by-elections in France, when the French National Front won a surprising number of victories, more than 10 million people have voted for extreme right and neo-Nazi parties.[12] The National Front, headed by rightist Jean-Marie Le Pen, is in complete political control of four towns in France, and has at least 275 regional councilors.[13]

France is far from alone in confronting electoral challenges from the extreme right. In Belgium, the Vlaams Blok party, whose slogan is "Our own people first," has won recent electoral victories. Similarly in Denmark, the Danish Peoples Party is increasing its share of the vote, in part, based on rhetoric against Muslims and immigrants of color. Other examples include the Centrumdemokraten (CD) in the Netherlands, the Freedom Party in Austria, and the MSI in Italy, which has been losing support but remains a political force. They are not only having an impact within their own states, but are seeking power regionally. In 1999, there were 32 MEPs from six different extreme right parties, organized into a number of blocs including the Group of the European Right.[14] Their role in the EP has been to resist anti-racism efforts by liberals and progressives.

All indications are that the political right will continue to grow in Europe. Economic and political upheavals sweeping most states in the Central and Eastern regions, and unstable economies in the West do not bode well. Increasingly, there is popular support for blaming "others" for the woes facing all Europeans, rather than focusing on other causes. Politicians take advantage of the anxieties to build support for more conservative policies, and the parliamentary system of proportional representation facilitates inroads made by extremist forces. With as little as 5 percent of the vote, parties gain political seats and a popular forum in which to spew their venom. In some small towns in France, for instance, extremist politicians have passed laws banning rap music and removed books on multiculturalism from the shelves of local public libraries.

Growth of Racist Violence

Racist violence also remains a major problem. In recent years, there has been an increase in group and individual attacks on people of color and ethnic minorities—particularly Africans, Arabs, South Asians and the Roma. The European Union reports that more than 12,000 racist incidents were recorded in Europe in 1996.

Across Europe, according to the *European Race Audit*, physical violence is rampant against immigrants and racial minorities. In Bulgaria, five white teenagers were convicted in 1998 of the racial murder of a 19-year-old Roma. In Italy and Spain, homeless Africans have been killed by racists in a series of attacks that have escalated since the mid-1990s. One case that received international coverage in early 1999 was the racially motivated murder of Steven Lawrence in England. On April 22, 1993, Lawrence was stabbed to death by a group of five or six white youths while waiting for a bus. Not only were the police late in responding as he lay dying on the street, they botched the investigation, slandered Lawrence's family and lost or hid evidence. After years of protest, a national inquiry and a stunning 1,000-page report, the British government admitted its complicity in the injustice. The family received an apology from Prime Minister Tony Blair and the head of Scotland Yard, and Blair confessed on the floor of the House of Commons that England had not gotten rid of racism.

It was organized resistance by the Afro-Caribbean community and vast support from other communities of color and many white Britains that forced the issue into the popular domain. Just as the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles was a catalyst for national mobilization around police brutality, the Lawrence case fired up hundreds of thousands across the UK to speak out against racist violence and state indifference.

Immigration Policy

On June 21, 1948, right after World War II, the *SS Empire Winbush* landed at Tilbury Docks in East London carrying 492 Jamaicans.[15] It was the beginning of a massive wave of blacks from the Caribbean to England that would profoundly shape and racialize the nation's immigration policies. To address its labor shortage in the post-war period, England not only embraced a liberal immigration policy, but aggressively sought "colored" immigrants. Less than a decade later, politicians such as the late ultra-conservative Enoch Power would call for the reversal of the policies, and for the deportation of England's blacks. In the last three decades, immigration of people of color from the developing world to the states of Europe has generated antagonism, leading political leaders, the media and conservative political forces to target them as scapegoats for Europe's economic downturn.

Across Europe, the immigration of people of color continued to be a feature of the 1980s and 1990s. While many came to find work, a large number simply came to be with their families. In the Netherlands, for example, the number of Caribbean, African and Middle East immigrants has grown immensely. Official estimates count about 300,000 Surinamese, 260,000 Turks, and more than 200,000 Moroccans out of a total population of 15.5 million.[16] The non-European, foreign-born population continues to grow throughout the region, including Switzerland (18.9 percent), Austria (9 percent), Belgium (9 percent), Germany (8.8 percent), France (6 percent), and Denmark (4.2 percent).[17] Again, while those immigrants are not all people of color, a disproportionately high number are, and they make up the new faces of present-day Europe. Their growth has unleashed a vicious legislative backlash against immigrants of color.

In nearly every Western European country, immigration laws have tightened. What has emerged is a right-center consensus on immigration that seeks to close the doors on people from the global South, and, where possible, deport and reduce the colored populations that are already resident. In Austria, a new law was put in place in 1988 to stop refugees at the border. In Germany, there has been fierce conservative resistance to efforts to reform the nation's citizenship laws. In Switzerland, in a move reminiscent of California's Proposition 187, a new law was passed that requires physicians to deny medical service to those who are not legally in the country.[18]

Such policy battles will constitute perhaps the most serious confrontations that European states face in the coming century. Calls for ethnic or racial purity, while impossible to implement, if carried to their logical extension could ignite atrocities of the worst kind, as witnessed in the ethnically-driven breakup of Yugoslavia.

Global Connections

Extremist and racist groups have long been linked internationally. In the modern era, the Internet and advanced technologies facilitate the connections, and more directly tie European racists to their counterparts in the rest of the world, including the United States.

Racist and neo-fascist groups are not only working together across Europe, but have ties to groups in North America and elsewhere. One U.S.-based group that has reached out to the European right is the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC). The CCC, formed in 1985, is the heir of the 1950s Citizens Councils of America—popularly known as the White Citizens Councils—which were created to resist the civil rights revolution in the South. The CCC opposes "race-mixing," thinks the Voting Rights and Civil Rights acts should be repealed, and advocates eugenics-based solutions to the "race problem." More important than their racist rhetoric are the direct ties of council members to groups such as the Invisible Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the National Association for the Advancement of White People, the neo-Nazi

National Alliance and other right-wing extremist groups.

The CCC has gone global, establishing international ties to racist and fascist groups in a number of states in Western Europe. According to a report issued by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Mark Cotterill, head of the CCC's youth division, is originally from Britain and was active with the neo-fascist British National Front. Cotterill also has been associated with right-wing extremists in Ireland. In the fall of 1998, states the report, the CCC sent a delegation of its leadership to a meeting in France sponsored by Jean Marie Le Pen and his National Front.

International solidarity around race, however, has not been limited to right-wing and racist groups. Progressive African Americans have a long history of working with and supporting the struggles of people of African descent in Europe. As political scientist Ronald Walters documents in *Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements*, the links between Afro-Britains and African Americans are long and enduring.[19] From W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey to Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr., the ties have been dynamic although primarily one-way. While blacks in England have followed and often emulated African-American politics and culture, few African Americans are aware of black British activists such as black nationalist Michael X, MP Bernie Grant and civil rights activist Lee Jasper.

In recent years, black (and white) Europeans have closely followed racial developments in the United States, from the O.J. Simpson case and controversies surrounding Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, to Jesse Jackson's perennial presidential campaigns, the Million Man March and police killings of blacks.

African-American scholars also have been active in building connections with activists and scholars in England and elsewhere. Historians Barbara Ransby and Manning Marable are both on the editorial board of the Institute of Race Relations in the U.K. Professors bell hooks and Cornel West are popular speakers in the region, and the late poet and lesbian activist Audrey Lourde played a critical role in the emergence of Afro-German politics in the mid-1980s. Such encounters will likely grow in the future.

Fighting Back

At the grassroots level and in official circles, there has been an organized resistance to racism. Regional groups, such as the Standing Committee on Race in Europe (SCORE), SOS-Racism, and the Institute of Race Relations, have been at the forefront in exposing problems of race and in mobilizing communities to fight for their rights. SCORE has been educating and organizing black communities about developments in the European Union, and SOS-Racism has been fighting against racist immigration legislation as well as confronting the problem of racist violence against African and Arab people by Europe's growing array of neo-Nazi and fascist groups. SOS-Racism has been particularly in the thick of battle in France, where it more or less served as the principle opposition to the National Front.[20]

At the state level, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Union (EU) all have addressed the issue. In 1994, the European Parliament established the Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia to document and investigate racist movements in the region, and make recommendations to the EP about needed legislation to address the rights of Europe's ethnic, migrant and immigrant communities. It has issued a number of reports that activists as well as legislators have found highly useful.

In 1997, the EP launched the European Year Against Racism (EYAR), and for the first time in European history, there was a concerted and coordinated effort by member states to attack racism, xenophobia and all forms of intolerance. As Padraig Flynn, European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, stated at the time, "I believe that 1997 has the potential to be a historic year. It is the first time that there has been an agreement between the [European] Community institutions and member states to engage in concrete action to combat racism within the existing institutional framework. It provides a very practical vehicle for the Community and the member states to take action together and to take a firm stance against the rising tide of racism through the EU." [21]

The one-year campaign was given a budget of 5 million pounds to launch its activities, which included political events, educational forums, information campaigns, local and regional projects, and a Web site. The six objectives of the EYAR were:

1. To highlight the threat to basic human rights and economic cohesion posed by racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism;
2. To encourage thought and debate on how to combat racism;
3. To promote an exchange of experiences, best practices, and effective strategies developed at all levels of society to combat racism;
4. To distribute information on good practice and effective strategies among anti-racism organizations to increase their efficiency;
5. To make national integration policies understood, in particular in the areas of employment, education, training and housing; and
6. To draw on the experiences of those affected by racism and promote their involvement in society.[22]

The public relations goal of the EYAR was not only to initiate its own events and projects, but to be visible at as many public gatherings as possible. An effort was made to involve many different types of organizations, including the media, trade unions, student groups, religious organizations and community groups.

Conclusion

Europe faces a multiracial, multiethnic future whether it wants it or not. Issues of race, class, gender, nationality and other concerns will continue to unfold in the period ahead, as the region responds to wide and often troubling transitions. A critical variable affecting the quality of race relations will be the interplay between democratic inclusion and intolerance, and how much popular and official support each is accorded.

While the position of people of African descent will likely rise as they continue to integrate and assimilate into England, France, Germany and the Netherlands, their numbers will remain relatively low, impacting the degree and intensity of race consciousness and the available space for race-conscious political action. In any case, the coloring of Europe grows, and it will be important that African Americans continue to build economic, political and cultural ties.

Notes

[1] See Ivan Van Sertima, ed., *African Presence in Early Europe* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996).

[2] See Ivan Van Sertima, ed., *The Golden Age of the Moor* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

[3] Goldberg, David, ed., *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

[4] Hockenos, Paul, *Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 149.

[5] Sebestyen, Amanda, "Europe's Most Unwanted Race," CARF, February/March 1999, 14.

[6] Ford, Glyn, *Report on the Findings of the Inquiry*, (Luxembourg: European Parliament, Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991), 119.

[7] Blackshire-Belay, Carol Aisha, "Introduction: Critical Essays on the African-German Experience," in Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay, ed., *The African-German Experience: Critical Essays* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), ix, and Liz Fekete and Frances Webber, *Inside Racist Europe* (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1994), 47.

[8] Ibid, Fekete and Webber, 45.

[9] Owen, David , *Black People in Great Britain* (Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations of the Economic and Social Research Council, 1994), 1.

[10] See, for example, Michael Fabre, *From Harlem to Paris: Black American Writers in France, 1840–1980* (Urbana, IL: University of Chicago, 1993).

[11] See, for example, Rand C. Lewis, *The Neo-Nazis and German Unification* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

[12] Ford, Glyn, "Briefing Notes for Racism and Xenophobia," speech at Back to Basics Conference, October 10, 1998.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid, Ford, 11.

[15] Paul, Kathleen, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 111.

[16] Robinson, Eugene, "Blending In, Or Wiping Out? Immigration Tests a European Society," *Washington Post*, July 5, 1998.

[17] "Dutch Diversity," *Washington Post*, July 5, 1998.

[18] *European Race Audit*, February 1998.

[19] Walters, Ronald, *Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995).

[20] Morris, Lorezno, "African Immigrants in France: SOS Racism vs. the National Front," *National Political Science Review*, Volume 7, 20–36.

[21] "A Historic Moment," *Newsletter for the European Year Against Racism, January 1997*, 1.

[22] Ibid, 2.

ARTICLE | 4

Color-blind Redistricting and the Efficacy of Black Representation

BY RONALD WALTERS

In the early pages of my work, *Black Presidential Politics in America*, I began to wrestle with the theoretical basis upon which any minority—blacks in particular—might have been conceived to participate fairly and equitably within a supposedly democratic framework of government.[1] I found there was a flaw in the rules of political legitimacy for elections or decisions based upon the firm principle of majority rule, because of the existence of groups which were outside the process of consent. The rules were constructed with individuals in mind who existed within a closed system of social authority bounded by white male status. No special arrangement had to be made because the original concept of democracy did not conceive of the possibility that other groups would have political franchise.

In this, I posed a question which was derived from Jean Jacque Rousseau, who suggested that members of the minority on the losing side of a vote accepted the will of the majority as legitimate because of "the pre-conditioned existence of an egalitarian basis of society. The clear presumption of this pre-condition was that there was no *permanent* minority."[2] One could be on the losing side today and then on the winning side tomorrow. But what if one could not even participate in the process, or if allowed to do so, was positioned in society in such a way that he was on the losing side most of the time?

I suggested that blacks have constituted a nearly permanent minority, not only in the numerical sense—that is, that their participation in great decisions of policy might have little force regardless of which side they were on—but also in the sense that their very right to participate at all has been under constant historical scrutiny and change, being devalued in one era of history and valued in another. What is the resolution of that dilemma?

One key question was raised by James Madison, who asked in the 1787 Constitutional debates over the issue of majority rule: "How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded against?"[3] A modern political scientist, Robert Dahl, attempted to provide an answer. He said: "While a citizen may make certain allowances for majority decisions that displease him, the more frequently he expects to be in a minority, the less likely he is to accept the principle of majority rule. [Also] one can perhaps accept calmly the prospect of being in a minority as long as the issues are trivial. But the more important the issues, the more difficult it is to accept defeat by a hostile majority."[4]

As it was in South Africa, where Afrikaners made Parliament the supreme democratic decision-making body but excluded the black majority from its deliberations, where there is a permanent racial majority which occupies a subordinate status in society, the use of a majoritarian democracy may constitute political hegemony. One of the common ways to exclude blacks was to draw political districts which diluted their ability to register their voting power in the political system.[5]

America's Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to resolve that flaw in democratic theory by undoing the political hegemony of the white majority in the area of political participation. Electoral districts are the basis of that participation, because that is where people cast their vote, where they run for office and where they expect the most direct returns from the political system.

Racial Neutrality in Voting Rights

Racial representation became a special source of concern in the 1980s and 1990s, whether one considers political representation or representation in the workforce and other areas of American life. Yet, race was the basis upon which blacks were driven from the polls and political office from the late 1870s to the Second World War. Whereas the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was conceived as a remedial instrument by which Congress would implement the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, successive decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1990s invalidated the use of race as the main basis of drawing not only Congressional District boundaries, but all political jurisdictions.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to eliminate racial discrimination in voting, and Section 2 of the act made it unlawful to deny or abridge the right of anyone to vote on account of race or color. In 1980, in *Mobile v. Bolden*, the court set a standard for violations of the law, if it could be shown that a state had the purpose or intent to discriminate. But that standard was difficult to prove, and 1982 amendments to the act established a "discriminatory results or effect" standard. Under the doctrine of the "totality of the circumstances," one test was the extent to which members of a protected class had been elected to office. It examined the method by which the political process determined voting constituencies, and brought under strict scrutiny such practices as "packing" or "fracturing" minority communities to nullify or dilute the effect of their vote. Judicial interpretation opposed vote dilution tactics which had the effect of eliminating blacks and Hispanics from candidacies and from office through racial gerrymandering.[6]

In 1986, the Supreme Court tested the new interpretation of the law in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, and permitted black citizens to bring suit in federal district court challenging one single-member district and six multi-member districts. They claimed the redistricting plan impaired the ability of black citizens to elect representatives who reflected the interests of their community, in violation of Section 2.[7] The legal interpretation in that case has been the basis upon which the court established other tests to determine vote dilution.

Since such tests as the compactness, political cohesiveness of the community and the exclusive effect of white majority bloc voting were relatively easy to demonstrate, the court permitted the establishment of black majority districts as a remedy. Again, the standard which was the basis of the remedy used by the courts was the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was intended to protect and promote the right of blacks and other protected classes to vote and hold office.

Decisions of the high court reversing that line of law emerged most forcefully in *Shaw v. Reno*, 1993, which resulted in challenging the majority black Districts 1 and 12 in North Carolina.[8] The case, which ended as *Shaw v. Hunt* in North Carolina in 1996, directed the state legislature to redraw the districts without the primary use of race as a criterion. What triggered the case was the irregular shape of the district, which the Supreme Court found could be justified in no other way except than by the use of race to draw boundaries. However, because of the equally potent rationale that the shape of the district was influenced by the perceived need of the lawmakers involved to protect existing districts of incumbents, that reasoning signals a deep bias in the court over the issue of race. It appears there is a presumption of just motivation when the state allows the creation of errantly shaped white districts for ethnic or racial representation and denies the same to blacks as an unjust motivation that harms whites.

With respect to the seminal Shaw case, five white North Carolina voters filed a challenge to the majority black 12th Congressional District on grounds that it violated the principle of a color-blind Constitution.[9] The district court dismissed their claim, but on appeal, the Supreme Court found on June 28, 1993, by a 5-4 decision that:

> ...a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the *equal protection clause* may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though *race-neutral* on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.[10] (my emphasis)

Thus the court, in the process of invalidating the right of states to use race as the basis of drawing district boundaries, created a right for whites in black majority districts to use the Equal Protection clause to object to the black composition of the district merely on the grounds that blacks constituted the majority. That was clear inasmuch as the three-judge court that originally rejected the suit said the plaintiffs had failed to prove an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because favoring minorities did not constitute discrimination under the Constitution, and their status as a minority in the North Carolina 1st Congressional District did not lead to their under-representation in the state.[11]

Moreover, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's brief exhibited the extremely ahistorical view that the creation of black majority districts was "an effort to segregate the races for the purposes of voting."[12] So it may be easily seen that, in approving the claim of the appellants, the court was intent upon establishing a neutral definition of "racial discrimination" and "segregation"—terms traditionally used to define harm to blacks as a result of state action. The court's finding that the State of North Carolina had discriminated against whites by favoring blacks in drawing congressional district boundaries placed blacks and the Justice Department Civil Rights Division on the defensive.

The court went on to compound the historical revision of the Fourteenth Amendment by suggesting that, since the state could not justify the use of its plan as "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling governmental interest," it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, in his separate opinion concurring with the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy said if a state uses compliance with the Voting Rights Act in asserting there is a compelling state interest, "it cannot do so here." It's a profound statement of the change in priorities of the court to question whether the use of race to correct racial harm can be demonstrated to be in the "compelling state interest." It invalidates the racial basis upon which blacks were subjugated through slavery, and the long and continuing history of racial prejudice, discrimination and institutional racism that exist and are practiced vigorously in many quarters today.

The Shaw case was seminal in fostering profound changes in the language of the court, spoken for by Justice O'Connor, who found that the use of race to draw district boundaries constituted a blatant legitimizing of "race consciousness;"[13] that the use of race to group blacks together in a district constituted "political apartheid;" that blacks might have "little in common except the color of their skin…;"[14] that the grouping of blacks together fit a racial stereotype of the sameness of blacks[15] and that when a district is so constructed as to represent one group, elected officials may believe their interest is to represent them only.[16]

The vitiation of the role of the Fourteenth Amendment stands history on its head. Many scholars have noted the clear intended effect of the original meaning of the amendment was to posit a theoretical standard of equality before the law for all American citizens, the impact of which would be to give blacks access to their full rights of citizenship. As such, the amendment had a dual meaning in that it established a literal standard, but was intended to have a specific impact on blacks.[17]

Today, the literal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is being used to vitiate its special meaning of uplift for blacks and to re-empower whites legally to effect blockage of the political power of blacks by declaring the amendment to be race-neutral. In a society where preponderant power resides in the hands of the white group, the effect of "race-neutrality" as a legal standard applying to such issues as political representation and access to resources through Affirmative Action is to legalize whites' practical dominance in all areas of life. Said another way, whereas the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide access to citizenship for blacks disrupted their status as a "permanent minority" and created a fair political dispensation that gave them the opportunity to participate in majority decisions, the elimination of minority protections reinforces their status as a "permanent minority."

Moreover, the decision in Shaw is even more questionable because it is based on questionable social science. O'Connor finds racial consciousness is a barrier to racial neutrality, and objects to the fact that the race-conscious drawing of districts appears to legitimize the group interests of blacks. The authorities cited by O'Connor suggest that any reference to minority groups of color—even when a remedial intent is at stake—tends to stereotype them.

Nevertheless, the negative effect of racial stereotyping is the harm it does. The court does not prove that any harm is associated with the power blacks have acquired by the development of black majority districts. Moreover, in a study of stigma, Erving Goffman clearly shows it is the harm to the identity that is involved in stereotyping, and the nature of the harm depends upon whether the person affected is a member of an in-group or out-group.[18]

In the debate before the Supreme Court the question was asked whether or not districts drawn to recognize the interests of predominantly Polish wards in Chicago were illegitimate, and the reply by the attorney for the plaintiff was no, since they did not suffer from racial stereotyping because they were grouped together.

The point O'Connor appears to make is that the use of remedial categories of racial distinction constitutes a harm even to blacks and has been inferred to be subject to the most rigorous standards, such as in *Richmond v. Croson*, the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* case and others. However, sentiment against the use of racial categorization arose in instances, embedded in all the cases cited, where there was demonstrable harm against blacks which flowed from its use.

It should be pointed out that despite myriad inferences to the harm race-conscious categorization may do to blacks, the court never investigated the issue scientifically or otherwise. Settled law is reversed on the basis of untested assumptions of social behavior. Moreover, one observer suggested those who are now concerned by the use of racial categories as remedies were formerly "untroubled by racial classifications until they were used to remedy past discrimination."[19]

The point raised above is just as true with respect to O'Connor's characterization of black majority districts as "political apartheid." The concept refers to Southern-style political apartheid, reminiscent of the South African apartheid system, that enforced racial separation by law and custom with the intent to distance so-called inferior peoples from a superior one, to deny them access to resources and so to subordinate them. As such, it makes no distinction between the harmful effects of segregation and the fact that blacks have strongly supported the creation of majority black districts as a method of inclusion and as an act of freedom from the tyranny of white bloc voting, which suppressed and diluted the impact of their vote.[20] That version of apartheid suggests blacks are being oppressed by the creation of such districts, or the state is engaging in the separation of races for an odious purpose.

How can the justice's view be supported when so-called "apartheid" districts, or black districts, contain as many as 40 percent whites, as was the case in the 1st District of North Carolina? Under other circumstances, it would be an integrated district,

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RACIAL COMPOSITION OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS, 1996

TABLE NO. 1

DISTRICT	% BLACK	% HISPANIC	% WHITE
Alabama 1	63.5	0.3	36.5
Florida 17	54.0	24.1	21.9
Georgia 5	57.2	1.8	41.0
Illinois 1	67.8	3.1	19.1
Illinois 2	66.0	5.9	18.1
Illinois 7	59.8	4.1	36.1
Louisiana 2	60.7	3.8	35.5
Maryland 4	55.8	6.1	38.1
Maryland 7	67.8	0.9	31.3
Michigan 14	65.3	1.0	33.7
Michigan 15	68.2	3.7	28.1
Mississippi 2	58.1	0.5	41.4
New Jersey 10	57.3	8.5	31.2
New York 6	54.5	16.0	29.5
New York 10	59.4	18.5	22.1
New York 11	72.4	11.1	16.5
Ohio 11	54.8	1.0	44.2
Pennsylvania 2	58.4	4.0	40.1
South Carolina 6	58.3	0.5	41.2
Tennessee	54.1	0.7	45.2
Virginia 3	50.5	2.2	37.6
Average	60.16	5.4	30.8

Compiled from: David Bositis, "African Americans and the 1998 Midterm Elections," Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Washington, DC, 1998.

except for the fact that the racial balance favors blacks. The impact of this state of affairs should not be borne by blacks.

In the 105th Congress there are 37 black members, and 21, or 57 percent, represent black majority districts. The above data show the average proportion of whites in those districts accounts for fully one-third the population, with Hispanics a much smaller proportion at 5 percent.[21] The proportion of races represented in black majority districts should define them as integrated rather than black districts, as Justice O'Connor has designated them.

The real issue appears to be the rehabilitation of the legal framework of political apportionment to achieve untrammeled white power. If blacks as a group cannot express their interests in the political system except indirectly, then their group policy claims are subordinated and their group status suffers accordingly. Otherwise, if blacks can only address the political system as individuals, that would appear to place them at an even more substantial disadvantage; as a numerical minority group, unable to compete as a group with the majority, their restriction to individual status for participation heightens competitive disadvantages even further. That was the original basis upon which racial gerrymandering was conducted, since it was obvious that the reduction of group power through the elimination of blacks' ability to exercise a group vote worked to the advantage of whites. The argument also was made by Bruce Fein, a conservative attorney. He observed that "purposeful black majority districting intends the permanent frustration of the political preferences of the minority of white voters," and that "discrimination against white voters is unalleviated by white majority districts" since white voters do not reap the benefits and services of white racial representation.[22] That would appear to establish the possibility of an equal mirror image of harm between blacks and whites. But the relative weight of historical harm has formerly been construed as a criterion to sort the moral claims of each group, and it has generally fallen on the side of blacks because historical acts of racism have been meted out from a position of the preponderant power of whites.

At all ends, O'Connor says, stereotyping would raise the prospect of incitement to racial hostility and "serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness."[23] Again, one questions the basis upon which she concludes that after 30 years of the application of the Voting Rights Act, without significant violence as a direct result of black majority districts, racial hostility would occur, fomented by a latent white consciousness. It is a striking claim for which, I submit, direct evidence is missing.

Thus, the court strongly shifted the weight of the law from the use of race as a principle of amelioration for past exclusion, to denial of the use of race as a violation of the Equal Protection standard. Again, the effect of such a neutralist use of the Fourteenth Amendment is to recreate racial imbalances in political representation that existed in the first place. Today, it appears not to matter that blacks constitute a minority that, in most cases, would not substantially inhibit the exercise of political power by the white majority. Rather, both the status of blacks as a subjugated class and their bid for inclusion in political decision-making on the basis of proportionate equality are viewed as threats to white interests by those opposed to the creation of such districts.

The decision in *Shaw v Hunt* brought together the full force of the new doctrine and used it to invalidate the North Carolina districting plan. The original *Shaw v Reno* case was remanded to the District Court, where it was held that although the North Carolina plan did classify voters according to race, it survived the "strict scrutiny" test and was constitutional; it also satisfied the "compelling state interest" standard because it was done to comply with the Voting Rights Act, Sections 2 and 5.

The Supreme Court, however, found in the subsequent case, *Shaw v Hunt* (or Shaw II), that the North Carolina plan violates the Equal Protection clause because the state's reapportionment scheme is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.[24] It then proceeds to find that none of the newly legalized race-neutral standards were met and, in the process, severely cripples Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, where it found the effort of the Justice Department "too expansive" in preventing black vote dilution and eradicating past discrimination, concluding the creation of race-based districts was unnecessary. The basis of its decision was that race was the preponderant factor used in drawing the districts, which negated the argument by the District Court. The empowering use of race by the Justice Department, in interpreting Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, was indeed the central issue.

The rabid determination of the court to eliminate the use of race in redistricting may be seen in its reach back to the *Adarand v. Pena* case in requiring strict scrutiny where race is a remedy, and to *Richmond v. Croson* by requiring that an allegation of discrimination must be "identified discrimination" and that no generalized assertion of discrimination is adequate because it provides the legislature with no guidance to determine the scope of the injury. The concept of "identified discrimination" was first put forward by Assistant Attorney for Civil Rights Bradford Reynolds and used to guide the approach of Clarence Thomas, the then director of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to administration of employment discrimination cases.[25] In other words, it requires, as it did in *Croson*, an individual, documentable finding of discrimination, despite the fact that 100 percent of blacks were affected by slavery and discrimination. In any case, it must be asserted that the Croson approach of finding incidences of disparate, impact-based individual discrimination is very different from the massive denial of the franchise where, in the first 30 years of this century, no black served in the Congress, nor in the state legislatures because the black constituencies upon which their candidacy depended had been largely excluded from political participation.

Legislatures also have had to deal with damage or national interests where the scope of injury or the goal could not be determined, such as in the Savings and Loan scandal or going to the moon, or in weapons development. Those interests need only to have been declared to be national priorities, which is precisely what is being denied by the role of race in achieving remedies for black exclusion from political participation in this era.

The new interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has been used in such cases as *Shaw v. Reno*, *Miller v. Johnson* and others, an outcome regarded by Wade Henderson, head of the Leadership Conference on Civil rights, as "The first step in the resegregation of the American electoral democracy."[26] The result is that the repeated use of the principles and concepts of Shaw as instruction in several cases in Georgia, Florida, Texas and many state legislative districts has begun a pattern of reduction of black political representation in Congress from a high level of 40 members. By 1995, nearly all 13 of the districts which had been created as a result of the 1990 census were under attack, and judgments had been rendered against the 4th District Louisiana of Cleo Fields, the 5th District Georgia of Cynthia McKinney, the 2nd District Georgia of Sanford Bishop, the 18th District Texas of Sheila Jackson Lee, the 30th District Texas of Eddie Bernice Johnson, the 3rd District Florida of Corrine Brown, the 3rd District Virginia of Bobby Scott and the 12th District North Carolina of Mel Watt.[27] The result is that with the reapportionment of the Louisiana Congressional Districts, Cleo Fields was forced out of Congress by the change in the racial composition of his district in 1996, and Georgia has created only one majority black district, although three black representatives have won seats since that time.

Given the language and attitude of the court, other black majority districts may surely be eliminated. The effect could ripple down through all political jurisdictions, reducing the number from the present level of more than 8,500 national black elected officials. And it could be especially disastrous when the census is taken in the year 2000 and political boundaries are adjusted all over the country.

Underneath the conservative shift of the court is a fundamental, though outdated, rationale through which Justice Kennedy in *Shaw v. Hunt* served up an ambiguous challenge to society. He says: "Only if our society and our political system cleanses themselves of [racial] discrimination will all the members of the polity share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race." In other words, rather than relying upon and having access to the weapon of law, blacks are thrust back upon the good will of the majority and its ability to cleanse itself of racism. That issue was addressed in debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, wherein it was argued by those opposed that the promulgation of legal standards would be injurious to society as a whole, and that improved race-relations—and therefore the access of blacks to resources and rights—should be based on the principle of social acceptability, rather than the imposition of legal rights based on constitutional standards.[28]

The Efficacy of Racial Representation

No Binding Interests

Justice O'Connor's plea was that racial redistricting was specious because it proceeds on the principle that blacks have no interest except the color of their skin. Indeed, she suggested that:

> By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group—that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidate—a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very pattern of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract.[29]

But why does O'Connor deny to blacks what has been a positive characteristic of any culturally coherent group—the positive benefits of their unity? Here, she takes direct aim at the issue of the psychological and political coherence of blacks with the clear suggestion that it would be a negative outcome, when it has existed traditionally as a source of positive outcome in the sense that cultural coherence has enhanced social power.[30] In any case, it easily can be demonstrated by reference to any criteria of political behavior.

How, for example, would the justice explain the fact that blacks have manifested a pattern of voting behavior which has seen the majority of them cast their ballots for the same candidates at local, state and national elections; or that blacks voted for Democrats in 1998?[31] The pattern of political coherence reflected in 1998 has been traditional in both local and national elections and is illustrated briefly below with respect to blacks voting for Democratic candidates for president.

BLACK VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1980-1996 **TABLE NO.2**

YEAR	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Vote	85%	90%	86%	83%	84%

Source: "Portrait of the Electorate," *The New York Times*, November 10, 1996, p. 28.).

Or how is it that members of the Congressional Black Caucus cast their votes for the same issues, consistently having the highest liberality rating in Congress as a group? According to one study, the group exhibited a unity threshold of 90 percent on an analysis of roll call votes during the 1980s which was sustained regardless of the degree of prior consultation.[32] David Bositis also found in his analysis of the 103rd Congress that Congressional Black Caucus members maintain great cohesion and a remarkable degree of agreement, finding that in an analysis of 45 votes, on nine (20 percent) the Congressional Black Caucus was unanimous, but that "CBC members voted, on average, 83.9 percent of the time."[33]

Or why it is that with respect to public opinion, the black public at large consistently expresses a predominant consensus on issues of public policy or social practice, as indicated by a review of issue positions of blacks in 1996?

BLACK COHESION ON PRIORITY ISSUES TABLE NO. 3

ISSUE	% BLACK PRIORITY ISSUE
Smaller tax cuts	86.9
No cuts in Medicare spending	84.9
Favor a per child tax credit	73.4
Favor vouchers	47.9

Source: "Political Attitudes," Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies' 1996 National Opinion Poll, Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 1996.

With respect to four out of five of the issues surveyed in the 1996 Joint Center poll, blacks exhibited a very high degree of consensus.

In consideration of O'Connor's position, we are driven to the absurdity of having to consider that blacks in America are not a racially or ethnically coherent group and that they exist for most purposes as peoples of "color" but behave as individuals. The justice fails again to distinguish between negative and positive aspects involved in racial stereotyping and as such, exhibits a wholly unsophisticated understanding of the sociological dimension of the issue of black goal construction. For example, whites may consider blacks through all sorts of stereotypes, a phenomenon not controlled by blacks. However, the fact that blacks behave coherently to achieve social goals also has been necessary for them to defeat those stereotypes, rendering stereotypical depictions by whites far less important than the objectives themselves.

Congressional District Analysis

O'Connor's view that the effect on elected representatives of districts with a racial majority "sends the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole"[34] is specious, because it was seldom raised in an era when whites dominated all districts. Nor is it raised today where there are clear patterns of white misrepresentation of blacks in their districts, as will be shown below. That aspect of Justice O'Connor's decision falls into the category of representation research and asks whether or how blacks have been represented either with respect to their majority or minority proportion in a Congressional District.

Prof. Carol Swain is one of the most prominent proponents of the view that the ability of many whites to represent black interests better than blacks reduces the necessity for the creation of black majority districts. However, at the outset it is necessary to make a critical distinction. One reason for the election of a black representative for a black population is utilitarian, in the sense that such a person—being from the cultural group in question—is familiar with its interests and, therefore, is better able to represent those interests.

Another reason for black representation, or representation by any ethnic or racial group, is that the mere presence of such a person in a parliamentary body reflects the possibility of pluralist democracy, since the group has overcome being a "permanent minority" by achieving access to the means of decision-making.[35] Rather, Justice O'Connor and others have described any focus on race with respect to representation, identity or other aspects of cultural unity as an impediment to "color-blindness," and therefore a barrier to the achievement of a society reflecting that value. O'Connor's view is wholly subjective and without evidence, since racial representation is often powerful in itself as a symbol for society to measure the progress of inclusion. One cynical observer says of Justice O'Connor's perspective:

> "The court's decision is truly a color-blind one. It has a version of what politics must be. A person who 'happens to be African-American' can be elected to office for the purpose of representing African-American people. African-American people as such can have no representation. They do not exist but such districts might cause them to exist. To recognize race is immoral and racist."[36]

While this observation may launch Justice O'Connor's thinking into the outer limits, let us focus on both the utilitarian and descriptive reasons that refute the court's position.

Substantive Representation

The business of substantive representation is enacting legislation that conforms to the interests of constituents, and there has been a question as to whether the presence of blacks elected from black majority districts has enhanced that goal. There are two ways to illustrate that blacks have performed in a highly substantive manner. The first is to refute the charge that black majority districts have not caused changes in party transformation from Democrat to Republican, especially in the South, and in doing so to show the positive contribution of black majority districts to the liberalization of the districts they represent.

There has been a line of reasoning that suggests the creation of black majority districts has "caused an exodus of conservative white Democrats to the Republican Party."[37] Also, Cameron, Epstein and O'Holloran note there is a trade-off between the increase in the number of black majority districts and substantive representation, suggesting racial redistricting is the reason for the changes in the party composition of Congressional Districts in states such as Georgia.[38]

Nevertheless, there is very little evidence that the drawing of majority black districts caused political realignment in the South, since Ronald Reagan, the symbol of that alignment, was elected in 1980 with a substantial majority, comfortably carrying Southern districts both in 1980 and 1984. Indeed, a study of the transformation of Southern Congressional Districts by Whitby and Gilliam found that "by the 1980s, the racial composition of Congressional Districts has little systematic relationship to liberalized Congressional voting patterns," and that "all other things being equal, candidates elected since 1972 are generally more liberal upon entering Congress," thus confirming the generational replacement hypothesis.[39]

That overlooks the impact of ideology on the realignment of party identification in Congressional Districts. Transitions from Democrat to Republican, especially in the South where they have occurred with the greatest frequency, happen both within the context of electoral politics and because representatives who changed their party identification sensed changes in the ideology of their white constituents. As whites have become more Republican in the South, white representatives in the South have changed their political allegiance to conform. The same phenomenon occurred in the transition of blacks from Republican to Democrat in the 1930s and 1940s, and ideology was similarly at the base of that change, not changes in political structure.

Using 1984 data, I analyzed the relationship between the racial composition of districts and such factors as presidential vote, rural location and party representation. Selecting three Congressional Districts in the South and two in the North where the black population was more than 50 percent, I also included 14 districts immediately contiguous to the five, to test a thesis involving what I call "black consolidated districts." The data showed a strong correlation between percentage of black population and differences in the factors included. In fact, there is an inverse relationship between high percentage black population and high percentage vote for

Mondale; low percentage rural with Democratic Party identification and low percentage black population; high percentage vote for Reagan and high percentage rural with Republican identification.

There appeared to be some support for the black consolidated district hypothesis, as 10 (71 percent) of the 14 districts contiguous to those with high black populations voted for Ronald Reagan, while all of the black consolidated districts voted for Mondale and were represented by Democrats; 40 percent of the contiguous districts were represented by Democrats and the remaining 60 percent were Republican, but 67 percent voted for Reagan. Thus, party identification of the district representative in the contiguous districts in 1984 was not a critical variable and race was more salient than party. In the realignment that would occur, however, race would come to realign more with party identification.

Next, to further test the effect of race and ideology, all of the 19 Congressional Districts which had a 30-50 percent black population were divided into two ranges using 1984 data: 31-37 percent and 39-49 percent. The strongest relationships in those data were high percent of the vote for Reagan and conversely, high percent rural location; high percent of the vote for Mondale and low percent rural. Again, the interpretation of the data with respect to party identification is masked by ideology. All the district representatives were Democrats, yet the difference in the vote for either Reagan or Mondale was determined by whether the black population was in the first or second black population range. Those voters in the high-population Congressional Districts manifested the highest vote for Mondale, and conversely the lowest percent of black voters in the Congressional Districts saw the Congressional District vote go to Reagan. In addition, nine of those Congressional Districts had a low percentage Reagan vote, but it should be noted that in both the first and second black population ranges, 67 percent had substantial Hispanic populations of 20 percent or more. In those cases the Black-Hispanic coalition was responsible for the low Reagan or high Mondale vote.

To further deduce the impact of ideology on district behavior, a liberal/conservative construct was created based on voter ratings of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a liberal organization, and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC), a conservative organization.

The data clearly show that the largest proportion of liberal representatives (67 percent) are in Congressional Districts with a black population of 39-49 percent, or the second range, while 33 percent represented districts in the first black population range. Liberals were located disproportionately in either the extreme eastern or western parts of the country, and while all three of the moderate liberals were located in the South, two out of three of their districts voted for Ronald Reagan. Otherwise, five of the seven moderate conservatives who voted for Reagan were located in the South. No strong conservative representation exists in any of the Congressional Districts in either black population range.

The study concludes that for any important liberalizing effect to occur, the black population must exist in the range of 39-49 percent, especially in the South, and that some liberalizing could occur in districts outside the South with lower percentages of black population. That is consistent with other studies, such as those by Lubin and Cameron, Epstein and O'Holloran, who find that, "Inside the South, substantive minority representation is maximized by creating concentrated minority districts with about 47 percent black voting age population."[40]

Finally, I examined Congressional Districts above 20 percent black population using 1988, 1992 and 1994 data to probe the effects of more numerous districts in the South with respect to the issue of representation. The fact that a district is marked by a high black population and political behavior in which the balance of voters support conservative presidential candidates and representatives who score low on liberality scales suggests the political isolation of the black population. The issue is whether the presence of a black representative decreased the political isolation of black constituents in the state delegation, and as such, helped to enhance substantive representation.

I compared high black population Congressional Districts, one in each of several deep South states, to presidential vote and voter rating of the representative, with the following result:

ADA RATING OF WHITE CD REPRESENTATIVE, 1988,1991

TABLE NO.4

DEMOCRATS	1988	1991
Mississippi	58.0 (3)*	16.3 (3)
North Carolina	61.2 (4)	45.0 (4)
Georgia	50.0 (6)	60.0 (2)
Alabama	45.0 (3)	30.0 (1)
South Carolina	55.0 (3)	60.0 (2)
Louisiana	60.0 (2)	85.0 (1)
Average	54.7	39.4

Source: Michael Baron and Grant Ujifusa, *Almanac of American Politics 1990,1992*, DC National Journal. *These numbers represent the number of congressional districts with over 20% black population that were used in obtaining the average.

What accounts for the drop in liberal ratings between 1988 and 1991 cannot be a function of Congressional redistricting, since the figures amount to state averages of the South as a whole. Rather, it reflects the continuing strong alignment of political ideology with party identification from Democrat to conservative Republican. White Southern Democrats responded either by deciding not to stand for office, or by changing their party identification. In Texas alone, the average ADA rating for three Congressional Districts was 73 in 1988, which dropped to 45 for the same three districts in 1990. At the same time, 1988 ADA ratings of the only four black members of Congress in the South were considerably more than whites, on average.

ADA RATING OF BLACK SOUTHERN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 1988, 1991

TABLE NO. 5

MEMBER	1988 ADA RATING	1991 ADA RATING
Ford (TN)	85	80
Lewis (GA)	100	85
Espy (MS)	85	--
Washington (TX)	100	95
Average	92.5	86.6

Source: Grant Ujifusa and Michael Barone, *Almanac of American Politics, 1990* and *1992*, Washington, DC National Journal.

In fact, the trend to high liberality ratings continued after the 1990 census reapportionment, when the number of black members of Congress reached 39 in the House of Representatives in the 103rd Congress. Except for two black Republicans, J.C. Watt (OK-4) and Gary Franks (CT-5), Democratic members exhibited a significantly high rating. Nevertheless, the disparity between the average liberal ratings of black members of Congress in the South and the average ratings for the southern states as a whole is a striking 37.8 percent in 1988 and 47.2 in 1991. In short, the disparity, already substantial at close to 40 percent in 1988, grew another 10 percent by 1991.

Robert Singh finds that Congressional Black Caucus members are, in fact, the most liberal group of legislators in the House of Representatives, as indicated by his analysis of Congressional Black Caucus and non-Congressional Black Caucus ADA and COPE ratings between 1980 and 1990. In that period, the mean ADA score for the Congressional Black Caucus was 89.4 percent, while that for non-Congressional Black Caucus members was 67.4 percent.[41] Again, the differences are striking; there was a 23.6 percent difference in the ADA ratings and a 27.5 percent difference in the COPE ratings.

The above data shows that black representatives contributed about 25 percent more votes to liberal issues than their white counterparts. Specifically, let us consider the Bositis study of the 103rd Congress, when black legislators were at their maximum in the House of Representatives at 39 members. Bositis says there were 45 votes in the session, and if they are multiplied by the average number of black members voting (35 voting, 2 absent), then 1,575 total votes were cast, which means that one quarter (394) may be attributed to the presence of black legislators.

One could suggest that white liberals might have a voting record comparable to blacks, and so it is worth examining the voting record of whites who represent districts of substantial black population, since the issue is black representation. 1992 ADA ratings of such members are listed in Table 6.

While the average ADA score for white members of Congress representing large black populations may be expected to be much higher, it is roughly comparable to the ADA rating for Congress as a whole. That would mean even liberal whites who represent large black populations have voted much less frequently for issues favored by blacks than their black congressional counterparts.

Swain and others have been particularly critical of the practice of "packing" blacks into Congressional Districts to create substantial majorities that would ensure the election of black officials.[42] And while the courts in the Atlanta 5th District case originally recommended a 65 percent black district, in practice the hyper-stacking of blacks into Congressional Districts was not realized (there is only one 90 percent black majority Congressional District). Instead, as shown, the average black population in black majority Congressional Districts in 1998 was only 57 percent. Moreover, it is

TABLE NO. 6

LIBERAL RATINGS OF WHITE CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WITH LARGE BLACK POPULATIONS

DISTRICT	% BLACK POP.	ADA'92	NAACP'94
Pennsylvania	49.7	80	50
New York (16)	42.2	95	90
New York (17)	40.1	95	90
Mississippi (4)	36.5	30	40
Virginia (4)	30.7	55	50
Wisconsin (5)	28.7	(new)	90
Mississippi (3)	27.9	30	40
South Carolina (5)	27.9	75	60
Indiana (10)	27.2	85	90
Ohio (1)	27.2	(new)	60
Averages		67.12	66.0

Source: David Bostitis, "The Congressional Black Caucus in the 103rd Congress," Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 1993, Table 17. "Ten U.S. Congressional Districts with Largest Black Voting-Age Populations Represented by White Congresspersons."

worth questioning whether northern liberals who manifest high COPE and LCCR ratings are a real test, since what we must examine is the representation of blacks in both the North and South.

Descriptive Representation

Finally, Swain's argument for increasing the number of black elected officials by representing all kinds of districts, with or without black majorities, is essentially an argument for descriptive representation, where the emphasis is on expanding the number of blacks in a parliamentary body. Her apparent preference for that may conform to the requirements of pluralistic democracy, but only in form, not in substance. In fact, substantive representation is the only meaningful criteria for pluralistic democracy, because through it, black constituencies are represented. What does it mean for a black to represent whites, when whites could represent other whites?

Substantive representation is also positive in that it proves the openness of the political system and the tolerance of white constituencies, which also are hallmarks of a democratic society. However, it does not make the strongest case. For if there were 39 blacks in the House of Representatives who were not elected by majority black constituencies, one would have to conclude that they owed less of their political capital, and thus less of their representative responsibility, to such constituencies. The opposite political behavior would be aberrant in terms of the American political system. Therefore, the creation of black majority districts was necessary to create pluralistic political institutions.

Notes

[1] Walters, Ronald, *Black Presidential Politics in America*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989, p. 3.)

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison," in *Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States*, 1927, GPO, pp. 280–281.

[4] Dahl, Robert, *Democracy in the United States*, 1927, New York: Rand McNally, 1972, p. 25.

[5] The redistricting of a state for the election of congressional or legislative representation which violates the principles of compactness, homogeneity of popular interest and, [before the decisions in *Baker v. Carr* and *Gray v. Sanders*] equality of population in order to secure the advantages of the party or groups in control of the state legislature. The term is said to have arisen when an artist added wings, claws and teeth to a map of a sprawling district created in Massachusetts in 1812 and suggested that it be called "Salamander," but a Federalist editor changed the title to "Gerrymander" after Governor Elbridge Gerry. *Dictionary of American Politics*, p. 168.

[6] "Packing" means including as many blacks as possible into one political jurisdiction in an effort to devise a political majority. In an early voting rights case involving the

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creation of the 5th District of Georgia, the court decided that a 65 percent black district would provide a voting majority and elect a representative. (See, Bisbee V. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 at 507 [D.D.C. 1982]). "Fracturing," on the other hand, means splintering the black population, as has traditionally happened in the South, among various districts in such proportions as to create "black influence" necessary to elect a Democrat and perhaps moderate the voting behavior of the representative.

[7] 478 U. S. 30 [1986].

[8] *Shaw v. Reno*, 113 S. Ct. 1993.

[9] Parker, Frank R., Analysis of *Shaw v Reno*, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, July 6, 1993.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 2818.

[12] Ibid., p. 2824.

[13] Ibid., p. 2824.

[14] Ibid., p. 2827.

[15] Ibid., p. 2827.

[16] Ibid., p. 2827.

[17] Bardolph, Richard, ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, *The Civil Rights Record: Black Americans and the Law, 1849–1970*, p. 61.

[18] Goffman, Erving, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice Hall Publishers, 1963, pp. 83–87, 112–115.

[19] Jost, Kenneth, Review of "The Color-Blind Constitution," by Andrew Kull, Harvard University Press, *ABA Journal*, November 1992, p. 100.

[20] Here, the phenomenon of racial separation is itself separated from its original meaning as a social dynamic where whites forced blacks to be separate, an act of social behavior where the point was to maintain white supremacy. As such, this meaning conforms neither to the original meaning of racial segregation nor to "apartheid." See, John W. Cell, *The Highest State of White Supremacy: the Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. x. Cell says: "By segregation, then, I understand far more than mere physical separation. Segregation is at the same time an interlocking system of economic institution, social practices and customs, political power, law and ideology, all of which function both as means and as ends in one group's efforts to keep another in their place within a soci-

ety that is actually becoming unified." P. 14.

[21] This 57 percent represents a decrease from 62 percent in 1991, when 15 of 24 black Congressional Districts were black majority.

[22] Fein, Bruce, "No: Gerrymandering Is Unfair," ABA Journal, July 1993, p. 45.

[23] *Shaw v. Reno* op. cit., pp. 2824-2825.

[24] Shaw et. al., Hunt, Governor of North Carolina, et al., Supreme Court of the United States, No. 95-923, December 5, 1995, p. 1.

[25] Amaker, Norman C., *Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration*, Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1988, p. 112.

[26] Biskupic, Joan, "Court Rejects Race-based Voting Districts," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1995, p. 1.

[27] Sanford's district went from 52 percent black to 35 percent; McKinney's district went from 64 percent to 32 percent; Jackson-Lee's district went from 51 percent black to 45 percent black and 23 percent Hispanic; Johnson's district went from 50 percent black to 45 percent.

[28] Silberman, Charles, *Crisis in Black and White*, New York: Vintage/Random House, 1964, pp. 123–134.

[29] *Shaw v. Reno*, op. cit., p. 2818.

[30] Characteristics that define any culturally coherent group abound in the literature of the social sciences and thus, the elements of "ethnicity" may have meaning to blacks, as suggested in a recent study showing ethnicity can apply to "a human population with myths of a common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members." John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 6.

[31] "Polls Paint Picture of Who Voted, and How," *USA TODAY*, November 4, 1998, p. 18A.

[32] Singh, Robert, *The Congressional Black Caucus*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 145.

[33] Bositis, David, "The Congressional Black Caucus and the 103rd Congress," Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 1993, p. 19.

[34] *Shaw v Reno*, op. cit., p. 2818.

[35] This has been referred to in the literature as the distinction between "descriptive" and "substantive" representation. See Hannah F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*,

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

[36] Carr, Leslie G., "Color-Blind" Racism, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 126.

[37] McDonald, Laughlin, "The 1982 Amendment of Section 2 and Minority Representation," in *Controversies in Minority Voting*, ed. Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 81.

[38] Cameron, Charles, and David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90. No. 4, December 1996, p. 810.

[39] Whitby, Kenny J., and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., "A Longitudinal Analysis of Competing Explanations for the Transformation of Southern Congressional Politics," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 53, No. 2, May 191, p. 516.

[40] Cameron, and Epstein and O'Holloran, op. cit., p. 795. The authors also point to a finding by Lubin that a representative's voting behavior was influenced "with a structural break at 40 percent black population." Ibid., p. 797.

[41] Singh, op. cit., p. 143.

[42] Swain, op. cit., pp. 211–212.

ARTICLE | 5

Unfinished Business: African-American Political Economy During the Age of "Color-blind" Politics

BY RHONDA M. WILLIAMS

While working on this chapter, I worried about coming up with a strong beginning. Conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. solved my problem. I heard him on the radio during the commute home after taking our youngest son to school. Tyrell is the editor of the conservative magazine *The American Spectator* and was a guest on call-in C-SPAN. Most questioners were discussing the Senate's impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton. While the host and Tyrell tossed around the latest details of the bootygate debacle, a listener with a different bee in his bonnet called. When this caller criticized liberals for inappropriately talking about race and racism, Tyrell explained his present-day rule of thumb for dealing with race in the United States: in any discussion about politics, "...whoever mentions race first is the racist in the room."

Tyrell's response is important because his rule of thumb succinctly summarizes a core idea advocated by conservative intellectuals and politicians of this generation: not only is racism a thing of the past, but the very mention of race, at least in Tyrell's conservative circles, brands one a racist. His comments tell us that many white folks are just plain tired of race-talk. Recent polling data suggest the vast majority of U.S. whites agree with Tyrell: prejudice *was* bad, but now it's largely gone, and it's time for African Americans to carry on. Any remaining discriminatory behaviors that are personally or economically injurious should be handled via the enforcement of existing laws. Conservatives thus reject race-conscious policies, lambaste race-conscious sister-citizens and proclaim that we now live in a society that is colorblind; in other words, the foundation for racial economic justice is firmly established and here to stay.

Many progressive African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans (and some of our anti-racist white allies) do not share the same vision. Indeed, there are many among us who argue that deeply entrenched class, institutional and cultural legacies of white economic supremacy are still powerful determinants of African-American chances for economic survival and viability. If we wish others to seriously question the conservative message, and to be open to alternative accounts of ongoing racial economic inequality, we must provide ourselves and our allies a critique of and response to Mr. Tyrell's perspective. To the extent that he crystallized a widely shared viewpoint, we must understand how the conservative movement has managed to convince most whites (and more than a few persons of color) that the nation's race work is done.

Those who reject that story must continue to advance publicly a more historically informed account of persistent racial economic inequalities. Race scholars and activists struggling with this question during the past 20 years have begun to provide an answer: We must challenge popular notions of racism's past and present, and examine it as a complex set of interrelated ideological, cultural and economic phenomena. Doing that will open the door to a richer and more nuanced understanding of ongoing white economic power in the United States. Then and only then, will we have a credible alternative analysis that articulates a different vision of racial economic equality.

Consider first the notion of racism that informs conservative and liberal race visions—the notion that it is simply the purposeful, illogical and wrong consideration of another's race in the judgment of that person's character or in the making of decisions about wealth, work, income, opportunity or status. From that perspective, racism is a backward set of beliefs and practices that we can eradicate by education, and discrimination is an associated set of exclusionary practices we end via the enforcement of existing civil rights laws.

Proponents also suggest that economic justice for blacks, Asian Americans and Latinos is attainable without fundamental changes in our culture or in the organization of our economic and political systems. Once society re-educates or executes hostile individual racists, we can be assured that the U.S. economy and legal system will function to appropriately reward both blacks and non-blacks who pursue education, work hard and play by the rules. In other words, those seeking racial economic equality should support the creation of a "color-blind culture"—one wherein individuals receive social and economic rewards that reflect their productivity, competence and self-discipline, and in which each of us refuses to see race.

Such a color-blind culture brands as racist those who think that notions of race continue to shape how individuals and communities experience the world and who advocate race-conscious policies as a means to the achievement of racial economic equality. It equates race consciousness with ignorance, irrationality and imposed group identities; its proponents define the race-neutral worldview as the domain of knowledge, reason and individually chosen group affiliation. From a policy perspective, proponents of that view believe color-blind economic justice has been achieved because the path to it was short and quick: Passage of 1960s Civil Rights legislation was the necessary and sufficient step. Legal change maps immediately into socio-cultural change, and the proclamation of the new regime is sufficient to create that regime.

A second, ideologically powerful dimension of this conservative vision is that it separates racism from *racial power*—the capacity of racially designated individuals and communities to wield substantive and largely unaccountable economic, political and social power over the lives of members of another race. Alternatively stated, this vision strips race of its historical meanings and the idea that beliefs about races have shaped and been shaped by our economic and legal system.

It obliterates, for example, the fact that whites in the United States used the law to define "white" not merely as *a* race, but as *the* race destined to wield privilege and power over those defined (by whites) as "not white." Moreover, those who passed the sometimes convoluted tests of whiteness—that is, they had no traceable black ancestors—designated themselves the intellectual and cultural superiors of "non-whites," and interpreted the economic and social world from that perspective. Whites accorded each other economic and social opportunities denied persons of color, not the least of which were tied to citizenship. Recall that the Naturalization Act of 1790 specifically restricted citizenship to white persons of good character who'd lived in the United States for at least two years. The expansion of white manhood rights in the early 1800s accompanied the race-based denial of voting rights for black men, arguably culminating in Judge Taney's infamous 1857 *Dred Scott* ruling. In it, the Supreme Court sanctified white rule as the law of the land, as the good and right end of white economic, social and political activity.

Possessors of whiteness also established for themselves the right to create "white only" spaces in both public and private sectors. Recall, for example, the sometimes overlooked Civil Rights Cases of 1883, in which the Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution applied only to the public sector. White citizens were at liberty to practice whatever forms of "private" economic discrimination they so chose.

That ruling legally sanctioned the rights of whites in post-bellum America to create, define and protect white spaces and places, ranging from schools, unions and neighborhoods to social clubs, business associations, business enterprises, industries and jobs. Proprietors could and did exclude black customers; employers could and did exclude black workers from specific industries and jobs; white property owners and developers used race-restrictive covenants to exclude black buyers. Notwithstanding several important cases of solidarity between black and white workers in the late 1800s and early 1900s, white employers and workers ultimately crafted a system of racial job segregation that would become national in scope and longstanding.

By the end of the 1800s, native-born whites and "newly white" European immigrants collectively dominated blacks in the struggle for land and jobs, each a lynchpin in the struggle for wealth and economic security. Federal housing policies facilitated white ownership and the appreciation of white property values during and after World War II, and the Department of Agriculture prevented thousands of black farmers from getting deserved loans, grants and other forms of state assistance, thereby halting or thwarting efforts to accumulate wealth.

Contemporary conservative race theory provides no meaningful account of that era of state-sanctioned white supremacy. At best, it suggests that for eight generations, whites of all classes, genders, ethnic origins, religious affiliations and educational backgrounds suffered from a deep and abiding racial irrationality and ignorance. White entrepreneurs, political leaders, dressmakers, farmers, office and factory workers, industrialists, educational elites, homemakers, social reformers, shopkeepers, union organizers and school children were profoundly misguided and confused about a substantive aspect of national life and culture. Of course, what's missing is a meaningful discussion of racism as an ideological system.

Cultural workers tell us over and over that humans will change behaviors much more quickly than they will change underlying belief systems—particularly those dealing with a fundamental understanding of themselves, their achievements, their relationships to others, who they are and how they became those people. The notion that 20 years of activism could completely undo eight generations of white supremacy is ludicrous, albeit seductive. Too many whites resisted, and too many people of color underestimated the resilient contours of racist discourse.

Civil Rights and Black Power movements did topple state-sanctioned white supremacy, and enshrined formal legal equality as the law of the land. Statutes, judicial rulings and executive orders made race-based discrimination in housing, employment, contracting and the provisioning of private credit illegal. They were, in effect, legal orders proscribing intentional discrimination by employers, unions and schools. Yet blacks seeking to enter all-white spaces did so in the face of substantial opposition. In institutions large and small, whites who previously had practiced segregation as a means to white domination remained in power. Many leaders of historically white institutions rejected the federal government's efforts to diminish white citizens' rights to practice racial exclusion. Absent a thorough cultural conquest of white supremacist ideologies, many rejected the integration of schools, neighborhoods, loans, jobs, workplaces and business opportunities.

Conservative analysts again tend to erase the significance of white resistance to black economic inclusion. However, conservative analysts and jurists have accorded great attention to the liberal judiciary's response to white resistance. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court recognized the problem inherent in prohibiting new acts of intentional racial discrimination but failing to do anything to encourage fundamental change in the souls and minds of those empowered to include and exclude. In the famous case of *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* (1971), the court confronted that exact issue.

Before the summer of 1965, Duke Power overtly practiced job-segregation-as-economic-domination. It had four white-only divisions and one division open to blacks. Moreover, the highest paid African American in the black department earned less than the lowest paid worker in any of the other four white-only departments. Later that year, in response to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the utility company abandoned its policy of overt race-based job discrimination. But it also instituted the following changes:

- Workers seeking transfer out of the historically black department needed to have a high school diploma;

- Workers seeking entry into historically white departments needed to be high school graduates and pass two aptitude tests.

Those new job requirements met the letter of the law—they were "race-neutral" policies—but had the effect of maintaining race-based job segregation and black-white earnings inequality within the company.

The court ruled that Duke Power's job criteria were in violation of Title VII because they functioned to prohibit black occupational access. More specifically, in a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court found that "race-neutral" policies having a "racially disparate impact" were illegal, *unless the employer could show they were related to job performance* (i.e., those who cannot meet the selection criteria are substantively ill-equipped to do the job).

The court's ruling in *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* issued a significant challenge to those seeking to perpetuate white economic privilege by new institutional practices. It offered a set of criteria by which African Americans could name particular practices as manifestations of white racial oppression. It implicitly recognized the persistence of white cultural resistance and the potential institutional power of resistant whites to define entry criteria in terms that assured few African Americans could jump the hurdle. The decision also cast an important light on the impact of supposedly race-neutral selection criteria. Consider, for example, layoffs and downsizing that use the last-hired-first-fired rule (seniority) and which seem less overtly malignant. To the extent that African-American workers are the most recently hired, the rule functions for some time to reproduce racial distributions of power that were established prior to affirmative action.

Griggs ruling presumes that the United States is a **racialized** capitalist society. That is, race signifies and symbolizes concepts; it organizes and legitimizes the distribution and exercise of power. Notions of race also inform individual and collective economic decision-making and the accumulation and use of power. When we interpret what race means, we talk about how race has shaped the distribution of well-being in our society, in very class- and gender-specific ways. Race matters in our political economy because we enter institutions and markets with preconceived notions about the capacities of individuals; race informs notions of community, class, gender and who exactly are "we, the people."

In that context, racial discrimination is more than the irrational manifestation of individual prejudice. It becomes a form of competitive domination, a racialized economic action that simultaneously reproduces white privilege and denies opportunities and rewards to people of color. When the managers and owners of Duke Power redefined the job criteria, they did so with the understanding that the new job allocation criteria would adversely impact black employees. I suspect at least some, but by no means all, also knew their actions would momentarily preserve the racial ties that bound them, across class lines, to white workers who felt their status and living standard threatened by black activism.

Much has changed in the 29 years since the Griggs ruling, not the least of which is the business-led and government-supported restructuring of U.S. labor markets. As scholars and journalists have noted, many U.S. workers lost economic ground between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Much-celebrated job growth in those years increased income inequality within and between races. Men with 12 or fewer years of schooling suffered the greatest losses in real wages, with black and Latino men enduring crisis-level losses in wage levels and job opportunities during the 1980s. Years of union-busting, downsizing, outsourcing and overseas investment in manufacturing jobs reduced working-class men's wages, and dramatically reduced working-class black men's job opportunities and wages. Women with high school diplomas fared better than men as the service economy generated more "women's work." Still, black women lost earnings ground to white women in the 1980s and early 1990s, and white women's median weekly earnings surpassed those of black men in the early 1990s. Although the service economy has been a job-growth machine, it has failed to provide economic stability and resiliency for millions of families.

That, then, is the context in which conservative politicians, intellectuals and organizers have waged their racialized and gendered class war during the past two decades. Legislative, judicial and intellectual warriors march to a consistent tune. Asserting that blacks and Latinos largely are unfit to compete in the global corporate economy, they repeatedly tell working-class white men it is ill gotten, colored gains that have kicked them to the economic curb. The war against the poor sent a similar message: Poor black women were robbing state coffers and had to be stopped. The power of each narrative to compel and legitimize policy change is a frightening reminder to progressives of the ongoing power of racist ideology and the unfinished work that lies ahead.

An important component of that unfinished business is providing a non-racist account of race, ethnicity, work and wealth in the United States. Social scientists of color have crafted pieces of it, but our stories are by no means part of the mainstream (see chapters by Patrick Mason and William Darity, Jr.). Yet the contours of that account are clear:

Economic racism deeply skewed the African-American class structure. Compared to U.S. whites, ours is an underdeveloped capitalist class; our professionals are deeply entrenched in the state sectors, and have less wealth than whites with similar levels of education, years of experience and occupation-income profiles.

Our communities, as well, are disproportionately populated by the working and non-working poor, and have entered the era of globalization and economic restructuring with fewer resources, economic and political, than white community counterparts. Economic racism has marked the distribution of every institution and market—the supporting literature is abundant, if relatively unknown. Within classes and genders, whites have pursued and/or consented to racial dominance in varied forms and locations since the birth of the nation.

Yet the economic legacy of white racial privilege is not an established part of the national history told to children in primary and secondary history. Liberals and conservatives alike will grant that publicly and privately institutionalized racism was a social ill, but we still have not taken its full measure. Consider our dominant national narrative of race, wealth and work. It is historically indefensible, yet remarkable in its tenacity. Here I refer to the notion that, chattel slavery and Jim Crow notwithstanding, white economic superiority is primarily due to white virtue. Whites are harder working, smarter, more creative and imaginative than their black peers. Thus white supremacy harmed blacks, but did not substantively help whites.

Herein lie the roots of popular aversion to any kind of race-based policies aimed at reducing racial income and wealth inequalities. Policies like affirmative action are an affront to those who believe that racial justice is largely achieved. For them, racial equity means the establishment of procedural equality; fair competition is strictly based on merit, where merit is imagined to be some undisputed "thing" about which most reasonable observers agree. And it just so happens that white folks have more of it than do blacks, and are uniquely qualified to test and measure it. Moreover, it is assumed that white racism has no significant impact on the evaluation of black abilities; recalling the fictitious cultural revolution, racism is a thing of the past.

In just that way, whites' accumulated economic and political endowments are both naturalized and made acceptable. No matter that the players come from families and communities unequally endowed with the wealth, income, schools and race-specific social network required for competitive dominance. So we have a scenario in which market agents supposedly untouched by cultural racism objectively evaluate applicants for schools, jobs, credit and housing. The results are acceptable because the games are fair.

Those of us who see our political economy as both racialized and capitalist have a different perspective. We must continue to show how white privilege shapes market outcomes, and support those who disproportionately bear the costs of white economic power. There is an abundance of research, employing a variety of methods, that supports such a proposition.

White privilege is not always born of intentional white acts of exclusion; it is sometimes the product of race-based social and kinship networks, where "them that's got give to them they know." Yet race- and class-based kinship systems and networks nonetheless reproduce white privilege. Parents pass on to their children racialized class endowments—material and intangible—that situate their children competitively in multiple spheres of capitalist life. As William Darity indicates, U.S. whites historically have had more to pass on to their children than blacks have passed on to successive generations of African Americans.

Unfortunately, white privilege is largely invisible to many white folks. There are many reasons, and I have already addressed one: the recurrent and resilient power of white racist ideology, in its race-specific and race-neutral forms. I close with observations on two more phenomena that sustain white denial. One is widespread social segregation. Segregated neighborhoods, churches, schools and civic associations sustain a culture of whiteness. Millions of middle- and working-class white Americans have little or no interaction with African Americans, except perhaps as consumers of black cultural products. They are insulated from African-American perspectives on racial inequality and black experiences of racism, pain and loss, and their ignorance of white advantage relative to U.S. blacks is sustained. Meanwhile, the media feed them images of super-rich African-American entertainers and athletes on the one hand, and criminal young men and poor mothers on the other.

But whiteness is only one aspect of white folk's identities and socio-political location. It does not protect most of them from class exploitation, sexism, heterosexism or anti-Semitism; it does not offer them haven from the ravages of deindustrialization, union-busting, stagnating family incomes, the double shift, gender anxiety or declining real wages; it does not protect them from spousal abuse, and in absolute economic terms, it doesn't pay like it once used to for many, many white males.

The cultural legacies and practices of white racism harbor a particular danger at this historical moment. Cultural racism affirms white virtue and normalizes black economic marginality. It is an era when hundreds of thousands of young working-class black men are without employment—

unless, of course, they are part of the prison-industrial complex. We are at a place where the median earnings of black women with high school degrees put them just above the poverty level, where seven years of economic growth has just begun to narrow the black-white unemployment gap.

In the 1990s, black college graduates regained some of the terrible wage losses suffered in the 1980s. Indeed, among college-educated men, black men's wages grew twice as fast as whites' between 1989 and 1997. Yet remarkably, black male college graduates still earn only 75 percent of what their white counterparts earn. The absence of a critical perspective on racism in our current political economy compels most whites to draw what to them seems to be an obvious conclusion: once again, black folks, on average, just ain't got what it takes.

From my perspective, then, we are caught between a rock and a hard place. The economic restructuring of the past 20 years has heightened white economic insecurities; for many whites, the zero-sum component of capitalist life is here and now, and they will not sacrifice for the betterment of black citizens. Black folks are supposed to get theirs the same way many white folks imagine they got theirs—through hard work and sacrifice. Many whites clearly do not see most African Americans as hard-working and willing to sacrifice. Hence, black folk are not worth sacrificing for. We are not, so it seems, part of the beloved national community. We are not yet within the empathetic circle. Empowering African Americans is not yet seen as a must, as a necessary component for national survival and prosperity.

What would it take to make us part of the community? I'm not sure. I have no quick fix. I do not know the sufficient condition. But I will name what I believe is a necessary condition: We must attend to the unfinished business.

We must come out of the racial closet and confront the cultural, political and economic legacies of white racism. We must do so in ways that critically address class, gender, nationality and sexuality. We must do so in ways that name the psychological, economic and social fear involved for whites in identifying too closely with black lives. And we must do so in ways that allow each of us to choose the path toward reconciliation and a full embracing of one another's humanity.

I'm afraid if we don't do that work, too many African Americans will not be building or crossing the bridge to the 21st century. Or if they do, it will once again be as unfree labor, this time in prison blues. If we don't do our work, that bridge may lead to a land of economic apartheid. And we know the history. It shows that, eventually, apartheid comes to an end. More often than not, in bloodshed.

ARTICLE | 6

History, Discrimination and Racial Inequality

BY WILLIAM DARITY JR.

An oft-voiced objection to race-based programs as a remedy for economic disadvantage is that living generations of white Americans bear no responsibility for past injustices inflicted upon black Americans. No living white American has owned slaves; no living white American has voted for laws forming the legal structure for Jim Crow practices in the U.S. South; and no living white American has established a regime of inferior, segregated schools for black Americans.

So, some ask, why should living white Americans have to bear the cost of compensating living black Americans for burdens borne by their ancestors? The argument is that living black Americans don't live in the crippling environment that confronted their ancestors; now is the time to dispense with race-conscious policies and embrace a color-blind environment. The pinnacle of the argument is a plea for African Americans to abandon their identification with "blackness" altogether (see *Kennedy*; *Sleeper*).

The call for blacks to cease being black typically is not accompanied by a call for whites to stop being white. Asking a subordinate group to surrender the identity that shields it against the slings and arrows of the structured power of a dominant group seems an oddly unilateral plea. As Daniel Boyarin (1994, pp. 241-2) has observed, disparity in power between groups is critical in drawing the line between identity as racism and identity as resistance:

> ...the very things appealed to in order to legitimate the subaltern identity are appealed to as well by dominating groups in order to exploit the dominated. The ... claim shifts from negative to positive with the political status of the group making the claim. Therefore, I suggest, that which would be racism in the hands of the dominating group is resistance in the hands of a subaltern collective.

The view that the past is irrelevant to current black-white relations in the United States denies the sustained "subaltern collective" status of blacks. But black sustained economic subordination is undeniable. Perhaps the most telling evidence is the fact that the Vedder, Gallaway and Klingaman (1990, p. 130) estimate of the black-white per capita income ratio in 1880 (59 percent) is identical with the same estimated ratio for 1990 (*Darity and Myers*, 1998, p. 26).

Continued subordination is due in significant part to ongoing discrimination that affects blacks adversely at all stages of employment—at the interview, at the job offer and at the wage and promotion opportunity (*see Darity and Mason*, 1998, especially pages 76–81). By discrimination I mean exclusion and differential treatment because of group affiliation, not the capacity to perform. Standard economic theory implies that discriminatory differences in employment, wages or earnings should evaporate over time because of competition. The best estimates of the impact of labor market discrimination over time on earnings and occupational status indicate the sharpest decline in discrimination occurred between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thereafter, the degree of racial discrimination stabilized, and black males in particular continued to suffer 12-15 percent losses in earnings as a consequence of continued discrimination (*Gottschalk*, 1997, pp.28–30; *Darity*, 1998, pp. 815–821).

Research by Jason Dietrich, David Guilkey and myself shows there is no evidence of an inevitable decline in labor market discrimination. For example, while discrimination against black males resulted in a 16 percent drop in occupational prestige in 1980 and a 14 percent drop in 1990, Puerto Rican males experienced a greater loss (11 percent) in 1990 than in 1980 (5 percent). Using U.S. Census data, Table 1 displays estimates of losses and gains in occupational status, for selected ethnic and racial groups over the course of a century, measured by the Duncan Socioeconomic Index. Negative values indicate discrimination against the group in a given year, while positive values indicate discrimination in favor of the group—what we call "nepotism" (*Darity*, 1998, pp. 815–821). The first six groups listed are non-white and/or Hispanic. The remaining ethnic groups are all white. Virtually all entries for white ethnic groups in each year are positive, signaling racial favoritism—nepotism—on their behalf in labor markets.

Audit studies—tests of labor market discrimination conducted with trained actors who are sent out in teams to pursue advertised job opportunities—provide the most incontrovertible evidence of current job discrimination. Studies conducted by the Urban Institute in Chicago, Washington, D.C., and San Diego, and by the Fair Employment Council in Washington, D.C., demonstrate significant levels of discrimination against black and Hispanic job applicants relative to white job applicants (*Fix, Galster, and Struyk*, 1993 and *Benedick, Jackson, and Reinoso*, 1997).

ESTIMATES OF DISCRIMINATION ON OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

TABLE NO. 1

(Duncan SEI) 1880-1990 For Selected Ethnic and Racial Groups
(Males, Ages 25-64)

	1880	1900	1910	1920	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
Mexican	-	-	-	.05	-	-.21	-.14	-.05	-.11	-.11
Puerto Rican	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.07	-.05	-.15
Native American	-	-	-	-.38	-.23	-.44	-	-.16	-.11	-.12
Black	-.31	-.39	-.44	-.41	-.38	-.35	-.34	-.27	-.16	-.14
Chinese	-	-.62	-	.81	.01	.54	-	.24	.22	.26
Japanese	-	-	-	-	.32	-	-	-.02	.04	.12
Austrian	.56	.42	.04	.01	.05	.11	.04	.10	.05	.07
Canadian	.05	.04	.07	.08	.15	.04	.08	.09	.05	.07
Dutch	-.08	-	.08	.00	-.01	.21	.12	.07	.00	.01
English	.05	.06	.02	.10	-.18	.13	.11	.11	.04	.04
French	.15	.05	.21	.03	.04	.06	.09	-.01	.00	.00
German	.05	.10	.06	.02	.06	.04	.08	.06	.01	.01
Irish	.03	.09	.11	.12	.13	.11	.08	.06	.01	.01
Italian	.40	.05	.10	.08	.06	.10	.11	.06	.05	.05
Polish	.48	-	.66	.02	.11	.03	.08	.06	.03	.02
Russian	.52	1.47	.57	.46	.35	.23	.20	.15	.15	.11
Scottish	.06	-.07	.13	.06	.08	.20	.13	.13	.05	.02
Swedish	-.04	.15	.02	.08	.05	.02	.12	.07	.04	.01

- Dashes indicate an estimate could not be computed for the group during the particular year. The 1890 census was destroyed in a fire and the 1930 census is not yet available.

What I would like to address is the structured pattern of black disadvantage and white privilege due to persistent, long-term effects of past racial injustice in the United States. Recent research provides compelling evidence that white privilege rooted in the legacy of racism is not just a matter of black militant rhetoric or the black imagination. It can be detected in data comparing the economic status of blacks and whites.

Elsewhere I have proposed that for a society to be authentically raceless, there would be no transmission of advantage or disadvantage across generations based upon group affiliation (*Darity*, 1998). Under such conditions, race no longer would be a persistent factor affecting an individual's life chances. Using that criterion, America is far from being truly raceless.

In a recently completed study with Dietrich and Guilkey (*Darity, Dietrich and Guilkey*, 1999), we combined U.S. census data from 1880, 1900 and 1910 and categorized each respondent by race and/or by ethnicity—the last determined by the father's place of birth. The 1890 census couldn't be used because it was destroyed by fire.

For men between 25 and 64, we could identify close to 40 separate ethnic and racial groups in the three censuses. Among non-whites, they included American natives, blacks of both West Indian and non-West Indian ancestry, Chinese and Japanese. Among whites, the groups included men of Austrian, Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, English, Finnish, German, Italian, Polish, Russian, and Scottish ancestry. Using a technique employing regression analysis, we were able to isolate the extent to which members of a particular group experienced gains or losses in relative occupational status at the turn of the century due to two factors. The first was a group's comparative position with respect to attributes associated with workplace productivity, such as literacy and work experience.

Suppose, for example, that white men of German ancestry had a higher incidence of literacy than the average American male between 1880 and 1910. Then German men might have had a higher-than-average occupational status based on that particular skill. In the jargon of economists, their human capital level was higher than average. On the other hand, if Italian white males had a lower incidence of literacy than the average American male over the same interval, their average occupational status might be lower.

In the case of black Americans, the denial of access to schooling during slavery had to be the major factor contributing to very low literacy levels circa 1880. It is noteworthy that, between 1880 and 1910, black Americans' incidence of literacy doubled, rising from close to 30 percent to above 60 percent. Nevertheless, there was no improvement in the relative occupational status of blacks during the same period (*Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey*, 1999).

A second factor that can be isolated to explain the relatively stagnant occupational status of blacks at a time of rising literacy is discrimination in employment, both positive and negative. We find that between 1880 and 1910, black American men suffered the largest losses in occupational status due to employment discrimination—upwards of 37 percent (see Table 1). Native American men suffered discriminatory losses in occupational status of the order of 19 percent. By contrast, virtually all white male ethnic groups experienced nepotism—favorable discrimination. Russian males, for example, had a 65 percent gain in occupational status due to advantageous treatment, and Finnish males had a 74 percent gain. The 4-5 percent gains for Danish, Dutch and English males were more modest, but positive nonetheless.

Next, we asked this: Did occupational outcomes for the ethnic/racial ancestors of today's participants in American labor markets have any effect on present-day outcomes? For the answer we turned to the 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses, where respondents not only self-reported their race but also their ancestry. We could match an individual in 1980 or 1990 who reported himself to be white and Hungarian, for instance, with Hungarian group results obtained for 1880, 1900, and 1910. And we could ask statistically whether group skill levels and exposure to discrimination a century ago might have had an effect on the occupational status of corresponding group members in 1980 and 1990. When we performed the regression exercise, we found spectacularly strong results from both effects.

While controlling for age, years of schooling, marital status, location, assimilation status and whether or not a person was U.S.-born, we found an ethnic/racial group's ancestral skill set and its exposure to discrimination at the turn of the century had a strong effect on its occupational status in 1980 and 1990. Black men at the turn of the century suffered both from a skills deficit and severe discrimination in employment. Both those effects significantly weigh down the occupational status of their descendants 100 years later.

Occupational prestige regression results for men in 1980 and 1990, again measured by the Duncan Socioeconomic Index, are reported in Table 2. The parameter estimates for OWN capture the long-term impact of group skill advantage or disadvantage at the turn of the century on descendants' SEI 100 years later. The parameter estimates for ROR capture the long-term impact of nepotism and discrimination at the turn of the century on descendants' SEI 100 years later. The parameter estimate for OWN decreases slightly between 1980 and 1990, but the estimate for ROR rises. So

RANDOM EFFECTS GLS RESULTS FOR OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE

TABLE NO. 2

(SEI) with Lagged Values of OWN and ROR, 1980 and 1990
(Males, Ages 25-64)

	PARAMETER ESTIMATE		Z-STATISTIC	
	1980	1990	1980	1990
Constant	41.923	41.609	127.700	183.399
Age	0.241	0.241	82.080	82.428
Education	6.406	7.360	352.033	352.277
Married, Spouse Present	2.491	3.305	30.538	44.493
Nonmetropolitan	-.4739	-5.635	-61.560	-77.616
New England	2.444	2.579	13.281	14.886
Middle Atlantic	0.878	1.079	6.160	7.703
North Central	-0.437	-0.471	-3.308	-3.637
South Atlantic	3.296	3.481	23.257	25.659
South Central	2.562	2.506	17.978	18.070
Pacific	0.788	1.634	5.418	11.620
Assimilated	1.035	0.889	13.471	11.933
Born in US	-1.711	-2.341	-10.474	-15.236
OWN	6.800	6.748	2.465	3.832
ROR	5.896	7.684	4.871	9.740

the effects of distant past discrimination become relatively stronger across the decade (*Darity*, 1998).

While some white male ethnic groups at the turn of the century suffered from a deficient skill base, almost all benefitted from nepotism in employment—a quantifiable measure of white privilege they have passed on to their descendants. If we had not been able to detect those effects, the case for an authentically raceless America might have been made. We were able to detect them, so the case cannot be made.

Moreover, the passing of racial advantage and disadvantage from generation to generation may operate even more powerfully with respect to another key dimension of economic status—wealth. The sharpest economic gap between blacks and whites in the United States involves wealth. Unlike income, wealth is a measure of individual property, such as ownership of a home or other types of real estate or financial assets, like equities. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) estimates average black wealth in 1990 at $41,616, and average white wealth at $247,248, indicating the black-white wealth ratio is a mere 16 percent (*Chiteji and Stafford*).

In a detailed examination of the black-white wealth gap, Oliver and Shapiro (1995) have described myriad ways in which the disparity matters. Access to wealth affects options with respect to higher education, the ability to adapt to major emergencies, the pursuit of self-employment, and the capacity to leave bequests to offspring. In fact, the primary source of wealth for individuals now is inheritance (*Blau and Graham*, 1990).

Consequently, black families today have relatively less wealth because their parents had less to bestow upon them. And the children of today's black families will have relatively less wealth because *their* parents will have less to give them. There is, again, a cumulative racial transmission process at work perpetuating economic disparity across generations.

The origins of the racial wealth gap are found in the long-term effects of slavery and Jim Crow practices in the U.S. South, which impeded black acquisition of property. And given that asset accumulation is partially attributable to savings, the historical black disadvantage in earning power has led to lower savings. Notably, there is no evidence of racial difference in saving rates for persons with comparable levels of income (*Darity and Myers*, 1998, p. 150).

The most important component of wealth for most Americans, apart from the super-rich, is home ownership. As Thomas Shapiro (1998, pp. 25-6) has observed, historically the home ownership playing field has not been racially level:

> The home ownership rate for blacks is about 20 percentage points behind whites... This difference is not merely the result of income differences. This is a product of the historical legacy of residential segregation, redlining, FHA/VA policy, and discrimination in real estate and lending markets...

Those conditions continue. Federal Reserve audit studies have found that, to this day, blacks are rejected for home loans at a rate 60 percent higher than equally qualified whites. Blacks also pay, on average, mortgage interest rates 0.33 percent higher than equally qualified whites—regardless of home location, purchase price or time of purchase. That amounts to an additional $9,000 in expense for a 30-year loan. Shapiro (1998, p. 27) observes: "Bankers insisted that they do not discriminate by charging different rates for black and white customers. Instead, it is far more typical for whites to bring greater assets to the table, use them to lower the amount of the loan or to pay 'points' on the loan." In short, white customers use their wealth advantage to reduce the cost of their loan. More, the average rate of appreciation for homes owned by whites rises nearly $30,000 more than for homes owned by blacks.

Shapiro concludes: "...this process reveals a key to understanding how ... past inequality is linked to the present and how present inequalities will project into the next generation. Essentially, past injustice provides a disadvantage for blacks and an advantage for whites in how home purchases are financed."

What can be done about such adverse economic legacies? Redressing them requires redistributing wealth to close the black-white gap. While scholars like Michael Sherraden have provided thoughtful proposals for asset development among low-income Americans, their focus has been on class-based rather than race-based redistribution measures, an approach that will not sufficiently address the pervasive effects of America's intergenerational code of color.

In an earlier work I pointed out that, in 1950, India adopted a national system of preferences on behalf of the "scheduled castes" to eradicate disparities produced by the Hindu caste system. Members of the Ezhava caste in the Indian state of Kerala—who once were not to be touched or even seen by upper caste Hindus—have displayed remarkable upward mobility in recent years, to the point that younger members of the group can be found saying they no longer need the reservation system.

But there is a subtext to the story. The Ezhava live in the state of Kerala in southern India, one of the most socially progressive regions of India. While the reservation system became national in 1950, the state of Kerala had adopted quotas to improve conditions for the lower castes *a century* *ago*, under British colonial rule. The Ezhava have benefitted from a system of preferences for about 100 years, or for close to four generations. Affirmative action in the United States, executed on a far more limited and cautious scale than the system pursued in India, has been in effect only about 25 years and is being rolled back at a ferocious rate.

Recognition of the durability of racial advantage and disadvantage across American generations means that policies to alter the balance, such as affirmative action, must be applied for at least three or four generations to have a pronounced effect.

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ARTICLE | 7

A Critical Assessment of Skills Explanations of Black-White Employment and Wage Gaps

BY WILLIAM M. RODGERS III

Many policymakers and analysts cite an increase in demand for more educated workers over the last 25 years as one of the most important changes in U.S. labor market history. In 1974, for every dollar that a full-year, full-time male college graduate earned, a male high school graduate working the same weeks and hours earned 70 cents. In 1993, a high school graduate earned 57 cents for every dollar a college graduate earned.

A growth in wage inequality among workers with the same education also occurred over the period (ERP, 1998). The gap expanded between high-skilled workers, those at the 90th percentile of the wage ladder; and low-skilled workers, those at the 10th percentile of the wage ladder. For example, one oft-cited study shows that, in the context of a ladder, the difference between the rungs at which low-skilled and high-skilled workers stood increased by 30 percent (Juhn et al, 1991).

Over the last 25 years, dramatic changes also have occurred in the black-white wage gap. From the mid-1970s to 1979, the black-white wage gap among full-year and full-time men narrowed, but it expanded during the 1980s. The gap expanded even among workers with the same education. Most significant was the increased gap among college graduates. It was virtually zero at the end of the 1970s, but expanded to 17 percent by the middle of the 1980s (*Bound and Freeman*, 1992).

Does a causal relationship exist between the growth of wage inequality and the expansion of the racial wage gap? Recent evidence suggests the answer is yes.

In 1979, the typical African-American male and 37th percentile white had the same wage. If we imagine a ladder and the rung on which an individual stands as his or her skill level, we can think of the typical African American and 37th percentile white standing on the same rung. They have the same skill. During the 1980s, the shift in demand toward more-skilled workers caused whites on the rungs of the lower third of their ladder to lose ground relative to the average white male. The ladder increased in height, creating more rungs between low- and high-skilled workers.

Since the typical African American's wage corresponds to a wage on a rung at the lower third of the white ladder, that shift also caused the typical African American to lose relative to the average white worker. The fact that all low-skilled workers fell to lower rungs on the ladder explains how the black-white wage gap expanded, without the need to address a possible worsening in discrimination. Increasing discrimination would mean that African Americans fell to lower rungs of the ladder, while whites with the same skill remained standing at their rung.

From a contemporary policy perspective, such a finding could be used to shift the focus from race-based to non-race-based remedies for the black-white wage gap. The latter remedies, such as running an economy with low unemployment and implementing strong minimum wage and collective bargaining policies, clearly benefit all Americans—especially African Americans. Yet, if labor market discrimination plays a dominant role in determining the economic success of African Americans, then even with a strong economy and strong institutions, a sizeable black-white wage gap will exist.

Does a relationship exist between wage inequality based solely on skill and the black-white wage gap at a given point in time? The answer is obviously yes. Past research has focused on the role that education plays in generating black-white wage gaps. The problem with relying on such a correlation to explain current racial wage gaps is that educational differences have narrowed dramatically since the mid-1970s. Instead, recent research has found another source of racial differences in skills.

During the 1980s, economic returns to school quality and family background increased. To control for that new cause of wage variance across individuals and groups, researchers began to compare the wages of African Americans and whites who have the same education, experience and test scores. Well-documented and sizeable test score differences between African Americans and whites fully explain the black-white wage gap that exists among African Americans and whites with the same education and experience. From a policy perspective, that result could be used to argue against the use of race-based remedies for the black-white wage gap. A critique of those new "skill" interpretations of the black-white wage gap will help to provide an up-to-date picture of young male black-white employment and wage gaps.

Current Estimates of the Male Black-White Wage Gap

A study by Richard Freeman and me (1999) estimates the current economic expansion's impact on labor market outcomes of non-college-educated men. The current expansion is the longest peacetime boom on record, and has brought unemployment rates below 4 percent in more than four out of ten metropolitan areas. Freeman and I found that young men—especially young African-American men—in labor markets with continuously low unemployment rates experienced a boost in employment and earnings. Adult men experienced no gains and their earnings barely changed, even in areas with unemployment rates continuously below 4 percent. Even with sizeable relative gains, large differences in employment exist.

To estimate the mean black-white wage gap, adjusted for racial differences in education and experience, average hourly wages were compared for African Americans and whites who have the same level of educational attainment and experience. To estimate the median black-white wage gap, median hourly wages were compared for African Americans and whites who have the same education and experience. From 1979 to 1985, hourly wage gaps widen for male new entrants, where new entrants are defined as respondents with one to 10 years of potential experience. It remains stagnant until 1997 and appears to have fallen in 1998. The wage gap among high school graduates widens during the first half of the 1980s, and remains constant until the early 1990s, when it narrows slightly. African-American college graduates are at parity with white college graduates in 1979, but between 1985 and 1987 a gap of 14-15 percent emerges. During the remainder of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the gap narrows to 7 percent, but widens again in 1998 to 15 percent.

Table 1 presents another measure of African-American economic status. Data relative to white men are used to estimate a model in which wages are a function of educational attainment, experience and region of residence. Estimated coefficients from the model are then used to arrive at the difference between an individual's actual and predicted wage, where the predicted wage is the wage an individual receives based on his educational attainment, experience and region of residence. Predictions for African Americans correspond to the wage they would receive if their education and experience received the same market payoff as whites. For African Americans and whites, the difference between the actual and predicted wage is referred to as the portion of an individual's wage affected by factors such as school quality and family background characteristics. Individuals whose actual wage exceeds their predicted wage are referred to as high-skilled workers.

LOCATION OF BLACK MEN IN WHITE RESIDUAL WAGE DISTRIBUTION

TABLE NO. 1

PANEL A: ALL MEN

Year	Mean	10	25	50	75	90
1979	40	8	18	37	64	85
1985	34	6	14	32	58	81
1987	36	6	16	34	60	82
1994	39	9	20	37	59	78

PANEL B: HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS

Year	Mean	10	25	50	75	90
1979	33	7	15	28	59	82
1985	28	6	13	25	43	72
1987	34	7	15	31	55	80
1994	39	17	26	42	57	69

PANEL C: HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

Year	Mean	10	25	50	75	90
1979	38	8	16	35	63	84
1985	33	6	13	32	57	81
1987	36	6	16	33	59	80
1994	39	10	19	36	57	78

PANEL D: COLLEGE GRADUATES

Year	Mean	10	25	50	75	90
1979	47	11	24	49	73	89
1985	38	4	16	39	65	84
1987	36	5	15	36	63	84
1994	38	5	17	40	66	80

SOURCE: Rodgers (1997). Entries represent the location of black men in the white residual log hourly wage distribution. The residual distributions are constructed using education and potential experience coefficients from the white regression line. Separate regressions are estimated for each potential experience group.

Individuals whose actual wage equals their predicted wage are referred to as average-skilled workers, and individuals whose actual wage is less than their predicted wage are referred to as low-skilled workers.

To develop the measures of economic status shown in Table 1, we locate the position at which median, 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentile African Americans lie in the white skill distribution. Using the ladder metaphor, that locates the rung on the white skill ladder at which middle-, low- and high-skill African Americans stand. Movements of African Americans on the white skill ladder correspond to changes in their relative status, an approach that allows us to determine whether increases in the wage gap were uniform across the skill ladder, or concentrated at particular rungs of the ladder. The decline in the relative positions of African Americans coincides with the expansion of wage gaps, and losses are greatest at rungs above the bottom quarter of the ladder. The least-skilled African Americans maintain their positions relative to low-skilled whites. Movements of African-American high school graduates indicate that the erosion in their relative status occurs at all skill levels, except among the lowest skilled. The recovery occurs among the lowest- and medium-skilled high school graduates. For college graduates, the gap during the 1980s occurs because African-American college graduates at all rungs of the ladder fell to lower rungs.

Identifying Sources of Change in the Black-White Wage Gap

The decline in the relative position of African-American men is concentrated in the first half of the 1980s. Over that period, the wage gap expanded at 0.78 percent per year. Why did the gap increase? One reason might have been that educational attainment differences had continued to widen. However, as is well known, just the opposite occurred. In fact, a narrowing in educational attainment differences contributed to a 0.33 percent per year narrowing of the wage gap. The wage gap also might have expanded if the return to additional years of schooling increased. Over the target period, the return did increase. In fact, it contributed a 0.33 percent per year expansion in the wage gap. The net effect of differences in educational attainment on the widening of the wage gap is zero.

That leads us to the following question: Was the gap's widening due to an increase in general inequality or a growth in discrimination? As described earlier, the gap's expansion could be due to an increase in wage inequality that put less-skilled workers at a disadvantage. Since the typical African-American male's position is at the lower segment of the skill ladder, the black-white wage gap would expand. Yet, over the period, inequality growth accounts for only 8.6 percent of the gap's actual increase. The net effect of the changes is that discrimination must have worsened from 1979 to 1985, the period in which the wage gap expanded the most.

For college graduates in the period from 1979 to 1985, the net effect is the same. Discrimination worsened. African Americans fell to lower rungs on the ladder. The gap expanded by 2.14 percent per year. One cause might have been that the difference in black and white college graduates with advanced degrees had expanded, but that didn't happen. In fact, the difference narrowed, contributing to a 0.53 percent per year decline in the wage gap. The gap also might have increased if there had been an increase in the payoff to advanced degrees. That did occur, but generated only a 0.18 percent per year expansion in the gap.

The gap also might have expanded if there had been a growth in general wage inequality among college graduates. Some growth did occur, but it only generated a 0.08 percent per year increase in the wage gap. Finally, the gap might have increased if there had been a decline in the relative position of African-American college graduates in the white college graduate wage distribution. That decline in position contributed a 2.6 percent per year widening in the gap. Clearly, the wage gap's expansion among African-

American and white college graduates is due to an increase in labor market discrimination, a falling to lower rungs.

Let's look now at changes in the gap at various rungs of the skill ladder. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the analytical framework for decomposing the change between median African-American and white wages from 1979 to 1985. By constructing the actual median wage gaps in 1979 and 1985 and then computing their change, it is possible to identify the portion of change that results from a growth in wage inequality—or the adding of more rungs to the ladder, making it taller. Then the 1985 predicted gap—a measure of the disadvantage that would have emerged if the median African-American wage had remained stationary on the ladder relative to whites at the middle rung—is constructed. By computing the difference between the predicted gap in 1985 and the actual gap in 1979, we arrive at the predicted change in the median black-white wage gap associated solely with an increase in general wage inequality—making the ladder taller by adding more rungs.

For ease of interpretation, a ratio of the predicted and actual changes can be multiplied by 100. If the ratio equals 100, then an increase in the ladder's length or general inequality growth explains all of the widening in the black-white wage gap. If the ratio equals 0, then an increase in the ladder's length explains none of the gap's widening. The ratio of predicted and actual changes equals 60, indicating that an increase in the ladder's height, or growth in general wage inequality, explains 60 percent of the actual increase in the median black-white wage gap. For the African American with the typical skills in the labor market, 60 percent of the relative decline in their wages occurs because of an increase in the ladder's height. A fall to lower rungs of the skill ladder explains the remaining 40 percent.

The analogy of the ladder's increase in height versus African Americans falling to lower rungs can be applied to changes in the wage gap for high school and college graduates. The most striking

DISTRIBUTIONAL DECOMPOSITION

FIGURE NO. 1



results are that an increase in the ladder's height explains very little of the actual gap's expansion. Depending on the rungs, the actual gap range increases, with the largest growth occurring at the bottom quarter and upper quarter of the skill ladder. The positive predicted changes at the rungs below the middle rung suggest that the increase in the ladder's height—the spread of the white skill distribution at the lower end—declined, helping to lessen the actual wage gap.

The values of the ratio at the middle and upper rungs indicate that an increase in the height of the skill ladder from 1979 to 1985 explains between 10 and 27 percent of the gap's actual increase. Standard deviations provide reasonable fits at rungs in the middle and upper quarter of the ladder, but not at the highest rung. The actual high school graduate gap increases at all rungs of the ladder, while the predicted changes at the middle to upper rungs are negative. Because of that, the ratio is only positive at the median and upper rungs. The contribution rises as we move up the ladder. The predicted changes at the upper quarter and top most rungs are similar to their population estimates. Only the predicted change at the upper-most rung is statistically significant. The college graduate analysis suggests that an increase in the skill ladder's height explains a portion of the gap's change at rungs from the bottom quarter to the top-most rungs. The standard deviation indicates that the ratios are marginally significant.

Removing Biases of the Composite AFQT Score

Proponents of the "skills" hypothesis derive their evidence from four studies that use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY is data from a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young adults interviewed annually since 1979, when they were ages 14 to 22. The samples used in this essay are based on the criteria in Neal and Johnson (1996). The sample is restricted to respondents who are in either the NLSY's cross-section, or supplemental samples of African Americans and Hispanics. Respondents must have an hourly wage ranging between $1.00 and $75. Neal and Johnson exclude respondents who did not take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test.

The point of contention is Neal and Johnson's and others' use of the composite score from the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) in civilian wage equations. The AFQT has its origins in the Army and Navy during World War II. After the war, and until 1973, the military administered eight different forms of the AFQT. In 1976, the military returned to uniform testing (Bock and Moore 1986), with a version of the AFQT, Form 8A, which is part of a broader test—the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) exam. The military uses the ASVAB as a general measure of trainability and the primary criterion for enlistment eligibility.

During the summer of 1980, Defense Department officials contracted with the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago to administer the ASVAB from July through October to a civilian sample of young adults. The project is referred to as the "Profile of American Youth," and its purposes were to assess the vocational aptitudes of a nationally representative sample of youth, and more importantly, to develop new national norms for the ASVAB. At that time military officials felt the exam needed a new benchmark because they were still referencing aptitude levels of current recruits to adult males who took the test during World War II.

The military used young adults aged 18 to 23 from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, who were chosen because they represented an existing sample of young adults. The AFQT exam consists of four of the ASVAB's 10 components, which cover a variety of subjects ranging from vocational to academic sections, including Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Mathematics Knowledge and Numerical Operations. Except for the Numerical Operations component, the AFQT score is geared to provide a summary measure of an individual's basic knowledge and skills: reading, writing and arithmetic.

Studies find that when researchers place the composite Armed Forces Qualification Test score (a combination of the math and verbal scores) of respondents in a wage equation, the black-white wage gap among women vanishes and the gap among men almost vanishes. A growing body of research questions the merit of using the AFQT as a sole measure of civilian job skills.

In replicating Neal and Johnson, Spriggs, Waaler and I found that at the time of the exam's administration, African-American respondents had completed fewer grades than whites. Scores also rise with completed grades. Because of those two facts, we argue that the composite AFQT score must be education-adjusted prior to its placement in an equation meant to explain the racial wage gap. Otherwise, the AFQT score understates the relative job skills of African Americans.

The major concern with the results is the failure to remove the composite score's racial bias in predicting wages. That is different than claiming the test is racially biased. In earlier work (1996), Spriggs and I demonstrate that the composite score predicts the wages of blacks and whites differently. The same test score does not generate the same wage. African Americans and whites have different regression lines and the math and verbal components of the AFQT measure different sets of skills across race. Significant racial differences remain even after an exhaustive set of family background, school quality and psychological measures are added.

To remove the bias or the unexplained portion of the difference in black and white test scores, a test score was created where racial differences can only emerge via racial differences in family background, school quality and psychological measures. When that test score is placed in the wage equation, the racial wage gap remains quite large, supporting the contention that labor market discrimination remains a formidable obstacle for many young African-American men and women.

Summary and Discussion

Several recent studies claim that the erosion in the relative earnings of African Americans during the 1980s had little to do with race and more to do with an increase in general wage inequality. Further, in an effort to identify and quantify "unmeasured" skills that are correlated with race, analysts began to incorporate the composite AFQT score—the military's test of basic cognitive skills—into civilian wage equations. In this essay, both explanations are critically assessed. To explain the role that wage inequality growth could play, discussion was placed in the context of a ladder, where position on the ladder denotes skill. An increase in the ladder's height represents wage inequality growth and a fall to lower rungs for African Americans; when whites with similar skills stay on the same rung, it represents a worsening in discrimination.

The most up-to-date series of estimated black-white employment and wage gaps through 1998 show that young men, especially young African-American men, in economies with continuously low unemployment rates experienced a boost in employment and earnings. Yet, sizeable racial differences in employment still remain. During the 1990s, the gap fluctuated between 10 and 13 percent. African-American college graduates have not recovered from the dramatic erosion that occurred during the first half of the 1980s. Currently, the gap sits between 15 and 20 percent.

Evidence explaining the widening of the black-white wage gap during the 1980s, as well as increases in the height of the ladder, or general growth of inequality, cannot explain much of the wage gap's increase. The evidence is more consistent with a fall of African Americans to lower rungs on the skill ladder due to a worsening in labor market discrimination. Further, at any point in time, the black-white wage gap is mostly due to labor market discrimination and not to test score differences that supposedly point to racial skill gaps.

More recently, proponents of the "skills" explanation provided yet another set of empirical results, which they claim are consistent with the general wage inequality explanation. Those studies find that the monetary value of cognitive skills increased during the 1980s.

However, for that explanation to stand, the value of cognitive skills must have increased at a faster rate than the narrowing of black-white test score differences that occurred over the same time periods. Given limitations in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and High School Beyond test score data, it is not possible to verify that claim. Respondents take those tests once, and researchers cannot determine whether racial differences in test scores narrow faster than any increase in the test score's value in the labor market. Evidence in Grissmer et al. (1994) shows that between 1975 and 1990, African-American students made test score gains that significantly exceeded the gains of non-Hispanic whites.

More generally, other studies on wage determination also have found fault with the AFQT score's ability to explain wages and the return to education. Given the growing collection of studies questioning the robustness of the composite AFQT test score to explain sources of wage differences between and within groups, caution is required in labeling the results as being driven by "skill" difference. In the context of black-white wage inequality, labor market discrimination remains an integral part of the African-American experience.

To further drive home my concern with the composite AFQT score, I end with a quiz. Suppose you have the opportunity to coach a team that will play the former world champion Houston Rockets. Would you use the top 10 free-throw shooters, or all-stars? You would clearly choose the all-stars. They are selected on a variety of skills: ability to dribble, shoot, pass, rebound and shoot free throws. If you chose the free-throw shooters, your team would probably loose miserably because you based your assessment of skills on one summary measure of ability. Shaquille O'Neill, for example, would not be a member of your team of superb free-throw shooters. As shown in the AFQT analysis, it is best to look individually at the skills that comprise our composite measure of skill. The market may put very different weights on each skill and these weights may differ by group.

An additional aspect of the quiz is the framework in which the question is asked. The general knowledge being tested revolves around a distinction between using a composite skill and *the components* of the composite skill to predict ability. For some groups, such as men and African Americans, and even African-American women, the basketball quiz might be a "no brainer," while for white men and women it might not be. The tables could be turned if the question were posed in the context of how to create the best possible swim team or symphony orchestra. It all depends on the experiences and knowledge of the subject that an individual brings to the table.

Thus, as many states move to high-stakes testing programs, such as the Standards of Learning in Virginia, the challenge will be to construct instruments that truly sort individuals on the basis of their knowledge and skills, instead of the context in which questions are asked. An additional challenge will be to resist the temptation to rely solely on composite measures to assess ability. If social scientists and policy makers fail to resist that temptation, they will err in identifying and attacking the causes of persistent racial employment and wage gaps.

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ARTICLE 8

The Reliance of African Americans on the Public Sector

BY LYNN C. BURBRIDGE

Since the 1950s the economic status of African Americans has shown startling improvement by many measures, one of which has been the emergence of a significant black middle class. Such gains are very real and should not be trivialized. Research shows, however, that they have been concentrated in specific sectors of the economy. Notably, blacks have made significant employment gains and achieved occupational mobility in the government and non-profit sectors. They have done less well in the for-profit sector—the very heart of the U.S. economy—which has experienced tremendous growth and expansion in recent years.

That was not always the case. Between 1950 and 1970, the number of workers in government increased by 43.8 percent, or from 12.1 percent of all workers in 1950 to 17.4 percent of all workers in 1970 (see Table 1).[1] The number of workers in the non-profit sector grew by almost 70 percent between 1950 and 1990, or from 4.5 percent of all workers in 1950 to 8.0 percent of all workers in 1970. At the same time the number of workers in the for-profit sector declined by 10 percent.

Between 1970 and 1990, however, we begin to see declines as a result of cutbacks in government services. Employment in government fell by almost 6 percent over the period. Employment in

DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE AND SALARIED WORKERS IN THE LABOR FORCE AMONG SECTORS, 1950–1990

TABLE NO. 1

PERCENT OF ALL EMPLOYED	GOVERNMENT	FOR-PROFIT	NON-PROFIT SECTOR
1950	12.1	83.3	4.6
1960	14.3	79.9	5.9
1970	17.4	74.6	8.0
1980	18.4	72.5	9.2
1990	16.4	71.3	12.3
PERCENT CHANGE			
1950–1970	43.8	-10.2	69.6
1970–1990	-5.7	-4.4	53.8

Source: 1990 Census of Population Public Use Tapes, calculations by author.
Note: Data on the "non-profit" sector are estimates and represent, more appropriately, those in non-government jobs in selected service industries.

the for-profit sector also declined by 4 percent. The non-profit sector, however, continued to expand—driven largely by expansion in health care—and grew by 54 percent. It should be noted, however, that in spite of declines, the for-profit sector still represents 71 percent of total employment.

Given that African Americans began leaving the rural South in large numbers in the 1950s and 1960s, it's not surprising that they were drawn into the growth sectors of the economy, which at the time were government and the non-profit sectors. The number of African-American females working for the government grew by 141 percent between 1950 and 1960, and the number of African-American males working for government in the same period grew by 91 percent (see Table 2). The number of African-American females in the non-profit sector grew by 140 percent and numbers of African-American males working in the same sector grew by 65

PERCENT OF BLACKS AND WHITES IN SECTORS, BY SEX AND PERCENT CHANGES

TABLE NO. 2

	FOR 1990		PERCENT CHANGE 1950–1970		PERCENT CHANGE 1970–1990	
	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES	MALES
BLACKS						
Government	26.1	20.8	140.6	91.0	7.4	8.9
For-Profit	53.9	71.9	-25.7	-11.9	-13.1	-6.1
Non-Profit	20.0	7.3	139.6	65.2	46.0	69.8
WHITES						
Government	17.4	14.3	29.3	36.6	-10.8	-6.5
For-Profit	63.4	79.2	-11.3	-6.3	-4.9	-1.7
Non-Profit	19.2	6.5	42.0	54.2	38.1	58.5

Source: 1990 Census of Population Public Use Tapes, calculations by author.
Note: Data on the "non-profit" sector are estimates and represent, more appropriately, those in non-government jobs in selected service industries.

percent. With the exception of males in the non-profit sector, those rates were three to four times the growth experienced by whites in the same sectors.

Between 1970 and 1990, the reliance of African Americans on government employment continued to increase, despite overall reductions in the government sector, and the number of African Americans working in for-profit sectors continued to decline. Fewer whites worked in government and non-profit sectors over the period, but reductions in for-profit numbers were considerably less. The reliance of both blacks and whites on the non-profit sector continued to increase over the period.

What does all that mean? African Americans are represented less and less in for-profit employment. And while there has been some redistribution among sectors for whites as well, the shift has been considerably smaller. By 1990, 26 percent of African-

American women relied on government employment compared to 17 percent of white women. Twenty-one percent of African-American men relied on government employment compared to 14 percent of white men. Since percentages of blacks and whites in the non-profit sector are more similar, virtually all the differences in black and white government employment come at the expense of private, for-profit sector employment.

The differences are even more dramatic for certain occupations (see Table 3). Only 11 percent of professional black women work in the private, for-profit sector compared to 18 percent of professional white women. Thirty percent of professional black men work in the private, for-profit sector compared to 44 percent of professional white men. Further, white women in executive and managerial positions are more likely to work in the for-profit sector (70 percent) than either black men (56 percent) or black women (50 percent) in similar jobs. White men claimed even higher percentages (79 percent).

Differences in lower-paying occupations also are marked. Black women in administrative support occupations (secretarial, clerical) are much more likely to work for government (33 percent) than are white women in the same occupations (17 percent). Similar differences exist for men.

Even among service workers, disparities persist—particularly for black women. Only 41 percent of black women in the "other services" category work in the for-profit sector, compared to 61 percent of white women. The percentage for black men is similar to that of white women (64 percent), but the percentage of white male service workers in the for-profit sector is the highest of all, at 74 percent.

While reliance on government employment appears particularly high for black women, when taking into account the reliance of black men on military employment it's possible to conclude that the issue affects both black men and women. By 1990, black military recruits totaled almost 30 percent of the Army (Table 4).

DISTRIBUTION AMONG SECTORS FOR BLACK AND WHITE WORKERS, BY SELECTED OCCUPATION AND SEX, 1990

TABLE NO. 3

OCCUPATION	BLACK WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS FOR-PROFIT	GOVERNMENT	NON-PROFIT	WHITE WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS FOR-PROFIT	GOVERNMENT	NON-PROFIT
FEMALES						
Total	53.9	26.1	20.0	63.4	17.4	19.2
Executive/Managerial	49.7	34.6	15.8	69.8	16.1	14.1
Professional Specialty	10.5	55.7	33.9	17.5	42.0	40.5
Technical	25.6	26.9	47.4	41.1	14.5	44.4
Administrative Support	51.5	33.4	15.1	67.0	17.3	15.7
Protective Service	34.3	59.3	6.4	31.0	61.2	7.7
Other Service	40.5	20.9	38.6	61.0	11.0	27.6
MALES						
Total	71.9	20.8	7.3	79.2	14.3	6.5
Executive/Managerial	55.8	33.6	10.6	76.3	16.5	7.2
Professional Specialty	30.6	44.1	25.3	44.3	31.5	24.2
Technical	51.7	27.6	20.6	69.3	18.0	12.7
Administrative Support	58.3	34.3	7.4	69.9	23.9	6.2
Protective Service	38.4	56.2	5.3	26.4	69.6	4.0
Other Service	63.8	19.8	16.4	74.2	13.0	12.8

Source: 1990 Census of Population Public Use Tapes, calculations by author.

Note: Data on the "non-profit" sector are estimates and represent, more appropriately, those in non-government jobs in selected service industries.

BLACKS AS PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND AS PERCENT OF THE ARMED SERVICES, 1980–1995

TABLE NO. 4

YEAR	% OF POPULATION	% OF ARMY	% OF NAVY	% OF MARINES	% OF AIR FORCE	% OF ALL ARMED FORCES
1980	11.8	29.5	10.4	20.7	14.3	19.7
1985	12.0	27.0	12.3	18.7	15.0	19.0
1990	12.3	29.1	16.1	19.3	15.3	20.9
1995	12.6	26.9	17.2	16.0	14.5	19.6

Source: Data from Bureau of Census, *US Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997.* Table 18 and 557.

Between 1990 and 1995, blacks seemed to bear a disproportionate share of the cutback in Army personnel. Nevertheless, the percentage of blacks in the Navy increased, so that overall they maintained their numbers at approximately 20 percent of the armed services between 1980 and 1995. That compared to a 13 percent representation in the total U.S. population.

Black high school seniors are 1.4 times more likely to expect to go into the military than are white seniors—odds calculated in a way that controls for socioeconomic (SES) status. Table 5 indicates that students of low SES are twice as likely to plan to go into the military as students from more privileged backgrounds. The combination of race and SES explains expectations of black youth regarding military employment.

As mentioned earlier, the growth in government services in the 1950s and 1960s at a time when blacks were seeking alternatives to agricultural employment may explain some of those employment patterns. But even as government began to cut back, blacks continued to rely more heavily on government employment, suggesting one of two possible explanations: Either blacks have a greater commitment to public service, or they experience greater discrimination in for-profit employment.

ODDS OF HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS PLANNING TO JOIN THE MILITARY, 1992

TABLE NO. 5

VARIABLE	ODDS RATIO
Males (relative to females)	2.917
Black (relative to non-Hispanic white)	1.436
Hispanic (relative to non-Hispanic white)	1.043
Asian (relative to non-Hispanic white)	0.725
American Indian (relative to non-Hispanic white)	1.525
Low socioeconomic status (relative to high SES)	2.002
High percent of school's students enter military	1.208

Source: Logistic regression calculated by author from US Department of Education, NCES 96-128 CD-Rom.

Both explanations have merit. Given their shared history of discrimination, blacks may feel a stronger call to public duty, in hopes of making the world a better, more honorable place. Nevertheless, African Americans—particularly those seeking upward mobility—also have found the public sector more open to them.

Regardless of their preferences, blacks are finding fewer and fewer opportunities in government, and calls for cutbacks in government services ensure the trend will continue. Privatization will result in more, formerly governmental services being provided by the for-profit sector. At the same time, welfare reform will result in significant numbers of black women entering the labor force at a time when their traditional governmental route to occupational mobility will be cut off. Given that confluence of factors, more African-American representation in the private, for-profit sector may become an increasing necessity.

Notes

[1] For detailed information on how these data were calculated, see Lynn C. Burbridge, *Government, For-profit and Third Sector Employment: Differences by Race and Sex. 1950–1990*, Wellesley, MA: Center for Research on Women, 1994.

ARTICLE 9

Education Accountability: First the School Systems—Then the Students

BY HUGH B. PRICE

Education accountability is the latest school reform wave to engulf America's public schools. Over the last decade and a half, urban schools have experimented with everything from top-down to bottom-up reform. Now states are trying "tough love"—loftier academic standards and high-stakes tests. The Clinton administration recently joined the fray with its proposed Education Accountability Act, which would mandate an end to so-called social promotion by school districts that receive federal aid.

The National Urban League does not fear holding our children to high academic standards. We know from research and practical experience in real schools that African-American children can achieve on par with other children. Prof. Linda Darling-Hammond of Stanford documented that in her important book, *The Right to Learn.*

But to have a fair shot at succeeding, children must receive education that is on par, as well. That is precisely the problem with the "tough love" approach President Clinton endorses and many states are implementing with carefree abandon. We staunchly oppose the Clinton administration's insistence that school districts end social promotion within four years, fully a year before districts are required to staff every classroom with a qualified teacher.

According to Darling-Hammond, urban and rural minority children are caught in an unconscionable trap between lofty standards and lousy schools. We say the trap is unconstitutional, as well. Why? Because it's the states that set the standards and it's the states that bear ultimate responsibility for low-performing public schools. Ninety-five percent of school-age black children attend public schools. Their future rests on improving the performance of public education, not on tearing it apart.

Our children are caught in the crossfire between advocates of accountability and the forces of inertia—between politicians who view school reform as a barrage of slogans and sound bites, and cynical educators who think this latest school reform wave, too, shall pass. Between state and federal overseers, on the one hand, and local educators who prize their autonomy, on the other. Between those who believe in reforming the system, and skeptics who view market-oriented alternatives, like school vouchers, as the only salvation for urban children.

The National Urban League insists that our children not be used as cannon fodder in the raging education accountability wars. Politicians and school administrators have got the business of improving schools completely backward. The head of the Virginia School Boards Association hit the mark when he said:

> "The state insisted on testing first, training teachers second and purchasing new books and teaching materials third, which is the exact opposite of what we need to do."

No well-managed corporation would modernize its product line that way. Of course, it must know where the bar for beating its competition is set. The next logical steps are to design prototypes, retool plants and manufacturing procedures, transform the organizational culture, retrain workers and exhaustively test new products—all before mass-producing new products for the market.

Fairness and common sense dictate that the accountability movement should be guided by sound pedagogical practice, not reckless political expediency. It's time to pause in the pell-mell rush to high standards and high-stakes tests, time to make certain all children receive high-quality education before holding them accountable to tough standards. In other words, it's time to hold the adults who are responsible for public education accountable for their performance before sanctioning youngsters for their failure to perform.

Much of President Clinton's plan is right on target. His administration wants Congress to help finance new teachers, reduction of class size and school construction. The federal government also would require that all classrooms contain certified teachers, and would underwrite local efforts to turn around faltering schools.

Some states, like Connecticut and North Carolina, have enjoyed significant gains by coupling high standards with increased investments in instruction. Unfortunately, those examples are the exception rather than the rule. Five years ago, the New York City Board of Education imposed tough new standards to improve student performance in high school math and science. Yet a recent appraisal by City Comptroller Alan Hevesi revealed that the school system is hampered to this day by shortages of qualified teachers and adequate laboratories. Worse yet, since the standards were imposed the percentage of uncertified science teachers has nearly doubled from 16.5 percent to 30.4 percent. According to the comptroller:

> "The school system's tough new standards for math and science are a step in the right direction. But we are setting up our kids to fail if we don't give them the tools they need to learn and meet those standards, including qualified teachers and working laboratories."

Urban school districts taking the backward route to accountability will confront the educational debacle that New York City now faces. If the English language standard that takes effect next year were in force today, more than a third of the city's 11th-graders would fail and be ineligible to graduate from high school. Diane Ravitch of the Brookings Institution worries that in some neighborhoods, fewer than 5 percent of the high school seniors will qualify for diplomas.

Can New York City close the gap at this late date? Will the city or the state foot the bill? Can the schools absorb those who fail, and for how long? Can they absorb several years' worth of aging underperformers?

Thoughtful politicians and educators who genuinely want children to achieve should ponder that scary picture and pause to make certain they put the horse back in front of the cart. To avert failure and frustration, the education accountability movement should be guided by the following principles:

- Education accountability starts with educators;
- Quality education now, student accountability next;
- Ending social promotion is a day late and a dollar short;
- Focus on the fundamentals.

Education Accountability Starts with Educators

Kati Haycock, head of the Education Trust, goes right to the heart of the League's concern about education accountability. If students fail, she observes, "there are already serious consequences for the kids, but not for the adults."

Historically, state education agencies have overseen school districts, but averted responsibility for the schools' performance. Protected by union contracts and tenure, school boards, administrators, principals and teachers have sidestepped accountability, as well. Academic failure by poor minority students was explained away by socioeconomic status or, worse, scientifically discredited and downright racist theories of inferior intellectual capacity.

After two decades of promising school reform, those excuses by the adults who preside over public education no longer hold water. Abundant examples of high achievement by low-income minority children confirm that they will meet society's expectations of them if adults will meet their obligations to them.

To begin with, states should shine a spotlight on how well individual schools do in lifting the achievement levels of minority children who have chronically lagged behind. Public exposure helps jolt educators out of their lethargy.

It may be necessary to invoke more draconian measures. Teachers and principals who are inadequately trained and unsuited for urban schools should be retooled, counseled out of education or, if need be, removed.

Schools that habitually fail their students should be placed on probation or treated much the same as other bankrupt but salvageable enterprises. Remove the management, replenish the staff with capable replacements and institute a recovery plan.

Students who chronically lag behind and those who are stranded in schools that are beyond resuscitation should be free to enroll in other public schools, in charter schools or alternative public school settings more suited to their needs.

The ultimate sanction that captures attention is shutting off financial support. Federal aid should be used to spur poor school districts to improve, not merely to subsidize their routine operations.

Without attempting to micro-manage the affairs of local school districts, the federal government should mandate that school districts receiving federal aid under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) actually close achievement gaps that separate poor and minority children from their more advantaged peers. If the districts don't make progress, then impose financial penalties until they get the point.

Ardent believers in universal public education should mark this prediction: If those who preside over public education waver on holding themselves accountable, then the idea of offering vouchers or so-called education savings accounts to children in failing schools will gain momentum. Pragmatic parents who are determined that their children receive a decent education will tune out philosophical appeals to preserve universal public education.

Quality Education Now, Student Accountability Next

In fairness to students, accountability begins with quality education. Few urban districts can claim that key ingredients are available to all students, especially low-income minority pupils.

How can urban children possibly meet high standards when, according to the National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, as many as half of their teachers have little background in subjects like math and science? One science teacher in Carroll County outside of Washington, D.C., recounts that the only college math course he took was pre-calculus. Yet his high school assigned him to teach math.

A recent survey of 4,000 teachers nationwide found that only one in five felt they were well qualified to teach in a modern classroom. The need to replace 2.2 million teacher retirees over the next 10 years, coupled with rising student enrollment and the pressure to reduce class size, means that even more marginally skilled people may be enlisted to teach.

How can black and Latino children possibly meet exacting academic standards when they're systemically excluded from rigorous courses geared to those standards? According to the Education Trust, high scoring white and Asian students are twice as likely as high scoring black and Latino youngsters to be assigned to college prep courses.

School districts receiving federal aid under the ESEA, and in particular Title I, must not tolerate any discriminatory educational practices toward African-American and other children of color. We define those practices as:

- tracking African-American and other children of color into dead-end, non-college preparatory courses;
- placing disproportionate numbers of such youngsters in special-education classes;
- holding back disproportionate numbers of such children;
- permitting disproportionately high rates of suspension and expulsion of minority children.

ESEA should include specific language prohibiting such practices and authorizing that federal education aid be withheld from school districts that countenance and fail to correct them.

The best way to boost scholastic performance is to institute—and then honor—an "Academic Bill of Rights" for children based on solid lessons from research and real-world experience. In the League's view, every American child has a right to:

- quality pre-school education that gets them off to a solid start;
- qualified teachers who genuinely believe their pupils can learn;
- access to challenging courses that help them reach their fullest potential;
- schools that are organized and outfitted for teaching and learning instead of maintaining order; and
- after-school and summer programs that promote academic and social development while keeping youngsters out of trouble.

If federal and state governments truly believe in accountability, they too must hold themselves to account for mobilizing the will and the wherewithal to deliver on such an Academic Bill of Rights. That means recruiting a new generation of qualified teachers and principals, assisting those now in place with effective mentoring and professional development, and investing in state-of-the-art schools and constructive after-school programs.

Beyond implementing those principles, more mundane steps must be taken. As two former state education commissioners, Thomas Boysen and Thomas Sobol, wrote recently in *Education Week*, teachers must be afforded an opportunity to become familiar with new instructional material and acquire new techniques. Students should have ready access to up-to-date textbooks, functional laboratories and state-of-the-art learning technologies.

If those essential ingredients of quality education are missing, then Boysen and Sobel are absolutely right that sending urban youngsters out to meet new high standards is a prescription for failure—and an injustice to the students involved.

Ending Social Promotion Is a Day Late and a Dollar Short

In the sage words of *Washington Post* columnist E.J. Dionne, ending social promotion "moves the burden of failing systems from the adults who run them to the children who aren't making it." Besides, previous experience with ending social promotion should give pause to those who mindlessly endorse it.

To begin with, school districts already refuse to promote thousands of students. Prof. Robert Hauser, author of *High Stakes: Testing for Tracking, Promotion and Graduation*, reminds us that retention rates were already on the rise before politicians began lambasting schools for indulging in social promotion. The jury is still out on whether the recent wave of tough retention rules actually work.

Experience provides scant cause for optimism. In the early 1980s, New York City tried ending social promotions. The school system hired 1,100 more teachers, equipped them with special training and placed them with failing pupils in smaller classes.

The well-intentioned effort flunked. Within a few years, students who had been held back were no better off academically than the low achievers of previous years who had been allowed to pass to the next grade. Even more troubling, the dropout rate for detainees was much higher than that of similar students who didn't stay back.

New York's experience echoes research findings from other districts. According to Prof. Darling-Hammond, dozens of studies show that holding students back:

> "... actually contributes to greater academic failure, higher levels of dropping out and greater behavioral difficulties. Instead of looking carefully at classroom or school practices when students are not achieving, schools typically send students back to repeat the same experience. Little is done to ensure that the experience will be either more appropriate for the individual needs of the child, or of higher quality."

Those who clamor for holding students strictly accountable seem oblivious to the known downsides of ending social promotion. That's why we say, wittingly or not, they are using low-achievers as cannon fodder in the education accountability wars.

Extending the school year to provide additional doses of high-caliber instruction makes sense. Mandating summer school may hoist students who just missed clearing the bar. But there's little reason to believe that youngsters who are lagging way behind will catch up with six weeks of remedial classes cobbled together by panicked school districts. There simply is no educationally sound alternative to up-front investment in high-caliber teaching and learning.

The infatuation with tests these days distorts instruction by pressuring educators to *teach to the test* instead of to a core academic sequence. School districts must be guided in the proper use of gate-keeping tests. At a minimum, they should be required to follow guidelines established by the National Research Council on High Stakes Testing for Tracking, Promotion and Graduation. Furthermore, until a school district can demonstrate equal access to quality education, it should be prohibited from instituting a test-based promotion plan.

The National Urban League's bottom line is that federal and state bureaucrats ought not to micromanage local decisions about who moves from fourth grade to fifth. Leave that call to parents and educators whose decisions are guided by the children's best interests instead of catchy slogans.

Focus on the Fundamentals

In their frantic search for the Holy Grail, urban school boards and administrators have embraced successive innovations that, when they've worked, have proven the point that low-income minority children can achieve. But those approaches have not lifted achievement levels district-wide.

Now that we know from countless demonstrations that urban children can achieve, the emphasis in school systems must shift to seeing that vastly more youngsters succeed academically. That means moving beyond the latest school reform fad and focusing on the rudiments of quality education.

In his provocative new book, *Spinning Wheels: The Politics of Urban School Reform*, Frederick Hess argues that "the professional and political interests of urban school leaders need to be hitched to the long-term performance of urban schools." We must evaluate educators on results, not promises—on outputs, not inputs.

In fairness to educators, states obsessed with accountability have inundated teachers with detailed standards, exhaustive and exhausting curricular guidelines and repetitive standardized tests. Exasperated educators like Memphis superintendent Gerry House, the recently designated "Superintendent of the Year," complain that test preparation and test taking are encroaching on time that is badly needed for basic instruction.

For instance, a fifth-grade teacher in Oklahoma City, whose students were studying *Macbeth*, questioned why they had to take three sets of standardized exams annually that cover much of the same content. One set for assessment and accountability purposes should suffice, freeing up time for the teacher and his charges to tackle additional challenging material that will equip students to excel academically.

With so much riding on results, teachers devote increasing amounts of the school day to "teaching to the tests." Middle-class parents enroll their youngsters in test prep courses that poor and working-class parents cannot afford, further solidifying achievement gaps.

Two years ago, the National Urban League proclaimed it was time to enter the "no excuses" era of urban school reform. Education accountability begins with educators. It ends with children, who will enjoy the benefits of solid academic preparation or else pay the ultimate price of failure. The education accountability movement must begin at the beginning—with the adults who preside over public education.

APPENDIX I

A History of the National Urban League

The National Urban League, which has played so pivotal a role in the 20th-century Freedom Movement, grew out of that spontaneous grassroots passage to freedom and opportunity that came to be called the Black Migrations. When the U.S. Supreme Court declared its approval of segregation in the 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision, the brutal system of economic, social and political oppression quickly adopted by the White South rapidly transformed what had been a trickle of African Americans northward into a flood.

Those newcomers to the North soon discovered they had not escaped racial discrimination. Excluded from all but menial jobs in the larger society, victimized by poor housing and education, and inexperienced in the ways of urban life, many lived in terrible social and economic conditions.

Still, in the degree of difference between South and North lay opportunity, and that African Americans clearly understood.

But to capitalize on that opportunity, to successfully adapt to urban life and to reduce the pervasive discrimination they faced, they would need help. That was the reason the Committee on Urban Conditions Among Negroes was established in 1910 in New

York City. Central to the organization's founding were two remarkable people: Mrs. Ruth Standish Baldwin and Dr. George Edmund Haynes, who would become the Committee's first executive secretary. Mrs. Baldwin, the widow of a railroad magnate and a member of one of America's oldest families, had a remarkable social conscience and was a stalwart champion of the poor and disadvantaged. Dr. Haynes, a graduate of Fisk University, Yale University and Columbia University (he was the first African American to receive a doctorate from that institution), felt a compelling need to use his training as a social worker to serve his people.

A year later, the Committee merged with the Committee for the Improvement of Industrial Conditions Among Negroes in New York (founded in New York in 1906), and the National League for the Protection of Colored Women (founded in 1905) to form the National League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes. In 1920, the name was shortened to the National Urban League.

The interracial character of the League's board was set from its first days. Prof. Edwin R. A. Seligman of Columbia University, a leader in progressive social service activities in New York City, served as chairman from 1911 to 1913. Mrs. Baldwin took the post until 1915.

The fledgling organization counseled black migrants from the South, helped train black social workers and worked in various other ways to bring educational and employment opportunities to African Americans. Its research into the problems blacks faced in employment opportunities, recreation, housing, health and sanitation, and education spurred the League's quick growth. By the end of World War I the organization had 81 staff members working in 30 cities.

In 1918, Dr. Haynes was succeeded by Eugene Kinckle Jones, who would direct the agency until his retirement in 1941. Under his direction, the League significantly expanded its multifaceted campaign to crack the barriers to black employment, spurred first by the boom years of the 1920s, and then by the desperate years of the Great Depression. Efforts at reasoned persuasion were buttressed by boycotts against firms that refused to employ blacks, pressure on schools to expand vocational opportunities for young people, constant prodding of Washington officials to include blacks in New Deal recovery programs and a drive to get blacks into previously segregated labor unions.

As World War II loomed, Lester Granger, a seasoned League veteran and crusading newspaper columnist, was appointed Jones' successor.

Outspoken in his commitment to advancing opportunity for African Americans, Granger pushed tirelessly to integrate racist trade unions, and led the League's effort to support A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington Movement to fight discrimination in defense work and in the armed services. Under Granger, the League, through its own Industrial Relations Laboratory, had notable success in cracking the color bar in numerous defense plants. The nation's demand for civilian labor during the war also helped the organization press ahead with greater urgency its programs to train black youths for meaningful blue-collar employment. After the war those efforts expanded to persuading Fortune 500 companies to hold career conferences on the campuses of Negro colleges and place blacks in upper-echelon jobs.

Of equal importance to the League's own future sources of support, Granger avidly supported the organization of a volunteer auxiliary, the National Urban League Guild, which, under the leadership of Mollie Moon, became an important national force in its own right.

The explosion of the civil rights movement provoked a change for the League, personified by its new leader, Whitney M. Young, Jr., who became executive director in 1961. A social worker like his predecessors, he substantially expanded the League's fund-raising ability and, most critically, made the League a full partner in the Civil Rights movement. Indeed, although the League's tax-exempt status barred it from protest activities, it hosted at its New York headquarters the planning meetings of A. Philip Randolph, Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights leaders for the 1963 March on Washington. Young also was a forceful advocate for greater government and private-sector efforts to eradicate poverty. His call for a domestic Marshall Plan, a 10-point program designed to close the huge social and economic gap between black and white Americans, significantly influenced the discussion of the Johnson administration's War on Poverty legislation.

Young's tragic death in a 1971 drowning incident off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria, brought another change in leadership. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., formerly Executive Director of the United Negro College Fund, took over as the League's fifth Executive Director in 1972 (the title of the office was changed to President in 1977).

For the next decade, until his resignation in December 1981, Jordan skillfully guided the League to new heights of achievement. He oversaw a major expansion of its social service efforts, as the League became a significant conduit for the federal government to establish programs and deliver services to aid urban communities, and he brokered fresh initiatives in such League programs as housing, health, education and minority business development. Jordan also instituted a citizenship education program that helped increase the black vote and brought new programs to such areas as energy, the environment and non-traditional jobs for women of color. He also developed *The State of Black America* report.

In 1982, John E. Jacob, a former chief executive officer of the Washington, D.C., and San Diego affiliates who had served as Executive Vice President, took the reins of leadership, solidifying the League's internal structure and expanding its outreach even further.

Jacob established the Permanent Development Fund to increase the organization's financial stamina. In honor of Whitney Young, he established several programs to aid the development of those who work for and with the League: the Whitney M. Young, Jr. Training Center, to provide training and leadership development opportunities for both staff and volunteers; the Whitney M. Young, Jr. Race Relations Program, which recognizes affiliates doing exemplary work in race relations; and the Whitney M. Young, Jr. Commemoration Ceremony, which honors and pays tribute to long-term staff and volunteers who have made extraordinary contributions to the Urban League Movement.

Jacob established the League's NULITES youth-development program and spurred the League to put new emphasis on programs to reduce teenage pregnancy, help single female heads of households, combat crime in black communities and increase voter registration.

Hugh B. Price, appointed to the League's top office in July 1994, has taken its reins at a critical moment for the League, for Black America and for the nation as a whole. A fierce, market-driven dynamic described as globalization is sweeping the world, fundamentally altering economic relations among and within countries. In the United States that dynamic is reshaping the link between the nation's citizenry and its economy, and at least for the moment, is fostering enormous uncertainty among individuals and tensions among ethnic and cultural groups.

That economic change, and the efforts of some to roll back the gains African Americans have fashioned since the 1960s, have made the League's efforts all the more necessary. Price, a lawyer by training, with extensive experience in community development and other public policy issues, has intensified the organization's work in education and youth development; in individual and community-wide economic empowerment; and in the forceful advocacy of affirmative action and the promotion of inclusion as a critical foundation for securing America's future as a multiethnic democracy.

APPENDIX | II

African Americans Then and Now: A Statistical Overview

FAMILY INCOME, BY FIFTHS

TABLE NO. 1

In Constant $1997

AFRICAN AMERICANS	BOTTOM FIFTH	LOWER MIDDLE	UPPER MIDDLE	TOP FIFTH
1997	$11,396	$21,875	$36,052	$57,000
1993	8,886	17,827	30,814	51,651
1989	10,184	20,063	33,723	54,306
1981	10,115	18,526	30,372	47,712
1977	11,113	19,047	30,208	47,871
WHITES	**BOTTOM FIFTH**	**LOWER MIDDLE**	**UPPER MIDDLE**	**TOP FIFTH**
1997	$13,598	$30,316	$46,775	$67,787
1993	12,726	28,371	43,629	63,317
1989	14,111	30,900	46,523	65,858
1981	13,659	28,398	42,193	58,432
1977	14,189	29,233	42,700	58,064

See: http://www.census.gov

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME, BY TYPE OF FAMILY

TABLE NO. 2

In Constant $1997

	AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES			WHITE FAMILIES		
YEAR	ALL FAMILIES	MARRIED COUPLES	FEMALE HEADED	ALL FAMILIES	MARRIED COUPLES	FEMALE HEADED
1997	$28,602	$45,372	$16,879	$46,754	$52,098	$22,999
1993	23,927	39,118	13,228	43,652	48,511	22,215
1989	26,158	39,672	15,053	46,564	50,749	24,523
1981	23,631	34,957	13,371	41,892	45,378	22,281
1977	24,286	34,833	14,216	42,512	45,499	22,346

See: http://www.census.gov

SHARE OF FAMILIES BELOW THE POVERTY LINE, BY FAMILY TYPE

TABLE NO. 3

	AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES			WHITE FAMILIES		
YEAR	ALL FAMILIES	MARRIED COUPLES	FEMALE HEADED	ALL FAMILIES	MARRIED COUPLES	FEMALE HEADED
1997	30.5	9.0	46.9	13.0	6.7	37.6
1993	39.3	13.9	57.7	14.5	8.2	39.6
1989	35.4	13.3	53.9	11.8	6.5	36.1
1981	37.1	16.2	59.5	12.4	7.7	36.9
1977	34.2	14.1	57.5	9.6	5.5	33.8

See: http://www.census.gov

HOME OWNERSHIP RATES, ALL FAMILIES AND AFRICAN AMERICANS

TABLE NO. 4

YEAR	ALL U.S.	AFRICAN AMERICANS
1998	66.3	45.6
1994	64.0	42.3
1990	64.2	43.4
1980	64.4	44.4
1970	62.9	41.6

See: http://www.census.gov

HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETION RATES

TABLE NO. 5

YEAR	WHITES	AFRICAN AMERICANS
1998	83.7	76.0
1993	80.9	67.7
1989	78.4	64.6
1981	71.6	52.9
1977	67.0	45.5

See: http://www.census.gov

ENROLLMENT STATUS OF 16-24 YEAR OLDS

TABLE NO. 6

YEAR	AFRICAN AMERICANS		WHITES	
	HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS	ENROLLED IN/ OR FINISHED COLLEGE	HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS	ENROLLED IN/ OR FINISHED COLLEGE
1996	16.0	27.0	12.5	36.2
1993	16.4	24.5	12.7	34.5
1989	16.4	23.5	14.1	31.8
1981	21.7	19.9	14.7	26.7
1977	23.9	21.3	14.7	26.5

See: http://www.census.gov

ADULT MALE (OVER 20 YEARS OLD) UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

TABLE NO. 7

Annual Average

YEAR	AFRICAN AMERICANS	WHITES
1999 through May	6.1	3.1
1993	12.1	5.7
1989	10.0	3.9
1981	13.5	5.6
1977	10.7	4.6

See: http://www.bls.gov

Index of Authors and Articles, 1987–1999

In 1987, the National Urban League began publishing *The State of Black America* in a smaller typeset format, making it easier to catalog and archive various essays by author and article name.

The 1999 edition of *The State of Black America* is the sixth to contain an index of authors and articles since 1987. The articles have been divided by topic and are listed in the alphabetical order of their authors' names.

Reprints of articles are available through the National Urban League, 120 Wall Street, New York, New York 10005 (212-558-5316).

Index of Authors and Articles
The State of Black America: 1987-1999

Business

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APPENDIX | IV

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APPENDIX | V

Selected Tables from *The Shape of The River: Long-term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions.*

In 1998, William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, former presidents of Princeton University and Harvard University, respectively, published one of the most significant studies yet presented on the effects of affirmative action in higher education—and its importance to the educational advancement of African Americans. That book is *The Shape of The River: Long-term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions.*

Amid recent charges and fulminations against affirmative action policies, findings about the good they have achieved for African-American and Hispanic-American college graduates stand out like the beacon of a lighthouse, piercing the night fog. We present here just a few of the charts and tables that ground and illuminate this path-breaking study.

COMBINED SAT SCORE DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS TO FIVE SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 1

1989



Source: Admissions data provided by five College and Beyond institutions.

BLACK MATRICULANTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL MATRICULANTS AT FIVE SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS

TABLE NO. 2

Actual and Hypothetical Percentages, 1989



Source: Admissions data provided by five College and Beyond institutions.

Notes: "Actual" is the percentage of black matriculants in 1989; "Hypothetical-1" is computed by manipulating the number of black applicants by the white admissions probability and black yield within each SAT interval; "Hypothetical-2" substitutes the white yield for the black yield.

FIRST-SCHOOL AND OVERALL GRADUATION RATES, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 3

1989 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.
Notes: "First-School Graduation Rate" counts as graduates only those students who graduated within six years from the same school at which they matriculated as freshmen. "Overall Graduation Rate" also counts those who transferred from their first school and graduated elsewhere.

GRADUATION RATES BY COMBINED SAT SCORE AND RACE

TABLE NO. 4

1989 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.
Notes: Graduation rates are six-year first-school graduation rates, as defined in the notes to Figure 3.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES MAJORING IN SELECTED FIELDS, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 5

By Race, 1989 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.
Notes: Includes first-school graduates only.

MEAN PERCENTILE RANK IN CLASS BY COMBINED SAT SCORE AND RACE

TABLE NO. 6

1989 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES ATTAINING PROFESSIONAL OR DOCTORAL DEGREES, BY TYPE OF DEGREE AND RACE

TABLE NO. 7

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

PERCENTAGE OF PROFESSIONAL DEGREES FROM TOP-TIER INSTITUTIONS, BY TYPE OF DEGREE AND RACE

TABLE NO. 8

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: National Science Foundation National Institute of Health Surveys of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering, and College and Beyond.

Notes: "Black" and "White" refer to College and Beyond cohort only. "National" refers to percentage of all professional degrees that were conferred by top-tier institutions in 1985.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES ATTAINING ADVANCED DEGREES, BY COMBINED SAT SORE AND RACE

TABLE NO. 9

1976 Entering Cohort





Source: College and Beyond.

TABLE NO.10

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES ATTAINING ADVANCED DEGREES BY TYPE OF DEGREE, CLASS RANK AND RACE

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

TABLE NO.11

PERCENTAGE OF PROFESSIONAL DEGREES RECEIVED FROM TOP-TIER INSTITUTIONS, BY CLASS RANK AND RACE

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

MEAN EARNED INCOME IN 1995, BY RACE AND GENDER, COLLEGE AND BEYOND GRADUATES AND NATIONAL GRADUATES

TABLE NO. 12

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond and 1990 U.S. Census.

Notes: For College and Beyond graduates, mean earned income is derived from income ranges reported by full-time, full-year workers. For National graduates, the 1989 income of full-time, full-year workers aged 37 to 39 is converted to 1995 dollars.

MEAN EARNED INCOME IN 1995, BY INSTITUTIONAL SELECTIVITY, GENDER AND RACE

TABLE NO. 13

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

Notes: Earned income is derived from income ranges reported by full-time, full-year workers. "SEL-1," "SEL-2" and "SEL-3" indicate institutions for which the mean combined SAT scores were 1250 or more, between 1125 and 1249, and below 1125 respectively.

MEAN EARNED INCOME IN 1995, BY CLASS RANK, GENDER AND RACE

TABLE NO. 14

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

Notes: Earned income is derived from income ranges reported by full-time, full-year workers.

PERCENTAGE OF MATRICULANTS PARTICIPATING IN CIVIC ACTIVITIES IN 1995, BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY, RACE AND GENDER

TABLE NO. 15

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

TABLE NO. 16

PERCENTAGE OF MATRICULANTS LEADING CIVIC ACTIVITIES IN 1995, BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY, RACE AND GENDER

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

TABLE NO. 17

MEAN OWN EARNED INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1995, BY RACE AND GENDER, COLLEGE AND BEYOND GRADUATES AND NATIONAL GRADUATES

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond and 1990 U.S. Census.

Notes: "Other Income" includes spouse's income and other non-earned income. Household income is the sum of own earned income and other income (sum may not add up to total due to rounding).

PERCENTAGE OF MATRICULANTS "VERY SATISFIED" OR "SOMEWHAT SATISFIED" WITH LIFE, BY RACE AND GENDER

TABLE NO. 18

1976 Entering Cohort



Source: College and Beyond.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES "VERY SATISFIED" WITH COLLEGE, BY CLASS RANK AND RACE

TABLE NO. 19

1976 and 1989 Entering Cohorts



Source: College and Beyond.
Notes: "Graduates" refers to first-school graduates.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES WHO WISH THEY HAD SPENT MORE TIME ON SELECTED ACTIVITIES, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 20

1976 and 1989 Entering Cohorts





Source: College and Beyond.
Notes: "Graduates" refers to first-school graduates.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES WITH LOW SELF-RATINGS WHO BENEFITED FROM COLLEGE IN SELECTED AREAS, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 21

1976 Entering Cohorts



Source: College and Beyond and College Entrance Examinations Board.

Notes: Graduates with "low self-ratings" in a selected area are those who rated their ability below the top 10 percent of their peers on a pre-college questionnaire administered by the College Entrance Examination Board. "Graduates" refers to first-school graduates.

TABLE NO. 22

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES WHO CONSIDER SELECTED SKILLS "VERY IMPORTANT" IN THEIR LIVES, BY RACE

1976 and 1989 Entering Cohorts

	PERCENTAGE RATING SKILL "VERY IMPORTANT"			
	1976 ENTERING COHORT		1989 ENTERING COHORT	
ACADEMIC SKILLS	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Analytical skills	87	85	83	83
Ability to communicate well orally	79	68	78	69
Ability to write clearly and effectively	71	65	68	62
Knowledge of particular field/discipline	46	43	45	43
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS				
Ability to work independently	74	67	73	68
Ability to adapt to change	72	61	70	66
Leadership abilities	61	47	56	47
Ability to work cooperatively	56	50	61	58
Rapport with people holding different beliefs	53	45	60	56
Competitiveness	25	20	30	22
PERSONAL/SOCIAL SKILLS				
Ability to form and retain friendships	41	44	53	57
Religious values	41	21	36	18
Ability to relax and enjoy leisure	40	33	47	45
Active interest in community service	24	15	29	14

Source: College and Beyond.
Note: "Graduates" refers to first-school graduates.

PERCENTAGE OF GRADUATES WHO BELIEVE COLLEGE CONTRIBUTED "A GREAT DEAL" TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED SKILLS, BY RACE

TABLE NO. 23

1976 and 1989 Entering Cohorts

	PERCENTAGE WHO BELIEVE COLLEGE CONTRIBUTED "A GREAT DEAL"			
	1976 ENTERING COHORT		1989 ENTERING COHORT	
ACADEMIC SKILLS	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Analytical skills	45	41	50	47
Ability to communicate well orally	27	17	33	25
Ability to write clearly and effectively	39	33	48	40
Knowledge of particular field/discipline	29	29	41	37
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS				
Ability to work independently	42	36	42	40
Ability to adapt to change	26	17	38	30
Leadership abilities	19	12	27	23
Ability to work cooperatively	19	13	28	26
Rapport with people holding different beliefs	28	23	43	42
Competitiveness	29	20	29	24
PERSONAL/SOCIAL SKILLS				
Ability to form and retain friendships	24	27	37	4
Religious values	8	4	11	7
Ability to relax and enjoy leisure	11	12	23	26
Active interest in community service	10	4	24	13

Source: College and Beyond.
Note: "Graduates" refers to first-school graduates.

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